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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 41762

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District,
in and for the County of Nez Perce

HONORABLE CARL B KERRICK

SCOTT CHAPMAN
Attorney for Respondent
LEWISTON, ID

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, AG
Attorney for Appellant
BOISE, ID
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Date: 3/18/2014

Second Judicial District Court- Nez Perce County

Time: 11 :54 AM

ROA Report

User: BDAVENPORT

Case: CR-2013-0000676 Current Judge: Jeff P. Payne
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Defendant: Colvin, Gaylord Jay

State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin
Date

Code

User

1/29/2013

NEWI

IMPORT

New Case Filed, Citation Import

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

CRCO

TRISH

Criminal Complaint

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

AFPC

TRISH

Affidavit Of Probable Cause

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

HRSC

TRISH

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 01/29/2013
Greg K. Kalbfleisch
09:00AM) ***2nd Offense DUI NEEDS SEEN BY
JUDGE***

PROS

TRISH

Prosecutor Assigned Nicholas D Lepire

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

ARRN

MEENA

Arraignment I First Appearance

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

NORM

LEONA

Notification Of Rights-misdemeanor

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

CHJG

MEENA

Change Assigned Judge

Jay P. Gaskill

HRSC

MEENA

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial- County 02/12/2013 Jay P. Gaskill
10:15 AM)

PLEA

MEENA

A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (118-8004(1 )(a) Jay P. Gaskill
{M}{2} Driving Under the Influence-( Second
Offenses))

MEENA

Judge

Notice Of Hearing

Jay P. Gaskill

HRHD

MEENA

Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on
01/29/2013 09:00AM: Hearing Held ***2nd
Offense DUI NEEDS SEEN BY JUDGE***

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

BNDC

TRISH

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1420 Dated
1/29/2013 for 1000.00)

Jay P. Gaskill

BONV

TRISH

Bond Voided

Jay P. Gaskill

BNDS

TRISH

Bond Posted -Surety (Amount 1000.00)

Jay P. Gaskill

BONV

TRISH

Bond Voided

Jay P. Gaskill

BNDS

TRISH

Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 1000.00 )

Jay P. Gaskill

NOAP

JENNY

Notice Of Appearance

Jay P. Gaskill

ATTR

JENNY

Defendant: Colvin, Gaylord Jay Attorney Retained Jay P. Gaskill
Scott M Chapman

RQDD

JENNY

Request For Discovery-defendant

Jay P. Gaskill

2/6/2013

RSDP

JENNY

Response To Request For Discovery-plaintiff

Jay P. Gaskill

2/12/2013

PTMO

JANET

Pretrial Motion And Order

Jay P. Gaskill

CONT

JANET

Continued (Pretrial- County 03/05/2013 01:00
PM)

Jay P. Gaskill

2/1/2013

JANET
2/14/2013

2/20/2013

3/5/2013

Notice Of Hearing

Jay P. Gaskill

CHJG

MERILYNN

Change Assigned Judge

Jeff P. Payne

ORDR

MERT

Order- Appointing Judge

Jeff P. Payne

CONT

MERT

Continued (Pretrial- County 03/07/2013 11:30
AM) Special Set - Pretrial

Jeff P. Payne

MISC

MERT

Notice Of Hearing

Jeff P. Payne

BDAVENPORT

Petition Requesting Appointment of Special
Prosecutor

Jeff P. Payne
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Second Judicial District Court- Nez Perce County

Time: 11 :54 AM

ROA Report
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User: BDAVENPORT

Case: CR-2013-0000676 Current Judge: Jeff P. Payne
Defendant: Colvin, Gaylord Jay

State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin
Date

Code

User

Judge

3/6/2013

ORDR

BDAVENPORT Order for Appointment of Special Prosecutor

Jeff P. Payne

MCON

BDAVENPORT

Motion To Continue Pre-Trial Conference

Jeff P. Payne

AFFD

BDAVENPORT Affidavit in Support of Motion to Continue
Pre-Trial Conference

Jeff P. Payne

ORDR

BDAVENPORT

CONT

BDAVENPORT Continued (Pretrial - County 03/14/2013 02:00
PM) Special Set - Pretrial

3/13/2013

3/15/2013

Order to Continue Pre-Trial Conference

Jeff P. Payne
Jeff P. Payne

BDAVENPORT

Notice Of Hearing

Jeff P. Payne

PROS

BDAVENPORT

Prosecutor Assigned E Clayne Tyler

Jeff P. Payne

MOTN

BDAVENPORT

Motion-D

Jeff P. Payne

AFFD

BDAVENPORT Affidavit of Scott Chapman in Support of Pretrial
Motions

HRHD

BDAVENPORT

Hearing result for Pretrial- County scheduled on Jeff P. Payne
03/14/2013 02:00PM: Hearing Held Special Set
-Pretrial

HRSC

BDAVENPORT

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Motions 04/18/2013 Jeff P. Payne
10:00 AM)

HRSC

BDAVENPORT

Hearing Scheduled (Final Pretrial 05/21/2013
10:30 AM) telephonic-parties to call in to Idaho
Co

HRSC

BDAVENPORT

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/07/2013 08:30 Jeff P. Payne
AM)

BDAVENPORT

Notice Of Hearing

Jeff P. Payne

Jeff P. Payne

Jeff P. Payne

MISC

BDAVENPORT State's Witness and Exhibit List

Jeff P. Payne

RQDP

BDAVENPORT State's Request For Discovery and Demand for
Alibi-plaintiff

Jeff P. Payne

RSDP

BDAVENPORT State's Supplemental Response To Defendant's
Request For Discovery-plaintiff

Jeff P. Payne

MEMO

BDAVENPORT

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Pretrial
Motions

Jeff P. Payne

RSDD

BDAVENPORT

Response To Request For Discovery-defendant

Jeff P. Payne

.. 4/17/2013

MEMO

BDAVENPORT States Memorandum in Objection to Defendant's Jeff P. Payne
Pretrial Motions

4/18/2013

HRHD

BDAVENPORT

Hearing result for Pretrial Motions scheduled on
04/18/2013 10:00 AM: Hearing Held

Jeff P. Payne

MINE

BDAVENPORT

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Pretrial Motions
Hearing date: 4/18/2013
Time: 10:05 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: none
Minutes Clerk: Brittany Davenport
Tape Number: crtrm4
Defense Attorney: Scott Chapman
Prosecutor: E Tyler

Jeff P. Payne

4/8/2013

4/12/2013
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Date: 3/18/2014

Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County

Time: 11:54AM

ROA Report

User: BDAVENPORT

Case: CR-2013-0000676 Current Judge: Jeff P. Payne
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Defendant: Colvin, Gaylord Jay

State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin
Date

Code

User

4/22/2013

MISC

BDAVENPORT

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Regarding Pretrial Motions

Jeff P. Payne

ORDR

BDAVENPORT

Order Regarding Pretrial Motions

Jeff P. Payne

HRHD

BDAVENPORT

Hearing result for Final Pretrial scheduled on
05/21/2013 10:30 AM: Hearing Held
telephonic-parties to call in to Idaho Co

Jeff P. Payne

HRVC

BDAVENPORT

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
06/07/2013 08:30AM: Hearing Vacated

Jeff P. Payne

HRSC

BDAVENPORT

Hearing Scheduled (Change of Plea &
Sentencing 06/05/2013 09:00AM)

Jeff P. Payne

5/22/2013

BDAVENPORT
6/5/2013

7/11/2013

Judge

Notice Of Hearing

Jeff P. Payne

CONT

BDAVENPORT

Hearing result for Change of Plea & Sentencing
Jeff P. Payne
scheduled on 06/05/2013 09:00AM: Continued
Judge Payne & Tyler to appear telephonically,
Chapman and Colvin in person

HRSC

BDAVENPORT

Hearing Scheduled (Change of Plea &
Sentencing 07/11/2013 08:30AM) Tyler to
appear telephonic

Jeff P. Payne

BDAVENPORT

Notice Of Hearing

Jeff P. Payne

MISC

BDAVENPORT

Rule 11 Agreement

Jeff P. Payne

HRHD

BDAVENPORT

Hearing result for Change of Plea & Sentencing
scheduled on 07/11/2013 08:30AM: Hearing
Held Tyler to appear telephonic

Jeff P. Payne

NOPE

BDAVENPORT

Notification Of Subsequent Penalties

Jeff P. Payne

AMCO

BDAVENPORT Amended Complaint Filed (118-8004 {M} Driving
Under the Influence)

Jeff P. Payne

REDU

BDAVENPORT

Charge Reduced Or Amended

Jeff P. Payne

GLTY

BDAVENPORT

Guilty Plea Or Admission Of Guilt (118-8004 {M}
Driving Under the Influence)

Jeff P. Payne

STAT

BDAVENPORT

Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk
action

Jeff P. Payne

SNIC

BDAVENPORT

Sentenced To Incarceration (118-8004 {M} Driving Jeff P. Payne
Under the Influence) Confinement terms: Jail:
120 days. Suspended jail: 105 days.

PROB

BDAVENPORT

Probation Ordered (118-8004 {M} Driving Under
the Influence) Probation term: 2 years.
(Unsupervised)-stayed pending appeal

Jeff P. Payne
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ROAReport

User: BDAVENPORT

Case: CR-2013-0000676 Current Judge: Jeff P. Payne
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Defendant: Colvin, Gaylord Jay

State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin
Date

Code

User

7/11/2013

MINE

BDAVENPORT

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Change of Plea & Sentencing
Hearing date: 7/11/2013
Time: 8:35am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: none
Minutes Clerk: Brittany Davenport
Tape Number:
Defense Attorney: Scott Chapman
Prosecutor: E Tyler

Jeff P. Payne

JDMT

BDAVENPORT

Judgment

Jeff P. Payne

BVEX

BDAVENPORT Surety Bond Converted I Exonerated (Amount
1,000.00)

Jeff P. Payne

JDMT

BDAVENPORT Amended Judgment

Jeff P. Payne

ORDR

BDAVENPORT

Order Staying Judgment

Jeff P. Payne

NTAP

DEANNA

Notice Of Appeal

Jeff P. Payne

APDC

DEANNA

Appeal Filed In District Court

Jeff P. Payne

CHJG

DEANNA

Change Assigned Judge

Jeff M. Brudie

BNDC

DEANNA

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 11252 Dated
7/15/2013 for 150.00)

Jeff M. Brudie

BONC

DEANNA

Condition of Bond Reporter's Transcript

Jeff M. Brudie

ORDQ

JANET

Order Regarding Disqualification of Judge
(Brudie)

Jeff M. Brudie

TRAN

PAM

Transcript Filed

Jeff M. Brudie

BNDC

DEANNA

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 11769 Dated
7/23/2013 for 22.25)

Jeff M. Brudie

BONC

DEANNA

Condition of Bond Balance due for Reporter's
Transcript

Jeff M. Brudie

BNDO

DEANNA

Bond Converted to Other Party (Transaction
number 1210 dated 7/23/2013 amount 150.00)

Jeff M. Brudie

BNDO

DEANNA

Bond Converted to Other Party (Transaction
number 1211 dated 7/23/2013 amount 22.25)

Jeff M. Brudie

ORAJ

JENNY

Order Assigning Judge (Kerrick)

Jeff M. Brudie

CHJG

JENNY

Change Assigned Judge

Carl B. Kerrick

ORDR

JENNY

Order Scheduling Briefs And Argument

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 11/19/2013
11:00 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

9/12/2013

BRFD

JENNY

Appellant's Brief

Carl B. Kerrick

10/16/2013

BRFD

JENNY

Respondent's Brief

Carl B. Kerrick

7/12/2013

7/15/2013

7/19/2013

7/23/2013

7/30/2013

8/2/2013

Judge

5

Date: 3/18/2014

Second Judicial District Court- Nez Perce County

Time: 11:54AM

ROA Report

User: BDAVENPORT

Case: CR-2013-0000676 Current Judge: Jeff P. Payne
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Defendant: Colvin, Gaylord Jay

State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin
Date

Code

User

11/19/2013

MINE

JENNY

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Oral Argument
Hearing date: 11/19/2013
Time: 11:01 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Linda Carlton
Minutes Clerk: JENNY
Tape Number: CTRM #1
Defense Attorney: Scott Chapman
Prosecutor: E Tyler

Carl B. Kerrick

DCHH

JENNY

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Linda Carlton
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

Carl B. Kerrick

ADVS

JENNY

Hearing result for Oral Argument scheduled on
11/19/2013 11:00 AM: Case Taken Under
Advisement

Carl B. Kerrick

OPOR

JENNY

Appellate Opinion & Order

Carl B. Kerrick

RMAN

JENNY

Remanded To Magistrate Court

Carl B. Kerrick

CHJG

JENNY

Change Assigned Judge

Jeff P. Payne

NTAP

BDAVENPORT

Notice Of Appeal

Jeff P. Payne

MERT

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Jeff P. Payne
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
Mia Carlson Receipt number: 0000526 Dated:
1/9/2014 Amount: $16.00 (Credit card)

MERT

Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost- CC
Paid by: Mia Carlson Receipt number: 0000526
Dated: 1/9/2014 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card)

12/18/2013

1/7/2014
1/9/2014

Judge

Jeff P. Payne
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Idaho State Police- Unh~--~--m-C-it_a_t-io_n__
In the court designated below the undersigned certifies that he/she has
J·ust and reasonable grounds to believe and does believe that on:
Citation #:

s-IG_N_A_T-UR_E_ _ _ -~---·-·---------------,

-1

1hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on[X]01/28/2013
Signature of Officer: - - ' i.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Officer Name:J TALBOTT
Officer ID:3431
Agency Name: IDAHO STATE POLICE

ISP0205648
Date/Time: 01/28/2013

11:07 PM

Witness:
Address:
Department:

DR#: L13000111

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
2ND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE

~~~;E~~~ANH~_PERCt R1 3 -

0 0 67 6

)viOLATOR
Last Name: COLVIN
MI
DOB
First Name: GAYLORD
Phone
Hm. Address:3131 4TH ST D
Cty, St, Zip: LEWISTON, ID 8350100000
. Height: 509 Weight: 175 Sex: M Eyes: BRO
Hair: BRO
DL#
DL State:ID Lie. Expires:2016
Class:D
16+ Persons: N
GVWR 26001+:N
Hazmat:N
Commercial vehicle driven by this driver: N
Bus. Name:
Bus. Addr:
Bus. Phone:

I REGISTRATION

Veh. Lie#: N164008
Yr. Veh: 1992
Make: TOYT
Model: SR5
Color: WHI
Style: PK
VIN: JT4RN01 P6N0028137
Carrier US DOT #:

I OFFICER NOTES

READ CAREFULLY
This is a MISDEMEANOR charge in which:
NOTE: If you fail to appear within the time allowed for your
appearance, another charge of failure to appear may be filed
and a warrant may be issued for your arrest.

1.
2.
3.

State:ID

4.

I LOCATION
Upon a Public Street or Highway or Other Location Namely:
SOUTHBOUND 5TH ST NEAR STEWART AVE

I VIOLATIONS
Did commit the following Offense(s), In violation of State Statute,
Infraction Citation: N
Misdemeanor Citation: Y
Posted Speed:
Observed Speed:
Accident: N
Date/Time:01/28/2013 10:24 PM

Serial#:

5.

You may be represented by a lawyer, which will be at your
expense unless the judge finds you are indigent.
You are entitled to a trial by jury if requested by you.
PLEA OF NOT GUlLTY: You may plead not guilty to the
charge by appearing before the clerk of the court or the
judge, within the time allowed for your appearance, at which
time you will be given a trial date.
PLEA OF GUlLTY: You may plead guilty to the charge by
going to the clerk of the court, within the time allowed for your
appearance, at which time you will be told if you can pay a
fixed fine or whether it will be necessary for you to appear
before the judge;
OR
You may have your fine determined by a judge at a time
arranged with the clerk of the court, within the time allowed
for your appearance.
You may call the clerk of the court to determine if you can
sign a plea of guilty and pay the fine and costs by mail.
I plead guilty to the charges.

Violation #1: 118-8004{1){a) {M}{2}
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUEN E {SECOND OFFENSE WITHIN 10
YEARS)- BRAC .123/.134- PRIO 4/7/11
Violation #2:

Defendant (if authorized by clerk of magistrate court)
MAIL TO:
NEZ PERCE COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT
PO BOX896
LEWISTON, ID 83501

COURT INFORMATR»J
~
NEZ PERCE COUNT
AGISTRATE COURT
~
0
1230 MAIN STREET c--.!
LEWISTON, ID 83501
Fine #1: MUST APPEAR
Fine #2:
(208) 799-3043
Court Date: 02/15/2013
Fine #3:
Court Time: 08:30 AM
Fine #4:
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Departmental Report # L 1~ooo 111

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 2ND JUDICIAL DIS~~TrO~THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JimzlJ!JtRCE

znn JRN zg

Rfl

s ss

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

COLVIN, Gaylord Jay
Defendant.
DOB
SSN/DL:
State: Idaho

State of Idaho,
County of NEZ PERCE
I, Senior Trooper Jeffory R. Talbott the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes
and says that:
1. I am a peace officer employed by the Idaho State Police.

2. The defendant was arrested on January 28, 2013 at 2257 hours for the crime of driving while
under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances (2nd offense)
pursuant to Idaho code section 18-8005(4). Second or more DUI offense in the last ten years?
Yes - Misdemeanor
Other Offenses:
3. Location of Occurrence: Southbound 5th St. near Stewart Ave., Lewiston, Nez Perce
County, Idaho

4. Identified the defendant as: COLVIN, Gaylord Jay by: Driver's License
5. Actual physical control established by: Observation By Affiant
6. I believe that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed such crime because
·of the following facts:
(NOTE: You must state the source of all information provided below. State what you observed
and what you learned from someone else, identifying that person):

Page 1 of 3
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Departmental Report# L1:5000111
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR STOP AND ARREST:
On January 28, 2013, approximately 2224 hours, I, Senior Trooper Jeffory R. Talbott of
the Idaho State Police (ISP), stopped a white colored, 1992, Toyota SRS (Idaho registration
N164008) for failure to signal when merging (merged from the right lane into the left lane
without signaling) southbound on 5th St. near Stewart Ave., Lewiston, Nez Perce County,
Idaho. I could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle and
noticed the driver's eyes were bloodshot. The driver identified himself as Gaylord Jay
COLVIN (date of birth
with his Idaho Driver's License. COLVIN admitted to
consuming alcohol prior to driving (two beers). After running a driver's check, I asked
COLVIN to exit the vehicle to perform the standardized field sobriety evaluations.
COLVIN performed and failed the evaluations (See AIR). I detained COLVIN for breath
samples. After listening to the ALS advisory and after the mandatory fifteen minute
waiting period, COLVIN provided two breath samples on the Life Loc FC20. During the
mandatory fifteen minute w·aiting period I remained in close proximity to COLVIN with
nothing between us. I did not hear or see him burp, belch, or vomit. His results were
.123/.134 BrAC. I arrested COLVIN for DUI. The ISP Regional Communications Center
advised me COLVIN had a prior DUI on 4/7/2011. I transported him to the Nez Perce
County Jail. COLVIN was booked into the Nez Perce County Jail for driving while under
the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances (2nd offense) pursuant
to Idaho code section 18-8005(4).

Video: Arbitrator
D.U. I. NOTES
Odor of alcoholic beverage: Yes
Admitted drinking alcoholic beverage: Yes
Slurred speech: No
Impaired memory: No
Glassy/bloodshot eyes: Yes

Sobriety Tests-Meets Decision Points?
Gaze Nystagmus: Yes
Walk & Turn: Yes
One Leg Stand: Yes
Crash Involved: No Injury: No

Other:
Drugs Suspected: No Drug Recognition Evaluation Performed: No
Reason Drugs are Suspected:
Prior to being offered the test, the defendant was substantially informed of the consequences of
refusal and failure of the test as required by Section 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code.
Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances. The
test(s) was/were performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-8004 (4), Idaho Code, and
the standards and methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement.
Breath Instrument Type: Life Loc FC20
BrAC: .123/.134
Name of person administering breath test: Jeffory R. Talbott
Date Certification Expires: 11/30/2014

Serial# 90205678

Videotape # Arbitrator

Page 2 of 3
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Departmental Report# Ll...,OOOlll

By my signature and in the presence of a person authorized to administer Oaths in the State of
Idaho, I hereby solemnly swear that the information contained in this document and attached
reports and documents that may be included herein is true and correct to the best of my
information and belief.

/

4

/

~

t

/

~

n-

Signed: _ __.l.C~~=/""_,/'1__,..--;""--"l-=-i,;..:;_/+-/_ _ _--,~-/_·-"e1"""~d~4
" --r=~~=-=-------'-~,;.::.1--~f_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(
- ~
(affiant)
1

Subscribed and sworn to me on

DI

/-zcr j '"Z e 13

-----~---+~,~~(~~-me-)~~------

~,4-C ---.~

NOTARY PUBLIC~O

Residing at:

k~ (S""ro N ( ::t:D .

My Commission expires:

OWER

~

the~

Based upon the above Affidavit, the Court hereby fmds that
Probable Cause to believe that a crime or crimes has been commi
and that the Defendant committed said crime or crime/
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L I3

CJt.:CJ

tII

Idaho State Police
INFLUENCE REPORT

Contacts [

] Yes

Glasses

[ vfNo

Eyes tracking ~qually [ vrYes [ ] No
HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS
EYES

PRE-TEST
] Yes [v(No
Remove Gl"asses [ ]
FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS
ADDITIONAL SOBRIETY TESTS

~~
~
L.::J

Eye does not pursue smoothly

0

[Zf

Distinct Nystagmus at max. deviation

[2r

0

Nystagmus onset before 45 degrees

0

I

TOTAL

VERTICAL NYSTAGMUS
PUPIL SIZE

DYes
CONSTRICTED [ ]

GrNo
NORMAL [ /

DILATED [

WALK~.9TURN

LJ

Cannot keep balance during instructi,ons

NYSTAGMUS
2
3
4

0

5

6

0

D
D
C2r

,r---+---,_---r---+--_,--~r-~

Starts too soon

2
Stops too soon

WALK 3

Misses heel to toe

TURN 5

[~(

Steps off line

g

Raises arms

D
D

r---+---~--~---+~~----~~

AND 4 r---+---,_---r---+-'-_,~---t------7'1
6r---+---~--~---+--~--~~~

7

sr---+-~;---~---+---1----r-~

Wrong number of steps
Improper turn
D

OBSERVATIONS
Eye Color

i3 tt..D

Eye Condition 3Lo?o -

.:>.d-t;> r

Speech _________

Cannot do test

'-/ I

Total

Foot Wear t3;Z.a;.~.h-J

l20zvrt::o's. Ground Surface ______________

ONE~STAND

L.:::J

Sways

G2(

Raises arms

D
D

Hops

CHEMICAL TEST

c=z(
C:=J

Puts foot down

D

Cannot do test
Total

Audio Tape

y

N

Video Tape

{J)

N

D

Breath

C:=J

Other

Test Result

Blood
."

le23 /1.3''-(-

Refused test, Why?-------------------------------

Office~Sig~a~re~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~;~k=d~~~-~·t~A~,~t--------------~ D~e--~t~-~~~~~~~~~t-~~---------
EH 07 05-01

(

REV. 1/07
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lr

Instrument Operations Log

90205678 - LE#61464

Instrument Serial Number:

Idaho State Police

Agency:

:This log should contain all of the evidentiary testing results for the instrument indicated by the serial number listed above.
Date

tlvtff\~

(~---13'-l

. ,:)o

;.~/ ~~

0'73""1

!0"?\

~/ct,) ?3

c:n31

,f)":.?

\

,;:.,

Subject•s Name

Time

lz.~J11 42W.CJ

:1!

.:: t

/.--;c~/;,1

OIL I

?.u.

~fl.·"

1\....{. (y,..j

·f...'tor0

{!\:..LUiJI/
t

~e?.l.~

\ .::.;_ I

n(~,4f.>

.I)J

1

, o··;b

I()")(.,.,

<'

IJ.\...).
?-0~

; I[].-~

G.::.<'H LC,:iLO

?_0,

.o~

Operator•s Name

Test Results

: t_.)'')

"-•

~\-- ((,_,.

·f'

't ~ r2. •

_:r.

,j 3~

b

.Q~)
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Page 1 of 1

8IP0112372928-JAN-2013 22:25:1600ILETS Reply
001/28/2013 23:24
DIP0112 Message Received From DMV
KR.IDISP0320.DMV .*MRI9234960.TXT
OLN/KA121401J
PAGE 01 FOR OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION PURPOSES ONLY
MAY BE THE SAME AS:
PRIVACY FLAG.
OLN/KA121401J.
** OPR STATUS/VALID.
NAM/COLVIN, GAYLORD JAY.
** CDL STATUS/NOT LICENSED.
RES/
CLASS/D.
** EXP/07-14-2016.
3131 4TH ST D
OLT/DRIVER LICENSE.
ID 83501.
LEWISTON
TRANSACTION/DUPLICATE.
END/MCY.
SEX/M. HAI/BRO. EYE/BRO.
ISS/07-08-2011. REC/350111890023. CNTY/NEZP.
HGT/509. WGT/175.
AKA OLN/518171362.
AKA OLS/ID.
CITN/10-27-2006C.
10-20-2006A.BASIC RULE.
ISP.LEWIS.
ORD DEGREE/INFR.
CITN/04-07-2011 WHJD.01-17-2011A.DUI.
CTY.LEWISTON.
ORD DEGREE/MISD.
ADDITIONAL LICENSE TYPES CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE ...
PAGE 02 FOR OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION PURPOSES ONLY
MAY BE THE SAME AS:
***** IDAHO IDENTIFICATION CARD ONLY - NOT A DRIVERS LICENSE *****
PRIVACY FLAG.
OLN/KA121401J.
ID
CARD
STATUS/VALID.
NAM/COLVIN, GAYLORD JAY.
RES/
** EXP/07-14-2015.
3131 4TH ST D
OLT/IDENTIFICATION CARD.
ID 83501.
LEWISTON

SEX/M. HAI/BRO. EYE/BRO.
HGT/509. WGT/175.
AKA OLN/518171362.
END OF RECORD
END OF MESSAGE ...

ISS/01-24-2011. REC/350110240025. CNTY/NEZP.
AKA OLS/ID.

MRI 9234962 IN: DMVI01 18985 AT 2013-01-28 23:24:51
OUT: ISPC 6087 AT 2013-01-28 23:24:51
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http://1 0.2.192.129/PRD? 41/Html/SystemDocs/CADinterface.aspx?MVIEW+Message:M...

1/28/2013

Page 1 of 1

8IP0112372928-JAN-2013 22:57:58DDILETS Reply
001/28/2013 23:57
DIP0112 Message Received From NCIC
NL0100CF,MRI9236642I
NL0100CF,MRI9236642
IDISP0320
NO IDENTIFIABLE RECORD IN THE NCIC INTERSTATE IDENTIFICATION INDEX
(III) FOR NAM/COLVIN,GAYLORD J.SEX/M.RAC/U.DO
PUR/C.
END
MRI 9236643 IN: NCIC 16606 AT 2013-01-28 23:57:37
OUT: ISPC 6162 AT 2013-01-28 23:57:37
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http://10.2.192.129/PRD741/Html!SystemDocs/CADinterface.aspx?MVIEW+Message:M...

1128/2013

for Failure of
Testing
(Advisory for Sections 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code)

lTD 3814 (Rev. 01-12)
Supply# 019680909

Mailing Address

State
1
,l .::=~~_;;; c:~::_;;

/ /../.
City

State

Zip

(~·l ~

~~

Fi:

Citation#

Operating CMV?

License Class
_/

D Yes El No
D Yes ~;a~i\Jo

Transporting Hazmat?

1. I have reasonable grounds to believe that you were driving or were in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol, dtugs, or other intoxicating substances. You are required by law to take one or more evidentiary test( s) to determine the
concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in your body. After submitting to the test(s) you
may, when practical, at your own expense, have additional test(s) made by a person of your own choosing. You do not have the
right to talk to a lawyer before taking any evidentiary test(s) to determine the alcohol concentration or presence of drugs or other
intoxicating s~_l?stances in your body.
2. If you refuse to take or complete anY. of the offered tests pursuant to Section 18-8002, Idaho Code:
A. You are subject to a civil penalty of two hundred fifty dollars ($250).
for a
B. You have the right to submit a written request within seven (7) days to the Magistrate Court of
hearing to show cause why you refused to submit to or complete evidentiary testing and why your driver's license should not be
suspended.
C. If you do not request a hearing or do not prevail at the hearing, the court will sustain the civil penalty and your license will be
suspended with absolutely no driving privileges for one (1) year if this is your first refusal; and two (2) years if this is your
.second refusal within ten (1 0) years.
3. If you take and fail the evidentiary test(s) pursuant to Section 18-8002A, Idaho Code:
A. I will serve you with this NOTICE OF SUSPENSION that becon1es effective thirty (30) days from the date of service on this
notice suspending your driver's license or driving privileges. If this is your first failure of an evidentiary test within the last five
(5) years, your driver's license or driving privileges will be suspended for ninety (90) days with absolutely no driving privileges
of any kind during the first thirty (30) days. You tnay request restricted non-commercial driving privileges for the remaining
sixty ( 60) days of the suspension. Restricted driving privileges will not allow you to operate a commercial motor vehicle. If this
is not your first failure of an evidentiary test within the last five (5) years, your driver's license or driving privileges will be
suspended for one (1) year with absolutely no driving privileges of any kind during that period.
B. You have the right to an administrative hearing on the suspension before the Idaho Transportation Department to show cause
why you failed the evidentiary test and why your driver's license should not be suspended. The request must be made in writing
and received by the department within seven (7) calendar days from the date of service on this NOTICE OF SUSPENSION.
You also have the right to judicial review of the Hearing Officer's decision.
4. If you are admitted to a problem solving court program and have served at least forty-five (45) days of an absolute suspension of
driving privileges, you may be eligible for a restricted permit for the purpose of getting to and from work, school, or an alcohol
treatment program.

If you have failed the evidentiary
test(s), your driving privileges are hereby suspended per #3 above,
commencing thirty (30) days from the date of service on this notice.
If a blood or urine test was administered, the department may serve a

Notice of Suspension upon receipt of the test results .
. ._-..,,"",,. .-.,..,"' for Failure or Refusal
the Court. Please refer

White Copy- If failure- to lTD; if refusal- to Court

Yellow Copy- to Law Enforcement

Pink Copy - to Court

Goldenrod Copy- to Driver

15

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

TRAFFIC COURT- SPECIAL
ARRAIGNMENT

9:00a.m.

JUDGE:
Greg Kalbfleisch
CLERK: Meena Cole
COURTROOM: 2
DATE: 1/29/13

BE IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT:
ARRAIGNMENT- DEF. PRESENT
NAME: _ ____:G::::..::a=.z-yl=o=-=rd=-=-J=..<ay---'C=-.:::o:...:...;lv:..=in-=------D.O.B.: _ _ _0:::::.....!7..:.....:11::......:.4.:.....:::11~97..:......;4:....___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
CASE NUMBER: _
CHARGE(S):

___;;C~R=1.=:;_3-....;:;_0.;;_:67~6_ _ _ _ _ _ __

SECOND OFFENSE DUI

Defendant is advised of rights, charges and penalties.

TRAFFIC COURT MINUTES

16

IN THE DISTRIC ~ COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

vs.

_j e.

1 Co \~:v

)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Defendant, )

FlLED

NO.

~f? fS- ~l3f~ 29 RP1 8 59

~l~~Z?~R~~T

The purpose of the initial appearance is to advise you of your rights and the charge(s) against you.

•

You have the right to be represented by an attorney at all times.

•

If you want an attorney, but cannot pay for one, the court may appoint one to help you. You
may be ordered to reimburse Nez Perce County for the cost of your defense.

•

You have the right to remain silent. Any statement you make could be used against you.

•

You have the right to bail.

•

If you plead not guilty, you can have a trial before a judge or jury of six people.

•

You can cross-examine all witnesses who testify against you.

•

You may present evidence, testify yourself if you wish, and have witnesses ordered to testify
by subpoena.

•

If you plead guilty, you waive your right to a trial, your right to remain silent, and your right
to confront witnesses against you. If you wish to make a statement before you are sentenced,
you may do so. You can appeal the court's sentence by filing a timely Notice of Appeal.

If you have any questions about the charge(s), about your rights, or about the court process, don't
hesitate to speak up. It is important that you understand.

Acknowledgement of Rights
I have read this entire document, and I understand these rights as set forth above.

Date

i /zc:; J l3
I

I

Defendant's Signature

----:72~-·
_t':_. ._·_____

~£
//

waives right to public defender at this time

17

Moneysaver Printshop 35475

St~:=?::Pnd Judicial District Court, State ofJ1::3ho

In and For the County of Nez Perc\.
1230 Main St.
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

F\LE

STATE OF IDAHO,

/

vs.

Plaintiffl313

Gaylord Jay Colvin,

JRN 29 Hrl 11

)
)

no

))

PATTY 0. WEEKS

)

WUiY

)

Case No: CR-2013-0000676

<,cl.ERK or m.xJo1JC~lcir:Y/~

Defendant .
~...:

NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Pretrial - County
Judge:

Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:15 AM
Jay P. Gaskill

at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho.

i.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Tuesday,
January 29, 2013.
Defendant:

Gaylord Jay Colvin
3131 4th St D
Lewiston, ID 8350100000
Mailed__

Hand Delivered_ _x_

Private Counsel:

Prosecutor:

Mailed__

Hand Delivered _ _

Mailed__

Hand Delivered_x_

Nicholas D Lepire

Dated: Tuesday, January 29, 2013
Patty 0. Weeks
Clerk Of The District Court

By:

~Qy~~
DOC22 7/96

NOTICE OF HEARING

18

,l~:::N~~~:s~~~~~~~-TO:

B~ INSURANCE CO.
P .0. Box 33015
St.. :Petersburg,
Florida 33733-8015.
.
.

~>.o. Box 33615
St. Petersburg, Florida 33733-8015
AND
4-NTHONY WILLIAMS
ABOVE ALL BAIL BONDS
.3123 9th Street, Lewiston, lD 83501

vs.

That we,

--:---

.'> c.

ffo C

0

}

I

as Principaland BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

I) • "'-...

as surety (Identified by attached ower of Attorney No.): :;-r;: /;(3 9 r?

'2 3.3>

are held and firmly

__

~-_3.

b~und unto t~~ • 5> ~ Court, · /;:; <--0,' 5 7<....__ City, i-"'-.. ~- Co~nty, ~
intbesurnof /C~'CJD z~-~~-~"~--~
Dollars,forthepayment~-er~ofweJJ,andtrulytobemade
/.
.

"'""'····

. we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, su~~essors and assigns~ jointly and severally firmly .~Y these presents.

c·ce:--

.----:;---

Signed and sealed tws·-~____,.~--Z=-··...L..1.-.:·----- day of _ _ _ _ _ _..:::~:::..--~
_ _:::_·_ _ _ _ _ _ ___,. A.D. 20
The condition of this obligation i• such tbatifthe said

--:5'~ C 0 JtJ i ...,

shall appear at tbe next regular or special term of the j/1---., ':> -~
/
'
v

/.12 --~ ·, S -:--o--.....
.,__T) ~ J::.

Court

-

l3
'orincipal,

(Na~e)

·

(Loeation) to be held in ~nd for said _County to answer a charge of

::J::?.a 0~.:2s-6l! &"- andshallappearfrom dayt~daya~r.d. term t-O term of

v
said Court and not depart the same without leave then this obligation is void, otherwise to remain in fun force and effect•.
Taken before and approv-ed by me:

{L!S.f
; j
1.,_.

-~(L.S.) ·
i) ..

THIS BOND NOTVALID UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BY AN INDIVIDUALLY NUMBERED POWER OF ATIORNEY PROPERLY EXECUTED, Olt !F
MORE THAN ONE (1} POWER OF AT£0RNEY IS AIT~CHED.

NOTE: TUIS IS AN APPEARANCE BOND AND CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS A GUARANTEE FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE PAYMENTS, BACK
ALIMONY PAYMENTS, FINES OR WAGE CLAIMS, NOR CAN IT BE USED AS A BOND ON APPEAL.
-----------~-------------------~------------------------------------

MOTION AND ORDER: TO EXONERATE BOND

PLEASE MAIL FORM TO:

Anthony Williams
ABOV.E ALL BAIL BONDS

BOND NO. ________________________________________

3123 9th Street

Lewiston, ID 83501
This is tocertify that I have examined the records of
the court and found the Jiability of BANKERS

INSURANCE CO. for the bond shown witb
corresponding puwer number was .terminated on:

DEFEND.ANT

------------------~-------------------

~OUNT$ ______________~--------------------------DATE~STED

__________________________________~--

CHARGE __________________________________________

Court _______________..;._________
J~Y---,-------------{Seal)
Signature of Clerk or o1her officer of the Court

CASENO. ___________________________~----------

19

;x -Enhanced DUI (2nd OffenstiJ
_Excessive DUI (.20 or Higher)

Gc>-{[ lbn~ Lc, ttJ~
Date:

-I) B ~ /[}o I 3

--~~------~~----~~--

NEZ PERCE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Your bond is your guarantee to appear in court. You_ will be required to appear at theNez
Perce County Courthouse for further proceedings regarding your case.
You are required to appear

I

La:. 9 Lf).o 13

{

\

at 9:00am. Should you fail

(

to appear as required, a warrant will be issued for your arrest.

Deputy Sheriff

NOTE: THE POSTING OF A BOND DOES NOT CLOSE A CASE.
I hereby certify that I have read the above notice, and I agree to appear as directed.

20

'~-
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Fll

2

ZD13 FEB 1 PrJ 2 OS

3
4

5

6
7
8

9

10

SCOTT CHAPMAN
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1106 Idaho Street
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-1234
Idaho State Bar No. 3467

11

12

13

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

14
15

STATE OF IDAHO,

16

Plaintiff,

17

18

Case No.: CR13-676

vs.
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,

19
20

Defendant.

21
22
23

24
25

Take notice Scott Chapman, of Chapman Law Offices, PLLC, makes an
appearance on behalf of the above-named defendant, in the above-entitled
matter.

26
27
28

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

1

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

21

1
2

Defendant hereby requests the Court set this matter for a pre-trial

3

4

conference.

5

DATED this

J$1' day of February, 2013.

6

7
8

9

10
11
12

13

I HEREBY CERTIFY that
a true and correct copy
of the fQregoing was on
this_/~_ day of February, 2013,

14
15
16
17

18

_J!_

Mailed
Hand Delivered
Faxed
Messenger

to the following:

19
20
21
22
23

Nicholas Lepire
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

24
25

26
27
28

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

2

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

22

I

-~~ ----~~~~----------------

~-~-:-:-:-:-:-:-:.,:-:.:-:-::-:-:-::-::-=-:-,:,:-:-:-:c:-:-:-::o;:

E-:-:.;:.·.:-:.;:.·.---.-.---,-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-~-:-;;

i

_]

.:--~..:-.:-.::.-..::-:.-:-:-::.._-..:-.:.-::.-::.-:.-:.-.:.-:--::...:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::---------.....

-

1

Z013 FEB 1 Pen~ I ?... Ur~a

3

5

6
7
8

1..--..-..---..-.,::·------~--...-...-..."'-:-:-.::-:::-:--,:..:..;:-:-:-~ ~.:-:-:-..:-=-=--~

FJ LE

2

4

~=-..::--:.-:--...- ...- ...-.._-..,_---.,. -..---..._-...- --~-----.: ------~---:.._-;_-..:_-.:~

SCOTT CHAPMAN
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1106 Idaho Street
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-1234
Idaho State Bar No. 3467

9

10
11

12
13

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

14

16

Case No.:

Plaintiff,

15

CR13-676

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

vs.

17
18
19
20

GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
Defendant.
COMES NOW, Scott Chapman, attorney for the above-named defendant,

21
22

and requests discovery from the Prosecuting Attorney pursuant to Idaho

23

Criminal Rule 16(b), for disclosure of evidence by the prosecution as follows:

24

I.

25
26
27

The defendant be apprised of and/or be permitted to copy, inspect, or
photograph: (a) any relevant written or recorded statements made by the

28

defendant in the above-entitled matter, or copies thereof; (b) the substance of

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

1

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

23

1-:-:-:-:-------------

-

~------1

"-- ------------------"- .,..._._m-

--

~--

______ ,

-

~--

------------------------

-

·----

_...,

-

~---------

----------

-

---

~-------------------------------

-

. ______________________________

-;

1

2

any oral relevant statements made by the defendant whether before or after

3

4

5
6

defendant's arrest, to any peace officer or prosecuting official, or agents thereof;
and (c) substance of any oral relevant statement made by the defendant to
defendant's counsel, whether made before or after defendant's arrest, including

7
8

9

statements made during any court proceedings.
Said statements shall include those in the possession, control, or custody

10
11
12

13

of the plaintiff, as well as those which by the exercise of due diligence would be
available to plaintiff. Recorded statements are meant to include transcriptions of
statements recorded stenographically, mechanically, electronically, or otherwise

14
15

and whether rriade in person to the plaintiff or its agents or transmitted to them

16

telephonically and/or by any other electronic device, with or without the consent

17
18

and/or knowledge of the defendant.
II.

19
20

The plaintiff be required to furnish to defendant a copy of defendant's

21
22

prior criminal record, if any, as is now or may through the exercise of due

23

diligence become known to the plaintiff.

24

III.

25
26
27

The defendant be permitted to inspect and copy or photograph books,
papers, documents, photographs, and tangible objects which are in the

28

possession, custody or control of the plaintiff or its agents, and which are

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

2

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC ·
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

24

1

2

material to the preparation of defendant's defense, or which may be used by the

3

4

plaintiff as evidence at trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
IV.

5
6

The defendant be apprised of and be permitted to copy, inspect, or

7

8

photograph the results of or reports on any scientific tests or experiments made

9

in connection with this case.

10

v.

11

12
13

The plaintiff be required to furnish to defendant a written list of names,
current addresses, and telephone numbers of all persons having knowledge of

14
15

the facts relevant to this matter, who may be called by the plaintiff as witnesses

16

at trial, together with the record of any prior felony convictions of such persons,

17
18
19

whether said record be in the knowledge of the plaintiff or its agents or available
to it by the exercise of due diligence.

20

VI.

21

22

Pursuant to Rule 16 (b)(7) of the Idaho Criminal Rules a written summary

23

or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce pursuant to Rules

24

25
26
27

702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or hearing.

The

summary provided must describe the witness's opinions, the facts and data for
those opinions, and the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of expert opinions

28

regarding mental health shall also comply with the requirements of I.C. § 18-

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

3

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

25

1

2

207.

3

VII.

4
5
6

The defendant be apprised of all evidence in the possession of the plaintiff
and its agents, exculpatory of the defendant or in mitigation.

7

VIII.

8
9

The defendant be apprised of the repair records and any journal of use for

10
11
12
13

the life of the intoximeter used, if any. A copy of the log sheet for the breath
testing devices used, or which would have been used, to test the Defendant's
blood alcohol, which log sheet should reflect all testing administered thirty (30)

14
15

days before and after the Defendant's test; a copy of the COBRA download data

16

for the breath testing device used in this case for the same time period of thirty

17
18
19
20

(30) days before and after the Defendant's test or, if your response is made less
than thirty days after the Defendant's test, then COBRA data up through the date
of your response.

21

IX.

22
23

The plaintiff be required to furnish to defendant all evidence discoverable

24
25

26
27

under Brady vs. Maryland, 373 U.S. 82, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 82 Sup. Ct. 1104
(1963).
Defendant further requests that the State of Idaho continue to respond to

28

this Request for Discovery in compliance with Idaho Criminal Rule 16(i),

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

4

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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2

requiring a continuing duty to disclose.

3

DATED this/ §:1- day of February, 2013.

4

:~:~S,PLLC

5

6
7

8
9

10
11

I HEREBY_CERTIFY
a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was on
this }~day of February, 2013,

12
13
14
15

16

)(

Mailed
Hand Delivered
Faxed
Messenger

to the following:

17
18
19
20

Nicholas Lepire
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

21
22

23
24
25

26
27
28

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY .
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Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

27

•-·~

.,.·,. ..... .,-;,

DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney

F\LED

NICHOLAS D. LEPIRE
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
I.S.B.N. 8461
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

CASE NO. CR2013-0000676

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY

vs.
JAY COLVIN,
A.K.A.: GAYLORD J. COLVIN,
Defendant.

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT AND COUNSEL:
COMES NOW, the State in the above-entitled matter, and submits the following
Response to Request for Discovery.
The State has complied with such req~est by providing the following:

1.

Any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or

copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of
which is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due
diligence; and also the substance of any relevant, oral statement made by the
defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace officer, prosecuting attorney, or
the prosecuting attorney's agent have been disclosed, made available, or are attached
hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B."

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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28
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2.

Any written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the substance

of any relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant whether before or after arrest
in response to interrogation by any person known by the co-defendant to be a peace
officer or agent of the prosecuting attorney, have been disclosed, made available, or
are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B. 11
3.

Defendant's prior criminal record, if any, has been disclosed, made

available, or is attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B."
4.

Any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings,

or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are in the possession, custody, or
control of the prosecuting attorney and which are material to the preparation of the
defense or intended for use by the prosecutor as evidence at trial or obtained from or
belonging to the defendant have been disclosed, made available, or are attached
hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B. 11
5.

Any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of

scientific tests or experiments, made in connection with the particular case, or copies
thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecuting attorney, the
existence of which is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise
of due diligence have been disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set
forth in Exhibit "B."
6.

A written list of the names and addresses of all persons having

knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial is
set forth in Exhibit "A." Any record of prior felony convictions of any such persons
which is within the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney and all statements made by
the prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses to the prosecuting

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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attorney or the prosecuting attorney's agents or to any official involved in the
investigatory process of the case have been disclosed, made available, or are attached
hereto as set forth in Exhibit "A.
7.

II

Any reports and memoranda in possession of the prosecuting attorney

which were made by any police officer or investigator in connection with this
investigation or prosecution of this case have been disclosed, made available, or are
attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B.
8.

II

All material or information within the prosecuting attorney's possession

or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or
which would tend to reduce the punishment therefore have been disclosed, made
available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B.

II

In addition, with regard

to material or information which may be exculpatory as used or interpreted, the State
requests that the defendant inform the State, in writing, of the defense which will be
asserted in this case, so counsel for the State can determine if any additional material
or information may be material to the defense, and thus fulfill its duty under I.C.R.
16(a) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9.

Wherever this Response indicates that certain evidence or materials have

been disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B, 11 such
indication should not be construed as confirmation that such evidence or materials
exist, but simply as an indication that if such evidence or materials exist, they have
been disclosed or made available to the defendant. Furthermore, any items which are
listed in Exhibit "B 11 but are not specifically provided, or which are referred to in
documents which are listed

in

Exhibit "B, 11 are available for inspection upon

appointment with the Prosecuting Attorney's Office.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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10.

The State reserves the right to supplement any and all sections of this

response if and when more information becomes available.
11.

The State objects to requests by the defendant for anything not

addressed above on the grounds that such requests are outside the scope AND/OR are
irrelevant under I.C.R. 16.
DATED this

~

day of February 2013.

it~

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of
the foregoing RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY was
(1)

hand delivered, or

(2)

hand delivered via court basket, or

(3)

sent via facsimile, or

( 4)

mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United
States Mail.

ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Scott M. Chapman
Chapman Law Office, PLLC
P.O. Box 446
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

-·~ .J.
tf:.fl/'-·
DATED this . /
day of February 2013.

S ENA SAVAGE
Legal Assistant

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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EXHIBIT "A"
LIST OF WITNESSES
STATE OF IDAHO vs. JAY COLVIN
NEZ PERCE COUNTY CASE NO. CR2013-0000676

1.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:
2.

NAME:
ADDRESS:
PHONE:

JEFFORY R. TALBOTT
Idaho State Police
2700 N&S Hwy
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 799-5151
BART M. JARRETT
3533 6th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208} 790-2277

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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EXHIBIT "B"
LIST OF REPORTS
STATE OF IDAHO vs. JAY COLVIN
NEZ PERCE COUNTY CASE NO. CR2013-0000676

1.

Copy of Citation, page 1.

2.

Copy of Idaho State Police Incident Report, pages 2-8.

3.

Copy of Report Concerning Reason for Arrest, page 9.

4.

Copy of Defendant's Driver's License and Registration, page 10.

5.

Copy of Detailed Call History, pages 11-12.

6.

Copy of Criminal History, pages 13-15.

7.

Copy of Driving History, pages 16-22.

8.

Copy of Notice of Suspension, pages 23-24.

9.

Copy of Idaho State Police Influence Report, pages 25-26.

10.

Copy of Instrument Operations Log, page 27.

11.

Copy of Lifeloc Printout, page 28.

12.

One (1) DVD: containing one (1) AVViewer video.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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SF:-- ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF T - HO
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
PRETRIAL MOTION, ORDER, AND JUDGMENT
THE STATE OF IDAHO

vs. JAY COLVIN

ADDRESS: 3131 4th Street D Lewiston, ID 83501
D.O.B.:
D.L.N.:
S.S.N.:
I.

07/14/1974
KA121401J
XXX-XX-1362

CASE NO. CR20 13-0000676

TICKET NO.: ~t!3blbol}:i1i\
AGENCY:
Idarlo sfathbiice

lUl3 FEB 12 PPl 2 36

PATIY 0. WEEF.S
CLER4..,0F
T,Hf:t.DJ~T. COURJ
The prosecutor or defendant moves the Court as follows:

.-

C{/L-lrU~

I ftlefCt).lf(

( ) For a bench warrant; defendant failed to appear.
DEPUTY
( ) bond set at $_ _ __
( ) any existing bond forfeited.
( ) For default judgment; defendant failed to appear.
( ) To amend the charge to a violation of Idaho Code _ _ _ __
p6 To set this matter on
, at
for: S' (,.o<.;"='t:J:1"
K) continuance ( ) with waiver of speedy trial ( ) trial by ( ) court or by ( ) jury
( ) To dlsmiss the chrage in the interests of justice.
( ) Posted bond of$
be forfeited and the case closed.
( ) I waive my right to a jury trial.
( ) Quash the bench warrant and re-set for pretrial.
II.

Defendant understands the consequences of a guilty plea:
(X) The plea is voluntary. (X) Defendant has been informed of maximum and minimum penalties.
(X) Defendant waives the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to
confront witnesses against he/she. (X) Defendant has been informed of the nature of the charge. (X) NO promises
have been made other than the plea bargaining agreement set out below. (X) Defendant understands that this
court IS NOT bound by the agreement. (X) Defendant gives up the right to appeal the judgment. (X) Defendant
understands that he/she has the right against compulsory self-incrimination during any court ordered evaluation.
MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE GIVEN TO ME AT ARRAIGNMENT. I UNDERSTAND THOSE RIGHTS
AND GIVE THEM UP. I PLEAD GUILTY TO THE CHARGE(S) SET FORTH ABOVE. I ADMIT TO THE TRUTH
OF THE ALLEGATIONS AND AGREE TO THE RECOMMENDED SENTENCE.

III.

Plea Bargain and/or RECOMMENDED sentence:

( ) Fine $__/$ _ _ suspended ( ) Jail__/_ _ suspended ( ) Community Service _ _ _ __
() P r o b a t i o n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - With the following recommendations:
( ) Report to the Probation Department withint 48 hours of today's date.
( ) Commit no Crime.
( ) Sign a probation agreement and abide by all the terms and conditions of that Agreement.
( ) Notify the Court, in writing, of any change of address.
( ) Obtain alcohol evaluation.
( ) Refuse no evidentiary test for the presence of drugs or alcohol.
( ) No Contact Order as term of probation.
( ) Driver's License Suspension _ _ _ _ _ __
( ) Restitution to be paid in the sum of$
to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Restitution to be paid in monthly installments of$
month beginning
and
To be paid in full on or before end of defendant's probationary period. Restitution to be paid to the
Nez Perce County Clerk of the Court, P.O. Box 896, Lewiston, ID 83501, or at the window on the
second floor of the Nez Perce County Courthouse in the form of a money order and/or cashier check.
( )

No Contact Order vacated. ( ) No Contact Order remains in effect w i t h - - - - - - - - - - - - -

91' OTHER:

Cf::..,_,.

('a.-.Jfl.

w( J&..JC,

c~.16:'--

DATED '2 -f'Z-r"?
DEFENSE ATTORNEY _ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED

---------./~::'t____.__.}.__"'-----='\-:':J-1---

DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE..------------

PROSECUTOR~

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

c

-

~a-=
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S~~ond

Judicial District Court, State of Idaho
In and For the County of Nez Perc
1230 Main St.
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

lD13 FEB 12

Plaintiff,
vs.

PATTY 0. WEEKS
. , CLE~·~~ 0
f r.r;rn,....
r: r ~fc~.~. r; 110. _1
(J h ';
.
fi'V0'
c,'·f, • ~v_,_XO,''
{A '-("
DtPUTY
J
K.

Gaylord Jay Colvin,

v:- . ,

Defendant.

Case No: CR-2013-0000676

NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Pretrial - County
Judge:

Tuesday, March 05, 2013
Jay P. Gaskill

01:00PM

at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Tuesday,
February 12, 2013.
Defendant:

Private Counsel:

Prosecutor:

Gaylord Jay Colvin
3131 4th St D
Lewiston, ID 8350100000
Mailed

-----Hand Delivered _ _

Scott M Chapman
P.O. Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

Delivere~

Mailed_ _

Hand

Mailed__

Hand Delivered _ _

Nicholas D Lepire

-

Dated: Tuesday, February 12, 2013
Patty 0. Weeks
Clerk Of The District Court

By:

~L

Depycleli
DOC22 7/96

NOTICE OF HEARING

36

/

i

)··· . '' Fn

·

IN THE DIS1RICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRifT OFTHE'STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF lbtf{{f-y~ PP) J 02
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,

Defendant.
___________________________
)
The Honorable JeffP. Payne is hereby appointed to preside over this matter.
DATED this

\4+---day of February, 2013.

I hereby certify that on this
was delivered to the following:
__

_Li_

day of February, 2013, a true copy of the foregoing

__

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

~Valley Messenger Service

__

Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Nick Lepire
County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

ORDER APPOINTING JUDGE

U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

~Valley Messenger Service

Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Scott Chapman
Attorney At Law
P.O. Box446
Lewiston, ID 83501

1
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Serond Judicial District Court, State of lrf~ho
1 and For the County of Nez Perce
1230 Main St.
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

Fl LE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

2013 FEB 20 Ar1 11 L.\8

vs.

PATTY 0.
CLERK OF

Gaylord Jay Colvin,

'fiE~

Case No: CR-2013-0000676

~~

)
)
)

Defendant.

NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Pretrial - County
Judge:

Thursday, March 07, 2013
Jeff P. Payne

11 :30 AM

at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday,
February 20, 2013.
Defendant:

Private Counsel:

Gaylord Jay Colvin
3131 4th St D
Lewiston, ID 83501 00000 /
Mailed
Scott M Chapman
P.O. Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
Mailed

Prosecutor:

Hand Delivered_ _

j

Hand Delivered _ _

Nicholas D Lepire
Mailed_ _

Hand Delivered

I

Dated: Wednesday. February 20. 2013
Patty 0. VVeeks
Clerk Of The District ,curt
By:

NOTICE OF HEARING
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
I.S. B. N. 2923

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
CASE NO.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.

ctZ-13 -0 0f.l7 (,

PETITION REQUESTING
APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR

JAY COLVIN,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Daniel L. Spickler, Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce County,
State of Idaho, in cooperation with the Court under Idaho Code §31-2603(a), and by
this instrument, and Petitions this Court for the appointment of E. Clayne Tyler,
Clearwater County Prosecutor, and/or his designee, as Special Prosecutor to assume
the duties of Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney in the above-entitled case, to act
with all the power as the Prosecutor for Nez Perce County. This appointment is
requested on the grounds that Jay Colvin is a prior Deputy Sheriff with the Nez
PETITION REQUESTING APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
-1-
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Perce County Sheriff's Office, therefore a conflict of interest exists. E. Clayne Tyler,
and/or his designee, has agreed to proceed with criminal charges if warranted in this
matter.
day of March 2013.

DATED this

/)

/"

lJ!~~~

DANIELL. SPICKLER?'
Prosecuting Attorney

STATE OF IDAHO

)
ss.

County of Nez Perce

)

'-~ day of March 2013, before me, a Notary Public for Idaho,
On this ~
appeared Daniel L. Spickler, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed
to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

N6tary Publidfbr the State of Idaho
Residing at: t!ewiston, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 03/18/2016

PETITION REQUESTING APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
-2-
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy
of the foregoing PETITION REQUESTING APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
was
(1)

hand delivered, or

(2)

hand delivered via court basket, or
sent via facsimile, or

(3)
.

(4)

\_./

//
mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the
United States Mail.

ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
E. Clayne Tyler
Clearwater County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 2627
Orofino, ID 83544
DATED this

11~~ ~

day of March 2013.

~;f(Acurytafu

SHELLY L. p~MATO
Executive Senior Legal Assistant

PETITION REQUESTING APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
-3-
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QEPUTY
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

CASE NO.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.

l_.z \3 ... ()0 ti7 (.,

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

JAY COLVIN,
Defendant.

HAVING REVIEWED the Petition Requesting Appointment of Special Prosecutor
in this matter, and being fully advised, I hereby find that there is good cause for the
appointment of a Special Prosecutor in this matter; now, therefore
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that E. Clayne Tyler, Clearwater County Prosecutor,
and/or his designee, is hereby appointed as Nez Perce County Special Prosecutor
under the provisions of Idaho Code §31-2603(a). The Special Prosecutor shall assume
the duties of Nez Perce County Prosecutor in the above matter, to act with full power
as a Deputy Prosecutor for Nez Perce County.
DATED this

.s-"""'-

day of March 2013.

JUDGE

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

-1-
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____ I

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER FOR
APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, was

V"
__ hand delivered, or

(1) _ _

(2) _ _ _ _ hand delivered via court basket, or
(3) _ _ _ _ sent via facsimile, or
( 4)
mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the
United States mail, addressed to the following:

uf.-

E. Clayne Tyler .... 11\(J..A'{
Ciearwater County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 2627
Orofino, ID 83544
Daniel L. Spickler
Nez Perce County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
DATED

this~ day of March 2013.

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

-2-
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Fax Server
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E. CLAYr~E T\'l..ER,: ISBN 5277
Ptos·ecuting Attorney
C-cn.tRd:y of. Clea.n'rat{6.t
"Post Office Box 2fD27
l)rof.Bno~ Idaho 83544-2627
l'dephone: (_208) 416-56)11
·Fa~: C~Q~f) 47![~~97lU

IN TI-lE IHSTRICT COURT Ofi' Tli.E- SECOf~D J UtHClAL .DftS'fJI.-{JCT OJf
TllE STATE OF JDAHOj IN ANU !FOR THE COUNTY OF NJi2Z }iiERCE
STATE OF lDAlHJ,

G,~-\:YLORD

,J. (:OLVIN!t

)
)

CASE NO. Clt 2U13-0U676

}

l'VtOT.ft:O:r~

)
}
)
)

TO COIYTKNUE
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

J
)

------~--~---)
CO.YvfES NO'V the State of Idaho, by and tl'u·ough E. Clayr1e Tyler, Si:tec.i.a1 Prosecuting
Attorney for 1"J.e'? P.erce C..ou.nty ~ and hereby n.1.ove.s: .the Court tor .an Order Continuing ·the Pre~

trial Conference currently: scheduled for I\1arch 7~ 2013 at 11:30 <:un.
This Ivfotion is sttppotted by the Afl:1da.vit of E. Claync Tyl~r tiled co.ncvrrenJly -hs;re:\yith.
DATED t._h.is //./'l.d11y ofM.arch. 2:013.

E. CL(}Y'NE TYLER
Pto.situting. Attonlt-:;y

J\10TJON TO

COh~D\lJE
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CER'I'IFIGATE OF DELlv'"ERY
The undersigned hert;by- certifies that a tn1e and conecl t.:~t!py of-the foregolr1g wa:1
to the foll.o>vving .on this ( !:&td.ay of l\1arch. 2013.

f~l.ict:d

~·cott Chap1nan
CHAPl'vfAN LAW OFFTCES, PLLC
PO Box 446
LeYviston, ID 83501

By5j~~:L c:~>~~;·~~ . . .;,.~"'~".
' Slliiron Haines
Pata1egal

lVfOTION TO CONTll\fUE

2
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E. CLAYNE TYLER

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
CLEAR,VATER COUNTY
P.O. BOX2627

OROFINO, IDAIIO 83544
208-476-5611
FAX (208)476-8989
DEPUTY: LORIM. GILMORE

FAX COVER SHEET
To:
Attn:

Nez Perce County District Comi
Brittany Davenpmt

Fax:
Fr01n:
Subject:
Date:
Pages:
cc:
Fax:

208-799-3058

Sharon Haines
State vs. G. Colvin
tv1arch 6; 2013
7, including cover
Scott Chapman
208-743-1266

iv1ESSAGE:
Enclosed for filing please fmd the Niotion, Affidavit, and Order to Continue the pre.-trial
conference scheduled for March 7, 2013.
Also, could you provide 1ne with a copy of the Court file on this case. ·"'.rc have only received a
copy of the "Investigative File.

Thank you,
Sharon ·Haines

** ** * ***** *** *** *** ** ** **** ** ** W ARN"ING ** * ** * * * * * * * * ~'<--:1<* * *** ·k>'< *~r}r ·k *~~ *•': *~' ir >'rYr~'<
This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed anrJ
may contain information that is privileged, confidential, and exen1pt from disclosure under
applic,able law. If you have received Lhis fax in etTor please contact this office immedialely.
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E. CLA YNE TYLER: ISBN 5277
J>rosecuting Attorney
County of Clearwater
Post Office Box 2627
Orofino, Idaho 83544-2627
Telephone: (208) 476-5611
Fax: (208) 476-9710

Deputy: Lori Gilmore, ISBN: 5877

IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.

GAYLORD J. COLVIN,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CR 2013-00676

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO CONTINUE

PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

--------------------------~)
STATE OF IDAHO

County of Clearwater

)
)ss.
)

E. Clayne Tyler, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the State of Idaho, hereby st·ates as

follows:
Your affiant ·was appointed as Special Prosecuting Attorney to handle the above-

captioned case on March 5, 2013 .
. That on March 6, 2013, your affiant received notice that a pre-trial conference -vvus
scheduled for Thursday, March 7, 2013 at 11 :30 a.m.
7

That your affiant has previously scheduled court requb:ernents and therefore rcsricctfully
moves the Court for an Order continuing the pre-trial conference to a date convenient wiih the

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF lviOTION TO CONTINUE
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Court and Com.tsel..
/

.~-'",.~~t..':·

DATED tl:iis: /~:~---~~-·day oflVIru:ch, 2013.

_____ ___------------

-------·-··

::.:

.....

-···.-~--··

E. CLAYl'JE TYLER
Pros.ccutitig AttornE:y

/,.,.,...-....,..•.,\

t .,

~,,_;'~)LL--=~~~"""''·14---Not.ar)T Public jn mHJ fbr Idaho
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i~t:zcd

Sc:-oU Chapman
CHAPiv1AN Li\.w.~ OFFICES, PLLC
PO B'.Jx.446
Lewiston~ TD 83501

By~:f.:::~:\~21-tJt
~'if-)
Hair,es -...,...
·
·-s11~it'on

.Paraleg~iiJ

AFFIDAVIT

ll~

S'CJPPORT OF l\,10TION TO CONTlJ--:JU.H

48

a;

2013 10:08:42 AM

PAG~

7

08

Fax

Se}."V~r

E. c:L.ll'll1\TI~ "I''lllJtR~ ISBN 5277
Pr-osecuting Atio.tney
Ccfr.-:-.f.Jflty of Cleaff·water
1)o;$t OffL::!) Bo:x 262'7
Ort{}Hr.w, Idaho 83544 ...2627
T~~e:}?1Mrno: (2-0g) t~76-56U
'l'fi!.)t.:: (208) 4;7'6,..9110

It~

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
~rJIE STATE OF IDA.l:IO~ IN AND FOR Tim CO"Ur\'r"fY OF NEZ PER.CE
)

CASE NO. CR2013-00676

)

)
)
)

ORDER. TO CONTINUE
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

)

)
)
)
·-~--w~•-•·~·----------.J)

BA.S:SD up on th<; r.aotion. and supportlni affidavit fl.led in thls nlattcr I'f IS IIERRUY

Th·) Final Pre-tti~ Conference scheduled in 1hls matter for the 7111 day of March~ 2013 1 h
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'
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Judicial District Court, State of" t:=:lho
In and For the County of Nez PercL
1230 Main St.
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No: CR-2013-0000676

Gaylord Jay Colvin,

NOTICE OF HEARING

Defendant.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Pretrial - County
Judge:

Thursday, March 14, 2013
Jeff P. Payne

02:00PM

at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday,
March 06, 2013.
Defendant:

Private Counsel:

Gaylord Jay Colvin
3131 4th St D
Lewiston, ID 83501 00000
Mailed__

Hand Delivered_ _

Scott M Chapman
P.O. Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
Mailed__

Hand Delivered_x_

Prosecutor:

_x_
Dated: Wednesday. Mar.cR:Q~3
Pa~ekS
/

4~ourt

By:
Deputy'®----:/7
DOC22 7/96

NOTICE OF HEARING
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

SCOTT CHAPMAN
.CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1106 Idaho Street
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-1234
Idaho State Bar# 3467

10
11
12
13

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

14

Plaintiff,

15
16

Case No.: CR13-676

vs.

MOTION

17
18
19
20

GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
Defendant.
COMES NOW the defendant by and through his attorney of record, Scott

21
22
23

Chapman, and makes the following pre-trial motions:
1.

For an order suppressing any and all evidence obtained as a result

24
25
26
27

of the "stop of the defendant's vehicle and/or seizure of his person" based upon
a lack of reasonable suspicion to stop, probable cause to arrest and further to
suppress any and all statements made subsequent to the "arrest" and prior to

28

advising the defendant of various constitutional rights for the reasons and on the

MOTION

1

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

52

___ I

I
1
2

grounds the stop and/or arrest of the defendant was without a reasonable or

3
4
5
6

articulable suspicion and lack probable cause in violation of Article I Sections
13 and 17 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho, the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States of America.

7
8
9

2.

For an Order to exclude any comment and/or reference and/or

questions regarding information and/or responses given to questioning by law

10
11
12
13

enforcement agent( s) based upon the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution as well as Article 1 Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution.
3.

To exclude any evidence of "prior bad acts", including but not

14
15

necessarily limited to, prior convictions if any, pursuant to Rules 402, 403,

16

404(b ), 608, and 609 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

17
18
19
20
21

4.

To require the state establish, outside the presence of the jury,

adequate foundation for any opinion and/or expert evidence pursuant to Rule
702 and 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence and to further prevent the State

22

from mentioning any said opinion( s) and/or expert evidence until the requisite

23

foundational requirements are met.

(See also, Rule 16(b)(7) of the Idaho

24
25
26
27
28

Criminal Rules).
5.

To exclude witnesses pursuant to Rule 615(a) of the Idaho Rules of

Evidence so they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses and further
request the Court to admonish any witnesses who have testified to not discuss

MOTION

2

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

53

II

!.

1

2

their testimony with other witnesses and if any witnesses remain In the

3
4

5
6

courtroom, they shall be barred from further testimony.
This motion is based upon records and files herein, the affidavit of Scott
Chapman, and evidence to be adduced at hearing.

7
8

DATED this I Ziay of March, 2013.

9

CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

MOTION

3

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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It
1
2
3
4

I HEREBY CERTIFY that
a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was on
this J3 day of March, 2013,

5

6
7
8
9

_K_

Mailed
Hand Delivered
Faxed JDR l./7t;-x9!9
Messenger

to the following:

10
11

12
13

E. Clayne Tyler
Prosecuting Attorney
Clearwater County
Post Office Box 262 7
Orofino, ID 83544

14
15
16

17
18 .
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

MOTION

4

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTOFNEYS AT LAW
PostOffice Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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1

2
3

4

5

6
7
8

9

10

SCOTT CHAPMAN
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1106 Idaho Street
P.O. Box446
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1234
Idaho State Bar# 3467

11

12
13

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

14

STATE OF IDAHO,

15

Plaintiff,

16
17
18

Case No.: CR13-676

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT CHAPMAN
IN SUPPORT OF PRETRIAL
MOTIONS

GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,

19
20

21

Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO

. 22

23

24
25

County of Nez Perce

)
: ss .
)

SCOTT CHAPMAN, being first and duly sworn on his oath, deposes and
states that:

26
27

1.

He is the attorney for the above-named defendant.

28

2.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is the Police Report (narrative)

AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT CHAPMAN
IN SUPPORT OF PRETRIAL MOTION

1

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

56

1

2

of Jeffory R. Talbott, an investigating officer in the above-entitled matter.

3

3.

4
5
6

The above referenced document is a true and accurate copy of the

original constitute official court documents in the above-entitled matter and/or
are capable of judicial notice and/or are investigative reports by police and other

7
8

law enforcement personnel offered by the accused in a criminal case.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

9

10

DATED this

11

I~ day of March, 2013.

12
13
14
15

16
17

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

\3

day of March,

2013.

18
19

c

Notary Public for the State of Idaho
Residing at:
0 I)~ t±O\ rb
My Commission Expires: g~2;3-tJ

20

£

21

22
23
24

25
26
27

28

AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT CHAPMAN
IN SUPPORT OF PRETRIAL MOTION

2

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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1

2
3
4

I HEREBY CERTIFY that
a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was on
this I~ day of March, 20 13,

5

6
7
8
9

-X-

Mailed
Hand Delivered
Faxed do-? L}l~--gg
Messenger

gq

to the following:

10
11
12
13

E. Clayne Tyler
Prosecuting Attorney
Clearwater County
Post Office Box 2627
Orofino, ID 83 544

14
15

---

16

17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT CHAPMAN
IN SUPPORT OF PRETRIAL MOTION

3

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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State v. Colvin
CR13-676
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L13000111

Incident Report
IDAHO STATE POLICE

Supplement No

ORIG

Reported Date

01/28/2013
Nature of eaa

DUI.
Officer

TALBOTT I JEFFORY R

On January 28, 2013, approximately 2224 hours, I, Senior Trooper Jeffory R. Talbott of the
Idaho State Police, stopped a white colored, 1992, Toyota SR5 {Idaho registration N164008) for
failure to signal when merging (merged from the right lane into the left lane without signaling)
southbound on 5th St. near Stewart Ave., Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. I subsequently
arrested the driver, identified as Gaylord Jay COLVIN (date of birth: 7/14/1974) by his ld.aho
Driver's License, for driving under the influence (DUI) second offense. COLVIN provided breath
samples on the Life Loc FC20. His results were .123/.134 BrAG. The vehicle was released to
lillian K. DAVIS (date of birth:
I transported COLVIN to the Nez Perce County jail
~here .he was incarcerated. T
op and arrest was recorded on the Arbitrator video
·system, file 062231.AV.

Rep;Jrt Officer

Printed At

3431/TALBOTT,JEFFORY R

02/04/2013 09:34
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Incident Report
IDAHO STATE POLICE

L13000111

Supplement No

ORJ:G

(jailed)

1. On January 28, 2013, approximately 2224 hours, I, Senior Trooper Jeffery R. Talbott of the
Idaho State Police (ISP), was traveling south on 5th St. approaching Stewart Ave., Lewiston,
Nez Perce County, Idaho. The weather was cool and cloudy with a light rain falling. The
·roadway was wet, clear of any obstructions and partially illuminated by streetlights. I was in a
;marked ISP patrol vehicle and I .was in uniform.·
2. As I was traveling, I witnessed a white colored pickup traveling south in front of me. As I was
behind the pickup, it appeared to be weaving in its lane and traveling 30 Miles per Hour (MPH)
in the posted 35 MPH zone. The pickup th~n activated its right hand turn signal and moved into
the right hand lane as we passed a traffic sign indicating the ri.ght hand lane was ending. The
pickup then continued south and merged back· to the left in front of me without signaling. I
activated my vehicle's overhead emergency equipment and the .pickup began to slow. The
pickup passed Stewart Ave., pulled to the right and stopped. I could see the rear license plate
Printed M.

02/04/2013 09:34

Page 2 of 4
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Narrative

Supplement No

L13000111

Incident Report
IDAHO STATE POLICE

OlUG

1

:

was Idaho N164008 and two occupants inside.
3. I contacted the driver, a male, and explained the reason for the stop. The driver stated he
moved to the right. I could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the
vehicle and noticed the driver's eyes were bloodshot. The driver handed me an Idaho driver's
license identifying himself as Gaylord Jay COLVIN (date of birth:
I recognized the
driver as an off-duty Nez-perce-eounty-Sheriffs-f)eputy;-·1he-should-know-abou\--signaling when merging and asked if he forgot about signaling, he stated his clutch was going
out of his pickup and that he didn't want to stall me. I asked for his vehicle registration and proof
of insurance. I asked Mr. COLVIN where he was coming from, he stated "I left downtown
and?". I asked where at downtown, he stated "I had a beer at the barn. I asked if it was just the
one drink, he stated ''Yes sir". While retrieving his paperwork I noticed Mr. COLVIN would
repeatedly look at the same pap~rs and appeared distracted by my questions. I asked his
passenger, a male, if he was at the bar with Mr. COLVIN, he stated yes. l asked if he had his
identification with him, he stated no. I asked which bar they were at, Mr. COLVIN stated the
Wrangler.
4. I returned to my patrol car and requested the ISP Regional Communications Center (RCC)
pheck Mr. COLVIN's driving privileges. I deactivated my vehicle's overhead emergency
equipment leaving just the rear 1ights activated for safety.
5. I contacted Mr. COLVIN and asked if he had just the one drink tonight, he stated he had two.
I had Mr. COLVIN turn in his seat and face me. l sa~ that he was not wearing glasses and
asked if he wore contacts, he stated no. I had Mr. COLVIN follow the tip of my thumb with just
his eyes. He appeared to show some signs of Nystagmus.
6. I returned to my patrol car and repositioned it to allow more room between our vehicles. I
contacted Mr. COLVIN and asked him to exit his pickup and meet me near the tailgate, he did.
had Mr. COLVIN perform the standardized field sobr!ety evaluations. The area where the
evaluations were performed was the paved. asphalt shoulder and roadway. I saw that Mr.
COLVIN was wearing brown colored "Romeo" shoes and I noticed no strong breeze blowing.

7.

I asked Mr. COLVIN if he'd had any recent head injuries, he stated no. I asked if he was
taking any medications, he stated no.
8. Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: I observed both of Mr. COLVIN's eyes were tracking equally
and his pupils appeared to be the same size. I observed a Jack of smooth pursuit, a distinct and
sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation, as well as onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees,
in both of Mr. COLVIN's eyes. Mr. COLVIN scored six out of a possible six decision points with
a failing score of four or more. While conducting the evaluation, I could smell the odor of an
alcoholic beverage coming from Mr. COLVIN's breath.
9. Walk and Tum: I asked Mr. COLVIN if he had any problems with his hips, knees or ankles,
he stated no. I asked if he felt comfortable walking in his shoes, he stated yes. I explained and
demonstrated the instruction phase of the Walk and Tum evaluation. Mr. COLVIN lost his
balance and stepped out of the heel to toe position. He then started wiping his shoe on the
ground as if trying to remove pebbles or rocks. I could not see anything near his feet that would
impede his ability to stand in the heel to toe position. He then stated "I'm a little nervous". After
Report Officer

Prtn\edN

3431/TALBOTT,JEFFORY R

02/04/2013 09:34
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Incident Report
IDAHO STATE POLICE
Narrative

L13000111

Supplement No

ORJ:G

:

-

· resuming the heel to toe position, I explained and demonstrated the walking phase of the
evaluation. I asked Mr. COLVIN if he understood, he stated yes. I asked if there was anything
he wanted me to go over or demonstrate again, he stated no. During the walking phase Mr.
COLVIN stepped offline, missed placing his heel to his toe and raised his arms for balance. Mr.
COLVIN scored four out of a possible eight decision points with a failing score of two or more.
--i-G-;--9Re-l::eg-S-tand:-t-explained-and-dem-onstrated-the-ene-teg-Stand-eva1uation-and-asked-Mr.
COLVIN if he unde~stood, he stated yes. I asked if there was anything he wanted me to go
over or demonstrate again, he stated no. During the evaluation Mr. COLVIN raised his arms for
balance and was _swayed visibly. Mr. COLVIN scored two out of a possible four decision points
with a failing score of two or more.
11. I infonned Mr. COLVIN I was detaining him for breath samples. I seated him in the rear
passenger side seat of my car sitting sideways with his feet outside the vehicle. I checked Mr.
~OLVIN's mouth for foreign material, none was found. I instructed him not to burp, belch, or
vomit. I read the Administrative License Suspension (ALS) advisory to Mr. COLVIN. During the
mandatory fifteen minute waiting period I remained in close proximity to Mr. COLVIN with
nothing between us. I did not hear or see him burp, belch, or vomit. During the observation
period, ISP Sgt. Ken Yount arrived on scene. Approximately 14 minutes and 30 seconds of the
observation period Mr. COLVIN made a deep sound out of his mouth. I asked Mr. COLVIN if he
had burped, he stated "That wasn't a burp''. After the mandatory fifteen minute waiting period
and after listening to the ALS advisory, Mr. COLVIN agreed to submit to a breath test. Mr.
COLVIN provided two breath samples on the Life Loc FC20. His results were .123/.134 BrAC.
12. I had Mr. COLVIN meet me near the front of my patrol car. I informed Mr. COLVIN I was
placing him under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs (DUI). I placed
Mr. COLVIN · in handcuffs and checked the handcuffs for proper fit. I then double locked them
·and searched Mr. COLVIN for contraband and/or weapons in front of my patrol camera, none
were found. I secured Mr. COLVIN in the rear seat of my patrol vehicle on the passenger side
with a seatbelt.

13. At Mr. COLVIN's request, I contacted Lillian K. DAVIS and released his vehicle to her, after
she arrived on scene. I contacted the passenger and identified him as Bart M. JARRETI (date
by his Idaho driver's license. I searched the vehicle for evidence of DUI,
of birth:
none was found. The RCC informed me Mr. COLVIN had a prior DUI conviction on 4n/2011. I
transported Mr. COLVIN to the Nez Perce County Jail.
14. I booked Mr. COLVIN into the Nez Perce County Jail for driving while under the influence of
alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances (2nd offense) pursuant to Idaho code
section 18-8005( 4). I released Mr. COLVIN to the custody of the Nez Perce County Jail staff
and had no further contact with him.

Report Officer

Printed At

3431/TALBOTT,JEFFORY R

02/04/2013 09:34
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Se :0::-:·.,d Judicial District Court, State of ld~~bo
an and For the County of Nez Perce
1230 Main St.
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

FILED
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No: CR-2013-0000676

vs.
NOTICE OF HEARING
Gaylord Jay Colvin,
Defendant.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Pretrial Motions
Judge:
Final Pretrial
Judge:

Thursday, April18, 2013
Jeff P. Payne
Tuesday, May 21, 2013
Jeff P. Payne

10:00 AM

10:30 AM

Friday, June 07, 2013 08:30AM
Jeff P. Payne

Jury Trial
Judge:

at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Friday, March
15,2013.
Defendant:

Private Counsel:

Gaylord Jay Colvin
3131 4th St D
Lewiston, 10 8350100000
Mailed_
Scott M Chapman
P.O. Box 446
Lewiston, lD 83501

Prosecutor:

E Clayne Tyler

Mailed_

Mailed_x_

Hand Delivered_

Hand Delivered_x_

Hand Delivered_

)

NOTICE OF HEARING
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\:AX
To: Clerk of the Court
. Company:
Fax:
Phone:

Nez Perce County District Court
12087993058

From: _Sharon Haines, Clearwater County Prosecuting Atty's Off
Fax:
Phone:
E-mail:

208-4 76-8989
208-4 76-5611

NOTES:
Enclosed for filing please find State's Supplemental Response to
Defendant's Request for Discovery, State's Witness and Exhibit List
and State's Request for Discovery in State vs. Gaylord J. Colvin. If
you would please file these documents I would appreciate it.
Sincerely,
Sharon Haines
Paralegal
cc:

Scott Chapman, Attorey for Defendant

Date and time of transmission: Monday, April 08, 2013 12:43:50 PM
Number of pages including this cover sheet: 12
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E. CLAYNE TYLER, ISBN 5277
Prosecuting Attorney
County of Cleru·V\rater
Post Office Box 2627
Orofino, Idaho 83544
Telephone: (208) 476-5611
Fax: (208) 476-8989
Deputy: Lori M. Gilmore, ISBN 5877
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO} IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff~

vs.
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR2013-676
STATE'S \VITNESS AND EXHIBIT
LIST

C01VIES NOW, E. CLAYNE TYLER, Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Clcmvv·aler
advises the Court that the State expects to call the following prin1ary witnesses al Lbe t.rin1
scheduled in this n1atter:
·witnesses:
Jeffory Talbott
ISP

Bart Jarrett
Further, the State advises the Defense and the Court that there are other witnesses
previously listed with the Court as ·witnesses, whon1 the State 1nay need to call depending on. ho\v
evidence and testimony are presented and occur at trial on the matter. rfl1c State respectfully
submits that these witnesses should also be eligible as witnesses should the state need to call

STATES WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST -1
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them.
For exhibits the state expects to introduce or anticipates the use of lhc foiJ.o,v.ing:

Exhibits:
Video/Audio Recording

Administrative License Suspension Fonn
Certified Copy ofJudgn1ent of Conviction for Case No. CR2011-396, Nez Perce County
LifeLoc.Printout
State reserves the right to call any witnesses or use any exhibit at the trial in this matler

which has been previously provided in State's discovery or in the DefendanCs discovery Jnd/or
\Vitness and exhibit list.

.

. -~

dn,n/

Dated this~ day of~'eh, 2013.

~~

/1t~
E. CL~~i TYLER

Speci8.1 Prosecuting Atton1ey

STATES WITNESS AND EXHIBIT UST - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR DELNERY
·

·

"~

_L"y;.vvt

I, the undersigned, hereby cmiify that on the~ day of'Nfm'eh~ 2013, a true and conc,cl
copy of the foregoing STATE'S vVTTNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST \vas _ _ 1nailcd or 1:!.:!_

delivered in com1house n1ail to the following:

Scott Champan
Chapman Law Office
P.O. Box 446
Lewiston) lD 83501
~'~

\.· · ·-.'-

1\~

\_·

L~:-eC~'¥(~~
Sharon Haines
Paralegal

STATES WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST- 3
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1
2
3

E. CLA YNE TYLER ISBN:5277
Prosecuting Attorney
Clearwater County
Post Office Box 262 7
Oroflno~ Idaho 83544-2627
Telephone: (208) 476-5611

l013 APR 8 Prl 2 11

4
Chief Deputy: Lori M. Giln1ore ISBN:5877
5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DJSTRlCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ThT AND FOR TI-lE COUNTY OF 1'-JEl PERCE

6
7

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR2013-676

8
Plaintiff,
STATE'S REQUEST FOR DISCOV.EIZ Y
AND DEMAND FOR ALIBI

9

vs.
10

GAYLORD JAY

COLVIN~

11

13
14

17
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20

21

To inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or me.ntal or medical

22

exa1ninations, care and treatn1ent of the defendant and of scientific tests or experiments mode i.n

!

23

connection with the particular case or copies thereof, within the possession or control of the clcfcndunt~;,

I

24

which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or ·which were prepared by a

witue~~s

I

25

whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or reports relate to testimony of the

26

'vitness.
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III

Furnish the Clearwater County Prosecutor1s office -vvith a list of nmnes and addresses of any \"/it !lt.~;:.:~c:;

-

l
!
l

he intends to call at trial.

4

This shall be a continuing request pw:suant to Idaho Crhninal Rt1lc 16 (i).
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DEFENSE OF ALIBIPURSUANT~O IDAHO CODE 19-519 AND TDAIIO CRITv1INi\L R.UJJ~ 1'2-1.1
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DATED this

~day offt~l, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF J\1AILING OR DELIVERY

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and couect copy of the foregoing
delivered by courthouse mail to the following on 1he ~heiay offv'larch, 201J.
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Scott Chapman
Chapman Law Office
P.O. Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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E. CLA YNE TYLER: ISBN 5277
Prosecuting Attorney
County of Clearvvater
Post Office Box 2627
Orofino., Idaho 83 544-2627
Telephone: (208) 476-56l1
Fax: (208) 476-9710
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Deputy: Lori Gilmore, ISBN: 5877
1'\I THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GAYLORD J. COLVfN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2013-00676

STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL RJ~SPONSE
TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY

Defendant.
___________________________
)
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT AND COUNSEL:

COMES NOW, the State in the above-entitled n1atter, and submits the follovving State's
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery.

The State has con1plied with such request by providing the following:

1.

Any relevant written or recorded state1nents n1ade by the dcfendunt or
7

copies thereof: vvithin the possession, custody or control of the State~ the existence of whjch is
known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due di ligcnc.e; and also the
substance of any relevant, oral statement made by the defendant whether before or after urrcst to
a peace oHicer> prosecuting attorney, or the prosecuting attorney's agent have been di~K.loscd,

n1ade available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit 11 B. n
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Any written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the su.lbstance

of any relevant oral statement made by a co-defendm}t whether before or after anest j n response
to interrogation by any person known by the co-defendant to be a peace officer or agent of the
prosecuting altorney, have been disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set. forth in
Exhibit "B. 11
3.

Defendant's prior criminal record, if any~ has been disclosed, n1adc available, or i0

attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit ''B."

4.

Any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, or

places, or copies or portions thereof, which are in the possession_, custody, or control of the

prosecuting attorney and which are material to the preparation of the defense or intended for use
by the prosecutor as evidence at trial or obtained from or belonging to the defendant have been
disclosed, m.ade available, or are attached hereto as sel forth in Exhibit "B. 11
5.

Any results or reports of physical or n1ental exan1inations, and of scientific tests or

experin1ents, n1ade in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the
possession, custody, or control ofthe prosecuting attorney, the existence of,vbich is known or is

available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence have been disclosed, ru0dc
available, or are attached hereto as sel forU1 in Exhibit "B.,.
6.

A ~'Tillen list of the nan1es and addresses of all persons having kmnvJedge of

relevant fa.cts who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial is set forth in Exhibit "A.''

Any record of prior felony convictions of any such persons which is within the kno'\vledge of lhc
prosecuting attorney and all staten1ents made by the prosecution witnesses or prospective

prosecution witnesses to the prosecuting attorney or the prosecutjng aUon1ey's agents or to any
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official involved in the investigatory process of the case have been disclosed nmde available, or
1

arc attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "A."
7.

Any reports and 1nemoranda in possession of the prosecuting attorney which

\Vcrc

made by any police officer or investigator in cmmection with this investigation or prosecution of
this case have been disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B.
8.

1
'

All material or information within the prosecuting attorney's possession

or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the oiTense charged or \vhich
would tend to reduce the punishtnent therefore have been disclosed, made available, or are
attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit ''B." In addition, with regard to material or infonnation
which may he exculpatory as used or interpreted, the State requests that the defendant inforn1 the
State, in writing, of the defense which will be asserted in this case, so counsel for the State can
determine if any additional material or information may be material to U1e defense, and thus
fulfill i.ts duty under l.C.R. 16(a) and Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

9.

Wherever this Response indicates that certain evidence or 1naterials have been

disclosed~ made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B, 11 such indication

should not be construed as coni1rmation that such evidence or materials exist, but simply as an
indication that if such evidence or 1naterials exist, they have been disclosed or made availab.lc to

the defendant. Furthem1ore, any iten1s which arc listed in Exhibit "B" but are not specifically
provided, or which are referred to in documents which are listed in Exhibit "B,If are available for
inspection upon appointment with the Prosecuting Attomeis Office.
10.

The State reserves the right to supplement any and all sections of this

response if and when n1ore information becmnes available.
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The State objects to requesls by the defendant for anything not culdrc~;~;cd ab<n·c

on the gToLmds that such requests are outside the scope AND/OR are irrclevnn! under 1.C.R. ! ().
DATEDthis

LJ.~~ .... 1

d

day of~, 2013.

c
~-------,.,.-~~
~7
~/1--~.--:~~-~
rfo~·-~-

~E- CLA~E TYLER

Spe9al,.,.Prosecuting Attorney for
Nez Perce County

CERTIFICATE OF lVlAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was rnai led
to the following this
day o1~~~2013:

Z?th

Scott Chapman
Chapman Law Office, PLLC
P.O.Box446
Le·wiston, TD 83501

(~~'"

~

By:\~__ ):::)V\A.- §~kl.«~/~
Sharon Haines
Para]egal
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The State reserves the right to call, at trial or any proceeding in this matter, any 1v.it.ness Listed in
or nan1ed in any discovery response or filing with the court, including those of !he dc.fcndant, to
include but not limited 1.o the following:
WITNESSES:

NAME:
ADDRESS:

JEFFORY R. TALBOTT
Idaho State Police
2700N&S Hwy
Lewiston, ID 83501

PHONE:

(208) 799-5151

NAME:
ADDRESS:

BART M. JARRETT
3 53 3 6th Street
Lewi.ston:> ID 83501
(208) 790-22 77

PHONE:

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY

-5

75

Fax Server

4/8/2013 12:44:48 PM

PAGE

7/012

Fax ;server

EXHIBIT "B"

1.

Copy of Citation, page 1.

2.

Copy of Idaho State Police Incident Report, pages 2-8.

3.

Copy of Report Conccn1ing Reason for Arrest, page 9.

4.

Copy of Defendant's Driver's Llcense and Registration, page 10.

5.

Copy ofDetailed Calll-Iistory, pages 11-12.

6.

Copy of Criminal History,. pages 13-15.

7.

Copy of Driving History, pages 16-22.

8.

Copy of Notice of Suspension, pages 23-24.

9.

Copy of Idaho State Police Influence Report, pages 25-26.

10.

Copy of Instrument Operations Log, page 27.

1 1,

Copy ofLifeloc Printout, page 28.

12.

One (1) DVD: containing one (1) A VViewer video

13.

Radio Logs from 2 hours prior to event, not numbered
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9

10
11

12
13

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

14

16
17
18

Case No.: CR13-676

Plaintiff,

15

vs.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S PRETRIAL
MOTIONS

GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
Defendant.

19
20

I.

21

FACTS

22

23

The defendant Gaylord Jay Colvin (Jay Colvin) was arrested for Driving

24
25

26
27

Under While Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI) in violation of Idaho Code
§ 18-8004. He was stopped for failing to signal when two uphill lanes merged
into one while he continued to travel in the right lane an alleged violation of

28

Section 49-808 of the Idaho Code.
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1

2

Jay Colvin has caused to be filed various pre-trial motions including a

3

4
5
6

motion to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the stop of Jay Colvin on
January 28, 2013.
The stop was based solely upon in alleged violation of Section 49-808 of

7

8

the Idaho Code which statute is unconstitutionally void as applied because it

9

failed to provide fair notice that signaling is required when roadway design

10
11

12

13

results in two lanes down to one and that the same section is unconstitutionally
void as applied because it fails to establish minimum guidelines as to what is an
"appropriate signal" to govern enforcement of the statute.

14
15

Evidence at the hearing should adduce the following:

16

1) On January 28, 2013 at a little before 10:30 p.m. State Trooper Jeffory
Talbott stopped a vehicle being operated by Jay Colvin:

17
18

19
20
21
22
23

24
25

26
27

28

2) The sole basis supplied by Talbott was: "As I was hehind the pickup,
it appeared to be weaving in it lane and traveling 30 miles per hour
(mph) in the posted 35 MPH zone. The pickup then activated its right
hand tum signal and moved into the right hand lane as we passed a
traffic sign indicating the right hand lane was ending. The pickup
continued south and merged back to the left in front of me without
signaling.
I activated my vheihilces overhead emergency
equipment ... ";
3) All of the foregoing appears on video from the "dash cam" video in
Talbots patrol vehicle and fails to support any contention of weaving.
Further testimony will be adduced which will indicate the vehicle
operated by Jay Colvin was and older model small pick up which will
not go up 5th street grade (location of the stop) any faster than 30 mph
which is why Jay pulled over to the right (actually changed lane with
an appropriate signal) to let the car behind him (Talbott) by and
Talbott chose not to pass.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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1

2

4) The sign refered to and the Idaho Driver's License manual entry is as
follows:

3

4
5
6

Lane Ends/Merge Left: Two lanes of
traffic will soon become one lane of traffic. Right lane
traffic must yield when merging.

7

8
9

5) Applicable portions of the Idaho Drivers manual read as follows:

10

Keep to the Right

11

18

In most cases, the law requires that we stay as far to the right side of the
road as possible. The exceptions are:
• When preparing to make a left turn.
• When passing another vehicle going in the same direction.
·When on a highway with more than two lanes where the right
lane is designated for slow traffic.
• When entering the left lane temporarily in order to avoid an
obstruction, a pedestrian, or an animal.
• When traveling on a road restricted to one-way traffic.
• When traveling on a road with two or more lanes traveling in the
same direction.

19

Using Your Turn Signals

20

Always give a turn signal when you:
• Change lanes or pass another vehicle.
• Turn at an intersection or into a driveway.
• Enter or leave a freeway or interstate highway.
• Pull away from a parked position along a road or street to enter the
traffic lane.
• Pull over to the side of the road.
Proper signalling may prevent a rear-end collision. Signals must start at
least 100 feet (in business or residential areas) or five seconds (on freeways
or highways) before you turn or change lanes. If you plan to turn just
beyond an intersection, signal just after you pass through the intersection so
you won't confuse other drivers. You may use either electric turn signals or
arm signals.
The correct arm signals

12
13
14
15
16
17

21
22

23
24

25
26
27

28

2-5
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1

2
3
4
5
6

Regulatory Signs - Regulatory signs are generally black and white,
although some are red and white, and must be obeyed at all times.
Warning Signs: Most warning signs are black on yellow and most are
diamond-shaped. They also include the fluorescent yellow/green school
warning signs, and the orange and black construction zone signs. These
signs warn you to slow down and be prepared to stop if necessary; a
special situation or hazard is ahead. Some common warning signs follow.
3-2

7

8
9

6) There will be evidence showing that no discernible left ward movement
or motion is required for a vehicle to continue straight forward movement down
5th street. Further that no "turn" is required.

10
11

7) Random observation of traffic will establish virtually no vehicles signal
at the point in question.

12

II
ARGUMENT

13
14

15
16

a.
Section 48-808(1) of the Idaho Code
is Unconstitutionally Void

17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24

25
26

27

28

State v. Morgan, 2013 SLIP opinion No. 14 at Page 3, states:

"Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth
Amendment." State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d
16, 19 (2007). Limited investigatory detentions are
permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable
articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about
to commit, a crime. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203
P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). "Reasonable suspicion must be
based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences
that can be drawn from those facts." Id. Reasonable suspicion
requires more than a mere hunch o~ "inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion." Id. (quoting United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, (1989)). The test for reasonable
suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known
to the officer at or before the time of the stop. Id.
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1

2

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.

3
4
5
6

Constitution requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be "worded with
sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited" and that it be "worded in a manner that does not allow

7

8

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711

9

(2003).

10
11

12
13

Therefore, a statute is void for vagueness if it "fail[ s] to provide fair
notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or fail[ s] to provide sufficient
guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion" in enforcing the statute.

14
15

Id. at 712. The statute involved in this matter, I.C. § 49-808(1) is

16

unconstitutionally void for both of these reasons.

17
18
19
20

A statute is facially vague if it is "impermissibly vague in all of its
applications," i.e. invalid in toto. Id.

However, even if a statute is not facially

vague it may still be vague "as applied" to a particular defendant's conduct. Id.

21

22

Burton is not arguing that I.C. § 49-808(1) is facially void but, rather, that it is

23

void as applied to her conduct.

24

25

Section 49-808(1) of the Idaho Code states:

26
27

28

No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a
vehicle right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit
from a highway unless and until the movement can be made
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_____ I

1

2
3
4

with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate
signal.
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 7 46, 748, 240

5
6

P.3d 933, _

7

similar circumstances states:

(Ct.App. 2008) in construing said statute under remarkably

8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

25
26
27

Due process requires that all "be informed as to what
the State commands or forbids" and that "men of
common intelligence" not be forced to guess at the
meaning of the criminal law. Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605,
612 (1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969
P.2d 244, 246 (1998). Accordingly, the void-forvagueness doctrine, premised upon the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a
statute defining criminal conduct or imposing civil
sanctions[fn1] be worded with sufficient clarity and
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited, and the statute must be worded
in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman
Estates v. FlipsideJ Hoffman Estates) Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 497-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192-94, 71 L.Ed.2d
362, 370-72 (1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,
711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148
Idaho 31, 34, 218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.App. 2009). Thus, a
statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give
adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence
concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it fails to
establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement or others who must enforce the statute.
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132; Martin, 148
Idaho at 35, 218 P.3d at 14.

28

The court goes on to hold:
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1
2

3
4

5
6

7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14

15
16

This vagueness in application occurs because the
statute does not specify how much or what type of
movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger the
duty to signal. Admittedly, a very literal interpretation
of the statute might lead to a conclusion that a signal is
required when two lanes simply merge because a
driver in either lane must move the steering wheel at
least slightly in order to steer into the emerging lane.
But the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly
literal application to every type of side-to-side
movement, for a vehicle literally moves to the left or
the right when a driver weaves a bit within his or her
lane or simply negotiates a bend in the road, but no
one would contend that a signal is required in those
instances. It is simply not apparent from the language
of Section 49-808(1) whether a signal is required when
two lanes blend into one. Persons of ordinary
intelligence can only guess at the statute's directive in
this circumstance. Therefore, the statute is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton's
conduct.

17
18

19

20

Because Section 49-808(1) could not be
constitutionally applied to her, Burton has shown that
no legal cause existed to effectuate the traffic stop that
led to her breath tests.

21

Burton v. State, 149 Idaho at 749-750, 243 P.3d at

22

It might be reasonably anticipated the state will raise the
spectre

23

24

of State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.3d 388 (Ct.App. 1999).

25

26

In that respect the Burton court stated:

27

28

This Court addressed a related but distinct issue in
State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388
(Ct.App. 1999). The driver there contended that the
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- - - - _____ !

1

2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9

10
11

12.
13

14

15
16
17
18

signal requirement defined in Section 49-808 did not
apply where a two-lane portion of a highway ended
and two traffic signs as well as painted arrows on the
highway advised motorists that the right lane was
ending and traffic should merge left. The Dewbre case
generated a separate opinion from each of the three
Court of Appeals judges. The lead opinion stated that
the signal requirement applied in that circumstance. A
second judge concurred in that result but did not join
in the lead opinion's reasoning, and the third judge
dissented. The Dewbre opinion does not have
precedential value bearing upon the present case for
several reasons. First, the Court in Dewbre was not
called upon to address the constitutional issue
presented here. Second, there was no opinion that
commanded a majority, and third, Dewbre is factually
distinguishable because in Dewbre, road signs and
arrows on the roadway informed motorists that the
right-hand lane was ending and that traffic must merge
into the surviving, left-hand lane. In the present case,
there is no evidence of such signage or other indicator
that one lane was ending and the other surviving.
Burton v. State, 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P. 3d at_.

19
20
21

22

The crucial element is the necessity of some distinct movement left or
right prior to the requirement of a signal. The position of Jay Colvin is no
distinct movement herein was required. And application of the Section 49-

23
24

25

808(1) of the Idaho Code is void for vagueness to the circumstances of the case.
Section 49-808 was last amended by the legislature in 2005. The Burton

26
27

28

decision came down in 2008. The legislature has been in session four times
since and has done nothing to clarify or remediate the statute's infirmity. One
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1

2

must assume the legistlature has placed its seal of approval on the Burton,

3
4

5
6

interpretation of its statute.
The Idaho Drivers manual does not at any place require a signal must be
used in the "Colvin" situation. In fact the signage indicating a lane ends is

7
8

denominated as "advisory" ... not mandatory. If a driver goes around a comer

9

faster than the "advised" speed on a yellow sign there is no law violation

10
11

12

13

warranting a stop (absent exceeding the overall posted speed limit).
Lastly and most importantly ... the evidence herein will show that no
distinct right to left movement was made by Jay on the night of the stop

14

15

requiring a signal. .. nor is such a movement ever required at that location

16

making the statute void for vagueness as applied herein.

17
18
19

20

21
22
23

While being required to signal if weaving within a lane or swerving to
avoid a deer, are situations that stretch the imagination, going around a bend in
the road is not. Proceeding forward on a road that makes anywhere from a 45°90° tum is not. Proceeding through the roundabouts that seem to be more and
more in vogue is not. In fact, signaling in these latter situations would actually

24
25

26
27

constitute a hazard.
Passing lanes often begin on inclines so slower traffic can stay right. The
passing lane then expires at the crest of a grade, where both lanes become one.

28

Thus, it is the lanes that merge and not the driver. It is preposterous to think that
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1

2

a vehicle proceeding forward to the right of a passing lane, who remains in that

3
4
5
6

lane throughout (and may even be passed by other cars) needs to signal to
lawfully continue moving forward.

In the present case, Jay Colvin was

proceeding down a three lane road, moved to the right-hand lane and continued

7
8
9

in that lane, never changing direction, exiting or merging.
Further, because the term "appropriate signal" is not defined in the Idaho

10
11

12
13

Code, a person of ordinary intelligence is left to wonder when a signal is
appropriate and, therefore, required. The vagueness doctrine does not require
every word in a criminal statute to be statutorily defined. State v. Casano, 140

14
15

Idaho 461, 464 (Ct. App. 2004). However, "a statute must be construed so that

16

effect is given to every word and clause of the statute" and "words and phrases

17
18
19
20

are construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language."

Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 656.

Therefore, effect must be given to the word

"appropriate" as it is used in this statute.

21
22

"Appropriate" is defined as "suitable or fitting for a particular purpose,

23

person, occasion" (http://www.dictionary.co1n, accessed Oct. 15, 2009) or

24
25
26

27

"suitable for the occasion or circumstances" (http://www.encarta.msn.com,
accessed Oct. 15, 2009). Therefore, inclusion of the word "appropriate" in the
statute implies that there are situations in which the use of a signal is not

28

appropriate. However, because the statute provides no definition of the term
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1
2

"appropriate signal," (e.g. when other traffic is present and your "movement"

3

4
5
6

could impede or interfere with their "movement"), people of ordinary
intelligence are left to wonder when a signal is appropriate. In fact, there are
many situations, including the one presently before the court, in which "the

7
8
9

appropriate signal under the circumstances was just as likely no signal at all."
Jay Colvin was traveling in the right-hand lane of a road that narrowed

10
11
12
13

from two lanes to one. Therefore, the design of the road forced Jay to continue
forward in the same direction without turning as the two lanes became one.
While the lanes merged (in a manner of speaking), Jay no more merged or

14
15

changed lanes by remaining in the right-hand side than someone in the left hand

16

lane in the same place may have merged or changed lanes. Thus, it becomes an

17
18

19
20

issue of who (in the two lanes) becomes the merger, changes direction or
changes lanes. The result, according to the anticipated State's position would
actually require parties in both lanes to signal. Hence, one could envision a

21
22

23

situation where a driver in the left-hand lane, would signal a right-hand tum and
a driver in the left-hand lane would signal to tum left, even though both

24
25

26
27

continued in the same direction with neither turning.
There was no other traffic in the vicinity at the time whose travel was
potentially impeded or interfered with by Jay's action. Therefore, it is likely

28

that the "appropriate signal" in this situation was no signal at all. However,
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1
2

because the statute fails to provide notice to people of ordinary intelligence

3
4

5
6
7
8
9

whether the terms "movement" and "appropriate signal" include such situations,
it is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this situation and, therefore, void.
b.
I. C. § 49-808(1) is Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied to
This Case Because it Fails to Provide Sufficient Guidelines as to
Whe~ a Signal is Appropriate Thereby Giving Police
Unbridled Discretion in Enforcing the Statute.

10
11

12

13

A law that does not provide minimal guidelines for enforcement
"impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries
for resol.ution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of

14
15

arbitrary and discriminatory application." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 586

16

(1990). This failure to provide minimal guidelines for enforcement is often

17
18

19

20

"what tolls the death knell" for a statute. Id. at n. 4. This is "perhaps the most
meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine.". Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).

21

22
23

In Bitt, a city loitering and prowling ordinance was struck down as failing
to provide sufficient enforcement guidelines.

118 Idaho at 590. Under the

24

25

26
27

ordinance, a person could not be arrested or convicted unless he failed to
identify himself and offer an explanation for his presence and conduct. Id.
However, the ordinance did not provide any guidelines for what constituted

28

credible and reliable identification and, therefore, gave police officers complete
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1
2

discretion to make that determination. Id. at 589-590. Although that ordinance

3

4
5
6

was found to be facially void, the reasoning is equally applicable in this "as
applied" vagueness challenge.
Similar to Bitt, I. C. § 49-808( 1)' s use of the phrase "appropriate signal"

7
8

without providing further enforcement guidelines impemissibly gives officers

9

complete discretion to decide who is and who is not violating the statute.

10

11
12
13

Although a facial challenge of I. C. § 49-808(1) might not prevail because there
are obvious situations in which a person of ordinary intelligence would
understand a signal to be appropriate, the statute is vague as applied to Jay

14
15
16

Colvin's conduct.
As discussed above, there are many situations in which a signal is not

17
18
19
20

necessary.

Not only does the statute's failure in defining the phrase

"appropriate signal" leave a person of ordinary intelligence wondering when a
signal is "appropriate," this failure to provide minimal guidelines provides

21

22

police with unbridled discretion in determining whether the statute has been

23

violated.

24
25

26
27

Therefore, Section 49-808( 1) of the Idaho Code is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to Jay Colvin because it fails to provide minimal guidelines as
to when a signal is appropriate thereby giving police officers unbridled

28

discretion in enforcing the statute.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S PRETRIAL
MOTIONS

13

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

89

1
2

3
4

5
6

c
Evidence of any Opinion(s) should be excluded until the State establishes
outside the presence of the Jury the Criteria set forth in Rule 702, 703,
a n d 704 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

Obviously, virtually the entirety of the State's case will be "opinion"

7
8

9

evidence offered by way of "expert" testimony. Defendant has moved to
exclude this opinion or reference to said opinion until requisites of Rules

10
11
12

13
14

15
16
17

702, 703 and 705 have been met.
Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.

18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25
26
27

28

Rule 703 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by
or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
The
expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and
give the reasons therefore without prior to disclosure of the
underlying facts or data, provided that the court may
require otherwise, and provided further that, if requested
pursuant to the rules of discovery the underlying facts or
data were disclosed.
The expert may in any event be
required to disclose the underlying facts or data on crossMEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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1
2

examination.

3
4

The Court of Appeals has held in State v. Eytchison, 30 P.3d 988, 136

5
6
7

8
9

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22

Idaho 210 (Ct. App. 2001) as follows:
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by
Idaho Rules of Evidence 702, which provides:
"If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." *fn1 The five sources of expert qualifications
identified in the rule, knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, are disjunctive. Konechny, 134 Idaho at 414,
3 P.3d at 539; State v. Hopkins, 113 Idaho 679, 6 81, 7 4 7
P . 2 d 8 8, 9 0 (Ct. App. 1987). Therefore, academic
training is not always a prerequisite to be qualified as an
expert; practical experience or specialized knowledge
may be sufficient. *fn2 Konechny, 134 Idaho at 414, 3 P.3d
at 539. However, there must be some demonstration that the
witness has acquired, through some type of training,
education or experience, the necessary expertise and
knowledge to render the proffered opinion. Konechny, 134
Idaho at 414, 3 P.3d at 539. A witness may be qualified
to render opinions about some things but not others. West
v. Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 139,968 P.2d 228,234 (1998).

23
24

The procedure advocated by the defendant was also apparently

25
26
27

argued in State v. Dutt, 139 Idaho 99, 73 P.3d 112 (Ct. App. 2003). The
only thing being requested by Defendant is the requisite showing be made

28

outside the presence of the jury before reference (even in opening statements)
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1

2

be made thereto.

3
4

Rule 16(b)(7) of the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

5

6

7
8

9

10
11
12

13
14
15
16

17

Expert witnesses. Upon written request of the defendant the
prosecutor shall provide a written summary or report of any
testimony that the state intends to introduce pursuant to
Rules 702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial
or hearing. The summary provided must describe the
witness's opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, and
the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of expert opinions
regarding mental health shall also comply with the
requirements of I. C. § 18-207. The prosecution is not
required to produce any materials not subject to disclosure
under paragraph (f) of this Rule. This subsection does not
require disclosure of expert witnesses, their opinions, the
facts and data for those opinions, or the witness's
qualifications, intended only to rebut evidence or theories
that have not been disclosed under this Rule prior to trial.
While the state has certainly provided some information by no means

18
19

does that information comply with the requirements of Rule 16(b)(7) of the

20

Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure. Absent such compliance such and expert

21

22

testimony should be excluded.

23

24
25

26
27

28

d

Witnesses should be excluded so they cannot hear the testimony of other
witnesses and further the court should admonish any witnesses who have ·
testified to not discuss their testimony with other witnesses and if any
witnesses remain in the courtroom, they should be barred from further
testimony.
Rule 615(a) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence states:
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1
2

3
4

5
6

7
8
9

At the request of a party the court may order witnesses
excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other
witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion.
This rules does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is
not a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party
that is not a natural person designated as its
representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose
presence is shown by a party to be essential to the
presentation of the party's cause, or (4) a crime victim
whose exclusion is prohibited under Article I, Section 22
of the Idaho Constitution.

10
11
12
13

The ruling on this motion is discretionary with the court, State v.
Danson,
113 Idaho 746, 747 P.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1987), but the purpose 1s to

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

prevent witnesses from being influenced by prior testimony. State v. Ralls,
111 Idaho 485, 725 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1986).
Witnesses should be excluded until after their testimony, and if they
remain in the courtroom following their testimony, they should be excluded
from further testifying. Further, the witnesses should be admonished to not

21
22

23
24
25

discuss their testimony with other witnesses in order to comport with the
purpose of this rule.
DATED this 8th day of April, 2013.

26
27

Scott Chapman
Attorney for Defendant

28
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that
a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was on
this gth day of April, 2013,

5
6
7
8
9

I:

..J

Mailed ( IC- ..-. 11 1c..
Hand Delivered
Faxed
Messenger
to the following:

10
11
12
13

E. Clayne Tyler
Prosecuting Attorney
Clearwater County
Post Office Box 2627
Orofino, ID 83544

14
15
16
17

~g

A~r ofthe FifiD

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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27
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SCOTT CHAPMAN
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
11 06 Idaho Street
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1234
Idaho State Bar No. 3467

.c~p•.wc;_
__

DEPUTY

10
11
12
13

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

14

16

Case No.: CR13-676

Plaintiff,

15

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY

vs.

17
18
19
20

GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
Defendant.
COMES NOW, the Defendant by and through his attorney of record,

21
22

Scott Chapman and responds to the State's request for discovery as follows:

23

I

24
25
26
27

To inspect, copy and photograph any books, papers, documents,
photographs, tangible objects or copies or portions thereof, which are in the
possession, custody, or control of the defendant, and which the defendant

28

intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
RESPONSE TO
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

1
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.I.

1
2

RESPONSE:

None at this time. Defendant reserves the right to

3
4

supplement.
II

5
6

To inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or

7
8

mental or medical examinations, ·care and treatment of the defendant and of

9

scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case or

10
11
12
i3

copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendants, which the
defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or which were prepared
by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or

14
15
16

reports relate to testimony of the witness.
RESPONSE:

None at this time.

Defendant reserves the right to

17
18

supplement.

19
20

III

Furnish the Clearwater County Prosecutor's office with a list of names

21

22
23

and addresses of any witnesses he intends to call at trial.
RESPONSE: Defendant reserves the right to call any individuals named

24
25

by the State in discovery and further reserves the right to supplement.

26
27

28

RESPONSE TO
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

2
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1

2

This shall be a continuing request pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(i).

3
4

5
6

FURTHER, THE STATE HEREBY DEMANDS OF THE DEFNEDANT
NOTICE OF DEFENSE OF ALIBI PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 19-519
AND IDAHO CRIMINAL RULE 12-1.

7

8
9

RESPONSE:

Defendant reserves the right to

supplement.

10
11

None at this time.

DATED this

Ld

day of April, 2013.

12

CHAPMAN LAW .OFFICES, PLLC

~~U-

13
14

A/i<Fember of the Firm

15
16
17
18

19
20

21

22
23

24
25

26
27
28

RESPONSE TO
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

3
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Fax Server

Attorney
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April 17~ 20.t 3

C1eik of the Court
Nez Perce County
Fax~ 208~799-3.058.

RE: State vs. Gaylord Colvin, CR20J3.-676"
Dear Clerk:

Enclosed please find State<s·l\;1.e.tnorandum in Objection to Defi:mdm1r s .Pre:~1:ri:::t1 Jvlobom:, lJ you
would please file this, I \vould. a_ppretiate it.
A-courtesy copy has been -faxed to Judge Payne in Idaho County.
___,___sincerely~

( _/~)\~\V·--~~-:1:,~ C,?"~~-<-4
···s1·a;:~n Haln.es

!

Paralegal

:Enclosures as stated
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OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

E. CLAYNE TYLER ISBN:5277

POST OFFICE BOX 262.7
OROFINO, ID 83544-2627
PHONE (208) 476-561·1
FAX
(208) 476-8989

Prosecuting Attorney

LORI M. GILMORE ISBN:5877
Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

E-MAIL: 6ccounly@.dearwa\ercoun\y .orsJ

FAX COVER SHEET
To:
Fax:

Nez Perce County District Court
208-799-3058

Frorn:

E. Clayne Tyler, Prosecuting Attmney

Subject:

State vs. Gaylord Colvin, CR13-676

Date:
Pages:

Aprill7, 2013
14, including cover

cc:

Judge Payne, Idaho County, Fax: 208-983-2376
Scott Chapman, Attorney for Defendant, Fax: 208-743-1266

MESSAGE:
See enclosed for filing.

******************** 7'********** W ARNING***********-i(******•"**~•****-r.****-k****
This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to ·which it is addressed and n\ay
contain information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosm·e under applicable
law. If you have received this fax in enor please contact this office immediately.
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E. CLAYNE TYLER- ISBN 5277
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney
PO Box 2627
Orofino, ID. 83544
Telephone: 208-476-5611
Facsitnile: 208-476-8989

2023 A-PR 17 Pfll 12 25

Special Prosecutor for the State
IN Tffi~ DlSTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff

vs.

GAYLORD J. COLVIN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO: CR2013-00676
STATE'S MEMORANDUlVI IN

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PRETRIAL 1\tlOTIONS

____________________________)
The Defe.ndant was charged with Driving Under the Influence (Second Offense)

fo11ov..ring a trai1ic stop on.January 28,2013 at about 10:24 p.n1., in the city of Lewiston, fdaho.
Idaho State Police Trooper Jeffory Talbott conducted the stop after observing certain driving
behavior, and following field sobriety tests, administered an alcohol evidentiary test resulting in a
documented blood alcohollevd of .123/.134.
The Defendant has filed a suppression motion, and a 111otion in litnine, requesting the

fo II o \Ving:

1.

To suppress all evidence obtained following the traffic stop of the Defendant's
vehicle, on the grounds that the officer lacked a reasonable articulablc suspicion
of illegal driving behavior, or of commission of a crin1e, sufficient to justify a

stop.
2.

To suppress all statements of the Defendant made prior to his arrest in that the
Defendant was not advised of his constitutional rights prior to his anest.

3.

To suppress aU staten1ents or responses .n1ade to law enforcement based on the
Defendant's Slh An1endment right against self incrimination.

STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS--PAGE 1
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4.

To exclude any evidence of prior bad acts per the Idaho rules of evidence,
including prior convictions.

5.

To require establishment outside of the presence of the jury of foundation for
expen wih1esses pursuant to Rule 702 and 705 of the Idaho Rules ofEvidence.

6.

To exclude witnesses fr01n the courtroorn until they ha·ve testified, to admonish
witnesses frmn discussing their testimony with other witnesses, and to bar ±l-orn
further testimony any witness who ren1ains in the courtroom following testimony.

1VIotion to Suppress Based On Lack of Reasonable Articulable Suspicion for Traffic
Stop:
It is anticipated that the. following will be offered into evidence at the suppression

hearing:
a.

b.
c.
d.
e.

f
.g.

The defendant was operating a motor vehicle on 51h Street (a public road) in
Lewiston Idaho, near Stewart Avenue, a 3 lane divided city street. There arc tvvo
southbound lanes and one northbound lane. The Defendant was initially driving
in the left hand southbound lane.
There was no oncoming traffic~ and the Defendant Y\'as driving at a speed aboul 5
n1iles per hour below· the posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour.
The Defendant exhibited some weaving in his lane of traveL
The Defendant activated his turn signal and changed lanes into the right hand lane
of traveL shortly before the right hand lane ended.
The Defendant failed to signal for the statutorily n1andated 100 feet prior to
changing lanes into the right hand lane.
Approximately 10 seconds oftravel time later, the right hand lane ended and
merged into the left hand lane .
The Defendant failed to signal when merging back into the left hand (through)
Jane.

Stop and investigatory detentions are recognized exceptions to the \.Varrunt requircn1cnt.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. C 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). An officer may stop and detain an jndividual
i(, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on
specific and articulable facts, that the suspect has been, is, or is about to engage in criminal
activity, or lhallhe vehicle is being driven in violation of traffic laws. State v. Rawlingsl 121
Idaho 930, 829 P .2d 520 (1992); State v. Gallegos! 120 Idaho 894, 821 P .2d 949 (1991 ). State v.
Roe 140 Idaho 176, 90 P.3d 926 (Ct. App. 2004). A stop is an intennediate response that allows
an officer to maintain the status quo, identify the suspect and investigate possible criminal
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS--PAGE 2
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activity, even though the officer docs not have sufficient information to establish probab1e canse
to make an arrest. See Terrv supra. Therefore any assertion that the officer n1ust have probable
cause to conduct an investigatory stop is a misstate1nent of the law. State v. Knight, 128 Tdaho
862, 920 P.2d 78 (Ct. App 1996).
To determine whether a stop is lawful, the reviewing Cotui must evaluate the facts known
to the o±1icer at the time of the stop hased on the totality of the circun1stances or the 'vho]e
picture. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002); ~(supra). In
addition, an officer is permitted to draw rational inferences from the facts in light of his/her
experience and training. See Temr, Gallegos (supra).
The validity of the stop is reviewed against an objective standard. Therefore, the

subjective thoughts of the officer and any grounds previously relied on by the State to justify the
stop are not relevant. In re Deen 131 Idaho 435, 958 P.2d 592 (1998).
The driving behavior of the Defendant lead to two possible reasons for engaging jn a
trat1ic stop.
First, the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion of the comn1ission of a DlJI given
the Defendant's driving behavior. The Defendant was driving well under the posted speed li111it,
at approximately 10:24 p.m. without any traffic to justify a lower speed; the Defendant weaved
within his lane; the Defendant failed to properly signal a lane change fron1 the left hand
southbound lane to the right hand southbound lane; and. the Defendant failed to signal a rnerge

into the through left hand lane when the right hand lane ended.
· Second, the officer observed violations of traffic law which \Vould justify a lrafiJ.c stop.
Those violations are of.ldaho Code 49-808:
(1) No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a highway or merge
onto or exit from a highway unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor 1vilhuul
giving an appropriate signal.
(2) A signal ofinlenl1on to tum or move right or left when required shall be given continuously to warn
other traffic. On conLTolled-access highways and be-fore turning from a pa.rl(ed position, the signal shall be
given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other Instances, for not less than the last one
hundred ( l 00) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning ...

The De:fendant failed to engage his signa1 for 100 feet prior to conducting a lane change
frmn the left hand lane into the right hand lane. The Defendant failed entirely to signal the n1erge
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRTAL MOTIONS--PAGE 3
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back into the left hand lane.
The Defendant argues that 49-808(1) as applied to him is unconstitutionally vague as
applied, arguing Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2008) supports this
argument. Burton involved a driver who, ~'hile driving

dOVI711

a highway encountered a passing

lane which began left of her lane. She continued in the right Jane, and at the end of the passing
lane, continued forward along the high\vay. She was stopped for failure to signal the
continuation. In that case, the Idaho Court of Appeals did hold the statute tmconsti.tuUonally
vague as applied.
Specifically, the Court described the facts as follows:
"The officer's description of the event is cryptic. His affidavit states only that he 1:\LnppeJ. Burton's v~hicle

after he observed it "fail to signal when it merged lanes." At the administrative hearing, Burton tcstiflcd that
in the two-lane segment of the highway there was a passing lane on the left, but she was traveling in the
right lane, and when the two lanes became one, ~'the left lane disappeared." She said Lhal she passeu a sign
which said that the lanes were going to merge, hut. there wag no evidence of signage i11dicating that one lan.e
was terminating and one continuing.
Bmton v. State, Dep't ofTransp., L49 Idaho 746, 749_, 240 P.3d 933, 936 (Ct. App. 201 0)

The Defendant is correct in anticipating that the State be1ieves State v. Dewbre, 133
Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999) provides the more appropriate guidance in tl:Us
circumstance.
Just after midnight on June l, 1996, an Idaho State police officer was traveling on Highway 57 in Bonner
County, when he began follO\ving Dewbre's vehicle. Highway 57 is a two-lane road with an occasionf'll
passing area where the single one-directional lane splits into two, creating a temporar)' passing 1ane,
Dewbre entered one of these passing areas. A sign was located near the beginning of the passing area
directing traffic to stay to the right except to pass. Two traffic signs and painted an·ows on the roaclw<1Y near
the end of the passing area advised traffic that the passing lane was ending and tllat traffic should merge left_
Upon enlering this passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle into the right lane. After driviJJg beyond the last
dashed line at the end of the passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle from the right lane into the remaining
single lane. Because Dewbre failed to signal \Vhile makb1g these maneuvers, the officer stopped Dewbre [ur
violating LC. § 49-808. State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 664, 991 P.2d 388, 389 (Ct. App. 1999)

The Dewbre Court -vvent on to hold as follows:
The language ofl.C. § 49-808 is plain and unambiguous and must be g;lven effect. The following holding
from the district court's order affirming the magistrate's dcnlal of Dewbre's suppression motion corTectly
analyzes the statute's application:
When Dewbre approached the pmtion of the highway containing a passing laue, the sign required
hjm to ''keep right accept to pass:, As such, Dewbre moved his vehicle Io the right to comply with
this requirement. When Dewbre reached the end of the pottion ofthe highway that conlained a
passing lane, lhe record clearly establishes that there was a slgn requiring Dewbre to merge back
into the left lane. This required a turning movement to the left. It is undisputed the [sic] Dewbre
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made these movements, and jt is also undisputed that he did not signal when l1e made either turn.
By failing LO signal when he made these tums, Dewbre violated LC. § 49-808.

It is true that at the point Dewbre made the.'>e turning maneuvers, 1he dl'lshed line did not separ<1te.
the left and right northbound lanes. Ho,..vever, the statute does not strictly limit its application to the
lane changes. h1stead, the statute requires a signal whenever an individual makes a "move right or
left upon a highway." Had the legislature intended only to regulate tmns and lane changes, it could
have stated so specifically. 13y moving first right, and lhen left, Dewbre came within the ambit of
the statute, and \Vas required to make to lsic] signaL (Emphasis added.).
I am constrained to agree. Upon entering the passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle to the right in order to
comply with the highway signage. Upon exiting, the passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle to the left
complying once again with the highway signage. There are no exceptions in LC. § 49-808 to 1J1e signal
requirement. State v. Pressley, 131 Idaho 277, 279, 954 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ct.App.l998). ·whenever a
movement is made to the left or right on a highway, regardless of whelhcr lhc movement is made necessary
to comply with highway signage, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to LC. § 49· 808.
I do not attempt by this holding to define the boundaries of what constitutes a "movement to the rig.ht or len
upon a highway." I conclude only that Dewbre•s movements placed him \Vithin lhc ambil of lhe statute.
Until further clarification is provided by the Idaho legislature, I am constrained f.o hold that ·whenever a
vehicle moves to the right or to the left because one lane- splits into two lanes, or two lanes merge into nne
lane, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to I. C. § 49-808. Therefore, LC. § 49-808 required. De\vbre
Louse an appropriate signal when he moved to the right \Vhlle entering the passing area and then to the left
while exiting the passing area.
Dewbre further argues that no signal is the appropriate signal when the vehicle movement can be macJe wilh
reasonably safety. The plain language of l.C. § 49-808 provides that an individual may «move right or left
upon a highway" iflwo requirements are met: (1) if"the movement can be made \Vith reasonable safely"
and (2) if"an appropriate signal" is given. Even if a vehicle can be moved with reasonable safety, LC. §
49-808 still requires the use of turn signals when making the movement lo the right or left. Ftn1hermore, Lhe
Idaho legislature specifically amended the turn signal law deleting the exception Dewbre argues. Prj or to
the amendment, the statute provided that an appropriate signal was only required "in the event any other
traffic may be affected by such movement.n 1953 Idaho Sess. Law 507. This exception was removed jn
1977 by the Idaho legislature. 1977 Idaho Scss. Law 370. Consequently, the legislature intended thatturn
signals be used when moving right or lefl on a higlnvay regardless of vvhether other traffic may be af.fected
or a vehicle is moving vvith reasonable safety. I agree ·with the d1strict court that an appropriate signal
requires "such a signal as would put others **392*667 on notice ofthe driver's intention to make a turning
movement, and that it was not the inlcnt of the legislature to negate the requirement of signaling ·when
makingaturningmovement." Statev.Dewbre, l33ldaho663,666-67,99.\ P.2d388,391~92(CL.App.1999)

Fortunately> the Burton Court anticipated the apparent inconsistency betvveen ,De\vbre and
Burton, and provided guidance:
Thjs CoUlt addressed a related but distinct issue in State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P .2d 3 8 8
(Ct.App.1999). The driver there contended that the signal requirement defined in Section 49-808 did not
apply where a lwo-lane portion of a highway ended and n~·o traffic signs as well as painted arrm:vs on the
highway advised motorists that the right lane was ending and traffic should merge leU. The Dewbre case
generated a separate opinion from each of the three Comt of Appeals judges. The lead opinion stated that
the signal requirement applied in that circwnstance. A second judge concmTed in that result but did not join
in the lead opinion's reasoning, and the third judge dissenled. The Devvbre opinion does not have
precedeutial value bearing upon the present case for several reasons. First, the Cout1 in Dewbre was not
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS--PAGE 5
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ea.lled upon to address the comtituti:o.l:.la11ssue p.re.sent~d here. Second, there was no opinion that
cmnmandcd a majority, and third~ Dewbre is factually distinguitiha11lc bemmsc in Dewhre. roCJd signs and
arrovi'S on the rcaclway informed motorists that the right-hand lane was· ending and that tra!Tic musr nwrge
into the survivi11g, [eft-hand fane. In. the present case, there is no evidence of such s ign.age or other ind k:t.dor

tbat one lan.e WHS ~ncling aml the olher sw·vi ving_....
... \Vc aro persuaded tbatth.ere'.isznerlt in Burton's coDtention that Section 49--BCH~(l) ifi iJJ1-C(71i';l.ilutlol'w1ly
vague as app-Ued in this circumstance, for lhe s.\atute do~s .not clearly indicate lhti.J .;:.~ sjgnal is required winrr1
t¥lo lane·~ tiie'rg~ v~ith neithe.r lane clearly ehdirig and 1ieitlier cl~ar!~· c.or:itinuing. This situati.on ciifJ~rs
srgnitkant:ly 1rom that where one ortwo lanes ends ·and the: other cm1tinae.s, as occun:·ed in D.!!H'bte. In ihe
Dewbre circumst:111cc, t}tc statute plainly rcquin::s a signal because a ddver in Lhe terminaling 'lcme nws.t
ch~ng:~ 1aTws· in wd~r. to ·cO.ntJnue navel on th.:;: higlrway~ and changing l.ancs const.hmos a nl.t.W0 to tile len tX
right. .But when there is·n.o basis to discern that one: 1a:ne 'Is terminating and the C?ther Sllrv[vi.Ilg~ b111 rather
ihe tvvo blend into u single lane, it is not clear that the continued tonvard rnove.riwnt cf n vebicl1~ ·t}r.~m .::~ither
ofthe two 'lartes· ii1to the enxerging lai1e consiituks a ;.mo\·e ... tight ot 1eJ:r that :is st1bje'ct :to the Stc!ioiJ
49····tW3( !) sigpc~l ryquireriJenl.
·
Burton v. &ta1e; De.p'i ofTn1ns.p., 149. ldaho 746, 749, 240 :P.Jd 933, 936 (Ct. Avp. 2.0l0)

In this· particular case there exists·a dear ident1fica.ti.on that the Tight 1une oftravel in.
which the Delendant had n1oved his vehicle

ended~

and i.he·left lane of travel was the through

lane. The following is a still frarne f1:om the video .ofOffic:er Talbott conducting the lrufl1c stop

on the Defendant. Clearly depleted is a ttaff!c sign.
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The mean)ng ofthis traffic -sign is as follo'V\-rs (FronT the 1d.abo Driver's ~"'1anu3l, Ju1y 20\2
Edition~

Page 3-3)~

.l. . ~TI1e I~nd.sl.fvierge Left; Two ianer. of traff.ic \vill <.Y-.101.\
becQnle o:n-e lane of tr.nffic. Right lane Lr<tffi.c nms.t yield 1vhen
.m.erging.
The facts of this case are dear. Th.e Defendant.·wa.s· in th~ right .hand. lane. The right lwnd
la·ne ended, and :shown by the 1ratt1c c<Jntroi sign depleted -abov~. The ~ig1:1 :i:I:-~E;tructed th~;
detendant that ·he 1nus'l1nerge to the left:. and f\1rther thn.t he rnust yield to the traHic ill the leTt
lane.

This is not a. situ:ation such as in Rurton \vhere tWt} l.ane·s .tr.tetged, ·\vhhout 2-ny i.nd:i.c~:rlif)n
that one ended and the ofh.er continued. 'fhis is mm:e akin to th¢

hii.:.~ -sii\latir)p. n1.l}~}~X!S~ \vf·(~~rr:.:-

one lane c-lear1y ends.: o.t1~ lan.e. is dearly the tl1r~,:1ug,h ln.nc, and th1.:;: driver in the-lane endi..ng is

instructed to yield to the through.lan:e. The Bu1·ton co:t:ut ind.i:c.aJ;es i.n this- sitr:ra,tion ~ tun1 sjgnnl t:.~
required and the statute is not vague as

applied~

This situation differs s:igr1ifi¢ahtly 1rom .that 1-vhere ohe oft"i;o lanes ends (tnd tbc· otll.cl' CnJttlnui~S, a::i
occurred 111. De-.,.r.·bre_ ln th~ .De!i!bre Cin::t.\111'3tan~~. the statut~ pHthly requit~s a sig11;ji becau.se -s_ dr1'tm· in i.b.e
t:errnina:ting lane must change lane~ in on.\e,r to coniinue tra:vd qn the· n1ghway, and ~hangmg .lane-3'
constitutes. a move to tlw lett or r:lght But wh~n thGre is no oa1~Js to di-sc~rn t!1at \)l't\3 l~IH~ 1~ termm(3l.li:tt~ <.mll.
the otbe.r p,unriv.ing., bnt rathe-r. the two blend into a sing~.e la.ne, it is.i1rYt ck~\1'lhat (he connrmedJonvartl
move1.111;;Di of a v.ehi~le fTPm ~hb.l!T cr lhe twv.hm~::s. i.n.tp th~ ep)erg.l:ng lf!ne. con.sUtut.~s a '"nwv<! .,. right ot-

1etf." t11.at is stibject to the Section 4Y-!s-IH5('l) signal requirement.
i3mt~.m

v. State. Dep't' ofiranSJ.l., 149 Jdaho 7:!1-6, 741), 240 P,3c:l93:J, Y::i6 {Ct:_ App_ :liHIJ)

This. .Defendant wa:~thus obligated to s~gna] his lane chq.nge trorn the rigl:J.t hnnr,! .ID,n_q J.nto
thr,;; throug.h .lane.•
His failure justit1es the traffic stop by -"T'roopet Talbott.
"Il1e DefendanC s n1otion to Sll:ppress ·e-v·i.deric.e based. on the l~gality of the trrd:li\; st,)p

should be den-ied.
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Motion to Suppress Statements of the Defendant tnade prior to his arrest (the
Defendant was not advised of his constitutional rights prior to his arrest.)
Idaho courts have clearly stated that Miranda d9es not generally apply to lJUl

investigatory detentions (whether actual questioning by the Officers, or in cond·ucting l:.'STs, or
both), even though the driver is not free to leave until the investigation is concluded. Sec for
example: State v. Pilik, 129 Idaho 50, 52, 921 P.2d 750, 752 (Ct. App. 1996) (Defendant not 1n

custody while being questioned following a traffic stop regarding alcoholl..l."le, and while being

subjected to Field Sobriety Tests); State v. Hartwig. 112 Idaho 370, 732 P .2cl339 (Ct.App.19W7)
(verbal COID111Unications 1nade during sobriety testing were not rendered jnadrnissiblc in Lhc
absence of a Miranda \vaming); and State v. Denefiel131 Idaho 226, 229, 953 P.2d 976~ 979
(Idaho, 1998) (A person temponirily detained pursuant to an ordinary traffic stop ]s not in c1Jslody for the
purpose of Miranda, adopting a like federal approach set fotth in Berkemer v. A1cCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).)

Neither is there any question in Idaho whether a person must be mirandizcd prior to bei1.1g

offered an evidentiary test for breath or blood alcohol. In State v. Hannon. 131 Idaho 80, 84-gs,
952 P ..2d 402, 406- 407 (Idaho App., 1998), the Idaho Court of Appeals has held:
HamJOn asserts that because he \;vas not given l.1iranda warnings before he consented to the
breathalyzer test~ the administration of the test violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against se1 fin crimination. The necessary remedy, he asserts, is suppression ofthe test results. We conclude, however,
that the privilege against self-incrimination and Miranda rigllts are not implicated by the administration of n
breath test.
The ~Miranda requirement that an accused he informed of the right to rernain. silent and the right to
counsel before custodial interrogation was imposed by the United States Supreme Courl in order lo
safeguard the accused's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 1Wranda v. Arizona, 3 84 lJ .S.
436, 86 S.CL 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). This privilege protects the accused only fhm1 compulsion to
give testimony against himself or to otherwise provide "evidence o~a testimonial or communicative 11aturc."
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757> 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 ( 1966). Tn 5'chmerher.
the United States Supreme Court held that a state-compelled blood test to dete.rmine alcohol conccntmtion
is physical evidence, not testimoDy or a communicative act, and therefore is unprotected by the FiHh
Amendment privilege, Id, at 760-65, 86 S.Ct. at 1830-33. Moreover, in South Dakota v, Neville, Lf59 U.S.
553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the Supreme Comt stated, "In the context of an ane.st for
driving while intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test .is no( an
inteiTogation within the meaning of 1\1iranda." !d. at 564n. 15, 103 S.Ct. at 923 n. 15.
Accordingly) Hannon's breath test resu1ts are adm[ssible, notwith~.tanding the lack of 1\fira!lda
warnings, because they are not testimonial or communicative evidence and because the otliccr's request for
the test was not an interrogation.

The Defendant's motion to suppress all statements he made prior to h.is mTest should 1Je
denied.
STATE'S
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Motion to suppress all statements or responses made to law enforcement. based on.
the Defendant's 5th Amendment right against self incrhnination.
Please see above. No

5th

Amend1nent right against self incrimination was infringed upon.

The Defendant answered questions while not in custody. He waived such right.

IV.

Motion to Exclude Evidence of Prior Bad Acts:
The only evidence of a prior bad act intended to be introduced by the State is evidence of

the Defendant's prior conviction, and then only in a bifurcated process through which t.he Jury
will determine if the sentencing enhancement (2nd DUI within 10 ;rears) \vill aJJply.
It is not the State,s intention to introduce any 404(b) evidence during the DUI portion of
this case.

V.

l\1otion To Require Establishment Outside of the Presence of the .Jury of
Foundation for Expert Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 702 and 705 of the Idaho Rules
of Evidence:
The Defendant argues that virtually the entirety of the State's case wi1l be "opinion"

evidence offered by way of"expert~' testimony. The State is confused by this assertion.
The evidence anticipated to be offered against the Defendant consists generally of:
1.

The Trooper's observations of the Defendant's driving behavior.

2.

The Trooper's observations of the Defendant (his odor, bearing, eyes, ability to
follow instructions, etc.).

3.

Statements of the Defendant, especially state1nents regarding alcohol
consumption.

4.

The Defendanfs performance on field sobriety tests.

5.

The blood alcohol test results.

The only evidence ·which may delve into expert witness testim.ony would be the

inferences drawn by the officer (n1ore factual testimony than expert), and perhaps the £del
sobriety evaluations. In that vein, it is a1so anlicipated that Trooper Talbott will testif-y as to his
training and experience jn D1JI evaluations so to describe for the jury the inferences he concluded
from his obsenrations and interaction with the Defendant.
STATE'S 1vffiMORA.NDUM lN OBJECTTON TO DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL MOTtoNS--P AGE 9
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In reviewing each field sobriety evaluation individually:
Idaho Courts have judicially recognized that the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test (HGN)
is reliable. The State 1s not required to present, prior to admission, evidence that the HGN test is
based on sufficient facts or data and derived fron1 reliable methods or principals. Purthcr, the
State is allowed to elicit testimony from Trooper Talbott that the defendant's HGN test results
indicate intoxication, although not a specific level of intoxication.
In 1991~ in State v. Garrett 119ldaho 878, 881, 811 P.2d 488,491 (Iclaho,1991) the Idaho

Supreme Court held as follows:
The court ruled that the HGN test satisfies the p·rye standard. We have been furnished with no publieations
or other authority which refutes the reasoned decision or tlle Arizona court. \Ve therefore hold l11r.11. the T-lC:iN
test does satisfy the Frye standard, because the test is based on a generally accepted theory: Pc1·sons who are
intoxicated (as well as some other non-intoxicated members oftlle populat]on) exhibit nystagmus. The
courts of oLher jurisdictions, inc1uding A1aska, Arizona, Towa, Louisiana, Montana, 01Jio, and Texas have
also decided that the HGN test satisfies Frye.

Testi1nony regarding the HGN, to the extent it arises to expe1i testimony, is properly

allowed. The foundation required for HGN testin1ony is established by case law:
" Qualifying police officers as experts on the adminish·ation of the HG N test is a simple matter
because ... "[t]he observation of HGN in a person and its interpretation as an effect of alcohol intoxication
do not necessari1y require expertise in physiology, toxicology, or any otl1er scientific field. The nystagmus
etfect can be observed without mechanical, electronic or chemical equipment of any kind. At least in lbc.
simple form presented in this case, it requires no more medical training than administration of other flcld
sobriety tests, such as the one-legged balance."

Jd at 883, 811 P.2d at 493, (quoting People v. Ojeda, 225 Cal.App.Jd 404, 275 CaJ.R.ptr. 472, tJ7'1 (1990)).
The foundational evidence presented in this case shows that deputy Schueller was qualified as an expert
under the Garrett analysis. She was trained in the BON technique by the Idaho Stale Police, nnd she had
received additional training on administration of the test at a separate seminar. Anderson's objection to her
qualifications was properly ovenuled.

State v. Anderson 130 Jdaho 765,767-768,947 P.2d 1013,1015-1016
(Idaho App., 1997)
Like-wise, anticipated testimony from Trooper Talbott regarding his remaining
observations are not considered expert witness testimony in the manner asserted by the
Defendant.
l'The officer was competent to testify as to his own personal knowledge of the resu1ts ofthe tests as
compared to the field sobriety tests. His testimony was admissible under LR.E. 701, "Opinion testimony by
STATE'S MEMORAl'i'DUM IN OBJECTfON TO DEFENDANT'S PRE-TIUJ'J.J MOTJONS--PAGE l 0
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lay witness~" because the opin·i·on vvru:, rat!onaHy·bascd on the perception ofrhc 'vvitness; <Hrd \Vas J~~~lpfitl Lu
the detemTination .of a fact in issue . . namely, >Nhdher Goerig ·w·as intoxicated v;.·hen stopped. 'rhe objections
ra1!>I:~d by Goerig were: the proper subject of cross-ex:~mi11aiio11, but do not persuade ns that the trial court
er:t·ed .f.rr admrt!:tng the rcst:irnony. State·v. Goerig 121 Idaho I OB, 1·12, 822 P.2d 1005, 1ODlJ (Idalw
App,.;l 991)

In that the sdentl±1c YeliabiHty of the horizontal g~1ze nyst~tghTlis test has: bt~eil jTid.ici;;; ll y
found to exist, and given the namre of the remu1ning fle1d sot-:n:iety eva1uat.ions n.s observations of
an officer cmn.petcnt to make su.ch observation and co.n1petent to ·express an opinion rege:wding

wht;ther the defendant passed or faile~l~ this Co.urt.shoul4 ~lcny tlw Pcfcndsnf $ rnoti{;m. /\,s
establ1shed by Idaho ya$e law, the Troop~r~s observ~1.tion.s ;u~d r;ondrJsiv.r1sp
TTQope(s

tr11in.ing .~nd ·~:xperieu.G~~ ~r~ gpy(;rned by :tR.E. 701

in olig.ht vf l;h~~·

than ;1s asscrt~d by the. D·~Jcw:bnl..

Of noie~ :then~: is no legal requircrnent .that the foundation rcq11i red prior to tcstin1cmy of
Tro()per ·ralbott be d{,1.ne outside the presence of the jury. In fad, :lt is c.ntixcl:y.propcr for tbc Jw·y
to hear the .t{)undational qttestions so that the Jmy can evaluate the testimony in Eglrt .of sn.tne~
V:t

l"'o: ex.dude witnesses. from the culilrt.nm.m until they h.av.e testified~. to arhli110T:ish
w]tness·es .from djs,!!ussing th.ei.r ·testhnmlly wBth other 'tlidtnesses, axHJ {o b~ur frotn.
fudher testinwny ali.ll.:Y '\'dtness wlw. remmins in H.w :etml:'t:nwm foHoYvi;ng fcNiiiill1inny.
'I'his matter ·is. discretionary -vvith tl1e Court, and guided (as pointed ·out 1-Jy the Defencbn!)

by LR.E. 615. Tl1e .Stale does not o'bj.ect to a m.otio:n to exdude vvitnesses. 1-fm:x:ever, ns u

rebuttal witness cam1.ot be determined until. after the dose nf the Defense case,

the SLate fed~;

;;m

order stating that any person who remain:-: ·in the courtroom following the conclusion of their
testhnony is. barred from further tes.tin1ony is not appropriate.
I

...•
·~
DATED thts. ---?+,_!,._day
01 Apn l~ 20 L .
. .

•

:/"'?,/,#.-.
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.. '
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COURT :MINUTES
CR-20 13-0000676

State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin
Hearing type: Pretrial Motions
Hearing date: 4/18/2013
Time: 10:05 am
Judge: JeffP. Payne
Courtroom: 4
Court reporter: none
Minutes Clerk: Brittany Davenport
Tape Number: crtrm4
Defense Attorney: Scott Chapman
Prosecutor: E Tyler

100505
100541
100611
100828
101128
101149
101400
101635

101808
101859
102231
102343
102437
103358
103536
103750
103817

E. Clayne Tyler present for the State. Gaylord Jay Colvin present with
counsel, Scott Chapman.
Tyler approaches bench with a copy of filing that was faxed, that includes
clearer images.
Chapman calls Trooper Jeffory Talbott. Talbott sworn by Clerk.
Chapman begins direct exam.
Tyler, objection-relevance. Chapman responds. Court instructs Chapman
to continue. Chapman continues direct exam. ·
Tyler, objection-misstates Officer's Police Reports. Court instructs
Chapman to restate question.
Tyler, same objection. Court, overruled.
Chapman approaches witness with a copy of Probable Cause Affidavit and
provides a copy to Tyler. Chapman continues direct exam.
Chapman questions Tyler if they can stipulate to entering the video
footage of stop. CD containing video footage of stop is marked as
Defendant's Exhibit A. Tyler agrees to stipulate. admission. Chapman
continues direct exaJJ+.
Chapman offers Defendant's Exhibit A, up to the actual stop. Tyler has
no objection. Admitted.
Chapman plays the video footage.
Court asks for one replay of footage.
Chapman continues direct exam.
Chapman concludes direct exam. Tyler begins cross exam.
Chapman begins re-direct. Chapman hands Trooper Talbott Defendant's
Exhibit B, his Probable Cause Affidavit and continues re-direct.
Chapman offers Defendant's Exhibit B. Tyler has no objection. Admitted.
Tyler, objection- Chapman is asking witness to draw legal conclusion.
Court questions Chapman regarding significance. Chapman responds.
Tyler has no re-cross.
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103831
103932
104044

104505
104609
104647
105025
105056
105257
105351
105517
105738
105748
105820
105832
105922
110110
110146

Chapman calls Gaylord Jay Colvin. Colvin sworn by Clerk. Chapman
begins direct exam.
Tyler, objects- Questions witness in aid of objection. Tyler questions
Colvin re: if Trooper Talbott would have any knowledge of mechanical
functioning of truck. Tyler moves to exclude testimony. Court-overruled.
Chapman continues direct exam. Chapman approaches for Clerk to mark
exhibit. Clerk marks CD as Defendant's Exhibit C. Chapman offers to
admit Defendant's Exhibit C. Tyler questions witness. Witness responds.
Tyler, objects to admission of 2nd part of video. Has no objection to first
part.
Chapman questions witness. Witness responds. Chapman still offers for
admission.
Court doesn't see relevance to what other vehicles are doing. Court will
admit for purpose of showing layout of roadway. Admitted for those
limited purposes.
Parties view video.
Chapman continues direct exam.
Tyler, objects-relevance. Chapman explains relevance. Court instructs
Chapman to continue.
Tyler, renews objection. Court responds. Chapman continues.
Chapman finishes. Tyler begins cross exam.
Chapman, objection-legal conclusion. Court responds. Court will make
legal determination. Tyler continues cross exam.
·
Chapman has no re-direct.
Chapman has no additional witnesses. Tyler has no additional witnesses.
Court addresses parties.
Chapman has no additional arguments. Tyler has no additional
arguments- asks that Court disregard the portion ofbriefmg re: statutorily
mandated time period for signaling.
Court addresses Chapman re: aspects of Motion. Court questions
Chapman re: suppressing statements and prior bad acts. Chapman
responds.
Chapman has nothing further. Tyler has nothing further. Court will take
under advisement and issue a written opinion.
Recess.
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State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin
Sorted by Exhibit Number
Storage Location
Number
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Description

Result

Property Item Number

Defendant's Exhibit A, CD with
footage of traffic stop, admitted
4/18/13

Admitted

Georgia

Assigned to:

Chapman, Scott M

Defendant's Exhibit B, Probable
Cause Affidavit, admitted 4/18/13

Admitted

Georgia

Assigned to:

Chapman, Scott M

Admitted

Georgia

Assigned to:

Chapman, Scott M

Defendant's Exhibit C, CD with
footage taken by Colvin, admitted
4/18/13

Destroy
Notification
Date

Destroy or
Return Date
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND IDDICIAL DISTRlCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CODNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 13-676

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

REGARDING PRETRIAL
MQTIONS

)
The defendant, Gaylord Jay Colvin, flied various pretrial motions. 'The tno1ions
were heard on April 18, 2013.

Mr. Colvin was personally present along witl1 hls

attorney, Scott Chapman. The State of Idaho was present, represented by t11e prosecuting
attorney, E. Clayne Tyler. Evidence was presented and tp.e parties submitted the matter
on the evidence presented· and arguments contained in memorandums the parties had
. previously filed. Thereafter, the court took the various motions under advisement.
Pursuant to his various motions, Mr. Colvin sought to:
• Suppress all evidence _obtained as a result of the stop of his vehicle
and/or seizure ofhis person;
• Suppress all statements he made subsequent to his arrest and prior to
being advised on his constitutional rights;
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS. OF LAW
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• Exclude any comment, reference, or questions regarding information
andlor responses given to questioning by law enforcement agents;
• Exclude any evidence of '~rior bad acts" :o specifically including any
prior convictions;
• Require the State to establish, outside the presence of the juzy, adequate
foundation for any opinion and/or expert evidence, and prevent the State
from mentioning any such opinions or expert evidence until the
foundation requirements have been met; and,
• Exclude witnesses from trial such that they cannot hear the testimony of
other witnesses.
After· considering the matter, the court makes the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
On J~uary 28, 2013, at approximately 10:20 p.m., Idaho State Police Officer
Jeffory Talbott stopped a vehicle being driven by Gaylord Jay Colvin in Le,;viston~ Idaho,
which stop resulted in Mr. Colvin being charged with driving under the influence.
Officer Talbott first noted Mr. Colvin's vehicle as it turned right onto 21st Street
.

.

from gtll Avenue. Officer Talbott then follovred Mr. Colvin's vehicle as it traveled south
on 21 sr Street, turned right on 16th or 19th Avenue and proceeded to 17th Street, turned left ·
onto 17th Street and traveled south on 17th Street to where 17th Street became 5th Street

and continued south on 5th Street. Officer Talbott then stopped Mr. Colvin's vehicle on

5th Street. Officer Talbott estimated it vvas three to foirr miles from where he started
following Mr. Colvin's vehicle to where he stopped :MI. Colvin.
Weatp.er conditions were dark

and cloudy, with light rain.

Mr. Colvin ·was chiving

a 1992 Toyota pickup.
As Officer Talbott observed and/or followed J\.1r. Colvin's vehicle he made

various observations about the operation of Mr. Colvin's vehicle, including; it weaved
within its lane at times; it consistently traveled under the speed limit~ including traveling
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

2

117

,Apr.22. 2013 11:18AM

No. 0488

P. 4

on 5th Street at approximately 30 mph when the speed limit was 3 5 mph; and:r it signaled
for and made three turns and one lane change. Officer Talbott did not observe or note
any law violations related to the operation ofJVIr. Colvin's vehicle prior to 5th Street.
As Officer Talbott and Mr. Colvin traveled south on 5th Street, 5th Street initially

·consisted of three traffic lanes, a single northbound lane and two southbound lanes. The
tw'o southbound lanes were parallel lanes, separated by a dashed white line.
Talbott

and Mr.

Officer

Colvin were both initially in the left-hand southbolll1d lane \Vith lv1r.

Colvin's vehicle directly in front of Officer Talbott's vehicle. As Mr. Colvin traveled
south in 'ili:e left-hand southbound lane he activated his right tum signal and moved frorn
the left-hand southbound lane into the right-hand southbound lane and continued south.
Officer Talbott remained in the left-harid southbound lane. Thereafter, while traveling in
the right-hand southbound lane, .Mr. Colvin passed a yello·w, diamond shaped traffic sif,rn
that contained a black symboL The sign was located along the right-hand shoulder of 5th.
Street and appeared

as follows:

After passing by the above-referenced sign Mr. Colvin continued south in the
right-hand southbound lane and the two southbound lanes converged to become a single
southbound lane. N.Ir. Colvin passed through the area where the two southbound lanes
converged and continued south in the single remaining southbound lane. l\1r. Colvin did
not use any signals while he traveled in the right-~and southbound lane as he approached

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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and traveled through the area where the two southbound lanes converged into a. single
remaining southbound lane. After

Mr. Colvin passed through the area where thre tvvo

southbound lanes converged Officer Talbott activated his overhead lights and stopped
Mr. Colvin for failing to signal, in violation of I. C. § 49_-808.
After stopping

:t:Jr. Colvin, Officer Talbott contacted Mr. Colvin,

adn1inistered

field sobriety evaluations, and arrested Mr. Colvin for driving under the influence.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

STOP OF VEIDCLE AND/OR SEIZURE OF PERSON
Mr. Colvin seeks the suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of the stop of

his vehicle and/or the seizure of his person.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the
unreasonable searches

and seizures of persons or property.

A search or seizme conducted

"Without a warrant issued on probable cause is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls

within one ofthe established exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v_ Buell. 145
Idaho 54. 55. 175 PJd 216. 217 (Ct.App.2008). ~ne such exception is an investig~~tive
detention based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Buell, 145 Idaho at 55. . 56;
175 P.3d at 217-18), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868. 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (19681

An investigative detention must be justified· by articulable facts raisjng reasonable
suspicion that the individual has been

or is about to be engaged in criminal conduct.

Buell, 145 Idaho at 56, 175 P.3d at 218).. Terry. 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct at 18.8_D., 20
L.Ed.2d at 906. The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause~ but
more than a mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. State v_ Evan.r.,__j)4
Idaho

560~

563, 6 P.3d 416,419 (Ct.App.2000).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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An officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if thoro is
reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being dliven contrary to traffic lavrs.

Evans, 134 Idaho at 563 .. 6 P.3d at 419; United States v. Cortez~ 449 U.S. 41L 417._1Ql.
S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621. 628 (1981).
In the current case, Officer Talbott could stop Mr. Colvin's vehicle to investigate
possible criminal behavior if he had reasonable articulable suspicion that l\1r. Colvin's
vehicle -vvas being driven contrary to traffic laws.
Officer Talbott stopped Mr. Colvin's vehicle because Mr. Colvin did not t1se a
signal when he proceeded from the right-hand lane of two parallel southbound lan.es of

5th Street to the single southbound lane when the two southbound lanes converged .into a
single southbound

lane. Officer Talbott stopped lvf:r. Colvin for failing to signal, in

violation of I. C. § 49-80S.
Idaho Code Section 49-808 provides in pertinent part:
(1) No person shall tum a vehicle upon a highway or move a vehicle right
or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and
until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor vvitl1out giving
an appropriate signal.
(2) A signal of intention to tum or move right or left when required shall
be given continuously to warn other traffic. On coutrolled~access
highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be
given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds au~ in all other
instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the
vehicle before turning.

In the current case, Mr. Colvin did not use a signal when traveling in the righthand SOUfubound lane as he approached and proceeded through the area Vlhere the two
southbo~d lanes converged into a single southbound lane. :Mr. Colvin asserts he ¥Vas not

required to signal and I. C. §49-808 is void for vagueness as applied.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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The Idaho Court of Appeals has addressed the applicability of I.C.§49--808 to
signaling when tvvo same-directional traffic lanes converge into one same-directional
traffic lane in Burton v. State Department of Transportation, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d
933 CCt.App.2010) and State v. Dewbre. 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ctlqm.1999).

Burton and Dewbre both involve situations in which the defendants vvere driving
on two lane highways that ~ad passing areas ·where a single one-directional lane v.rould
split/expand into two same-directional lanes and then at the end of the passing area the

two same-directional lanes would converge back into one same-directional lane. In both
cases the defendants were stopped for failing

to

signal, ip. violation· of LC. § 49-808,

when the defendants proceeded from the right-hand lane of a two same-directional lane
configuration to the si~gle remaining lane without signaling.

Ip. Burton the defendant sought vacation of a suspension of her driver's lic;ense by
the Idaho Transportation Department.

The defendant asserted the law enforce1nent

officer lacked legal cause to stop her vehicle because I. C. §49-808 was unconstitutionally
vague as applied to the facts of her case. On appeal the Court of Appeals held I.C. §49~
808 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant.

In Burton the defendant was driving in the right-hand lane of a two samedirectional lane configuration and when the two same-directional lane confit,ruration was

about to ·end the defendant saw. a traffic sign indicating the two same-directional lanes
merged.

The defendant did not signal as she approached the end of the t\vo san1e-

directional lane configuration.

Thereafter, a patrol officer stopped the defendant for

failing to signal, in violation of I. C. §49-808.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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In Burton the Court of Appeals was persuaded there -vvas merit in the defendant's
contentioD; that LC. §49-808 was unconstitutionally :vague as applied in her circumstaJ1Ce~
because the statute did not clearly indicate a signal was required when hvo lanes n1exged

with neither lane clearly ending and neither clearly continuing. As stated in Burton:
We are persuaded that there is merit in Burton's contention that Section
49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied in this circumstance, for
the statute does not clearly indicate that a signal is required when D:vo
lanes merge with neither lane clearly ending and neither deady
continuing. This situation differs significantly from that where one uf
two lanes ends and the other continues, as occurred in Dewbre._. In the
Dewbre circumstance, the statute plainly requires a signal because a
driver in the terminating lane inust change lanes in order to continue
travel on the highway, and changing lanes constitutes a move 'to the
left or right. But when there is no basis to discern that one lane is
terminating and the other surviving, but rather the two blend into a single
lane, it is not clear that the continued folWard movement of the v'ehi cle
from either of the two lanes into the emerging lane constitutes a 'move
... right or left' that is subject · to the Section 49-808(1) signal
requirement." (Emphasis added). Burton. 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P.3d at
936.
It Burton two same-directional lanes blended into a single remaining lane end it

was unclear which of the two lanes ended and which lane continued. Ho·wever, in the
current case it is clear which lane of the two same-directional lanes ended ancl·which lane
continued because there was a traffic warning sign advising motorists that the right-hand
southbound lane ended and the left-hand southbound laue continued ...
The Idaho Department of Transportation has adopted rules govenu11.g traf£jc
control devices, mcluding the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
Highways (1illTCD).

IDAPA 39.03.41.000 et.seq.; IDAPA 39-03.41.004; Id@.o

Department of Transportation Traffic ManuaL January 2012, Section 151.01.
, The most recent version of the MUTCD, the 2009 versio~ was published on
December 16, 2009~ and adopted changes were effective January 15, 2010.
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MUTCD, 2009 Edition, Section lA.Ol provides in part:
The purpose of traffic control devices, as well as principals for their use, is
to promote highway safety and efficiency be providing for the orderly
movement of all road users on streets, highways, b.ikeways, and private
roads open to public travel throughout the Nation.

Traffic control devices notify road users of regulations and provide
warning and guidance needed for the uniform and efficient operation of
all elements of the traffic stream in a manner intended to minilnize the
occurrence of crashes.

MUTCD, 2009 Edition~ Section 2C.Ol provides in part:
Warning signs call attention to unexpected conditions on or adjacent to a
highway, street, or private roads open to public travel and to situations
~hat might not be readily apparent to road users ... (Emphasis added).
MUTCD, 2009 Edition, Section 2C.03 provides iri part:
Except as provided in Paragraph 2 or unless specifically designated
otherwise, all warning signs shall be diamond-shaped (square 'vith. one
diagonal vertical) with a black legend and border on a yellow

background.....

·

MUTCD, 2009 Edition, Section 2C.42 provides for lane ends signs.

MUTCD, 2009 Edition, Figure 2C-8 shows various signs.
The sign 1fr_ Colvin passed while traveling in the right-hand southbound lane of
5th Street~ prior to the two southbound lanes converging to become a single southbound
lane, is a warning sign and is shown in Figure 2C-8 of the MUTCD, 2009 Edition and is
designated "W4-2~'and addressed in Section 2C.42 of the MUTCD, 2009 Edition. The
sign, as sho\Vll below, is a symbol sign for right lane ends.
.

.
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The above-referenced sign, posted along the right-hand shoulder of the 1-ight,·h21..nd
southbound lane of 5th Street, was a warning sign that called attention to a situation that

might not have been readily apparent- the right-hand southbou11d lane of 5 1b Street ··would
be ending and a motorist in the right-hand lane would have to move left and merge ·with
the left-hand southbound lane to continue. 1
In Dewbre the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a
traffic stop, alleging the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable seizures .. The trial court denied the· defendant's motion, holding that LC. §
49-808 required the defendant to signal. The Court of Appeals affinne.d on appeaL

In Dewbre a sign directing traffic to stay to the right except to pass \Vas located.
near the beginning of the passing area. Near the end of the passing area two traffic signs
and painted arro\:vs on the roadway ad_vised traffic the passing lane \.Vas ending and traffic

in the right lan.e should merge left. Upon entering the passing area the defendant kept to
the right and traveled through the passing area in the right-hand lane. After chiving past
the last dashed line separating the tWo san1.e-directionallanes the defendant traveled fr01n
the right-hand lane into the single remaining lane without signaling the maneuver.
In affrrming the trial court, the Court of Appeal~ stated:
'"Whenever a movement is made to the left or right on a highway,
regardless of whether the movement is made necessary to cotnply
with highway signage, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to
LC. §49-808 ...
. . .whenever a vehicle moves to the right or to the left because one
lane splits into two lanes, or two lanes merge into one lane, an
appropriate signal is required puxsuant to LC. §49-808".

1

When two parallel lanes converge, one or the other will have to "move~> towards the other; othenvise tlJ.e
two parallel lanes will remain parallel and never converge. In this case the warning sign advised that the
righ.t·hand southbound lane was ending and motorists in such lane had to move left to continue.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 666, 991 P.2d at 391.
The void for vagueness doctpne, pre1nised on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be worde.d ·with
sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand vvhat cotl_duct is

prohibited and the statute must be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and
discriminatozy enforcement. Burton, 149 Idaho at 748, 240 P.3d at 936. A statute may

be void for vagueness if it" fails to give adequate notice of conduct it proscribes or if it

fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others "\Vho JJln.st
enforce the statute. !d.; State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126. 131__(2.003)..;_

State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31. 34,218 PJd 10, 13 CCt.App.2009).
The language of I. C. §49-808 is plain and unambiguous. Dewbre, 133 IdaJJo at
666, 991 P.2d at 391. By its plain and unambiguous language, LC. §49-808 provides that

no person is to tum a vehicle upon a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a
highway or merge onto or exit from a highway without giving an appropriate signaL .L G.
§49-8080). Idaho Code Section49-808 also provides that a signal of intention to turn or
move right or left ·when required shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. .T. C,

{49-808(2). On controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked position,
the signal of intention is to be given for not less than five (5) seconds and in all other
instances for not less .than the last one hundred (1 00) feet traveled by the vehicle before

turning. !d.
Idaho Code Section 18-808(1) is worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness

that ordinary people, and in this case Mr. Colvin, could understand that 'Witl1· his traf£.c
hme (the right-hand southbound lane of 5th Street) ending and his having to merge left
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into another traffic lane (the left-hand southbound lane of 5th Street). to continue on, an
appropriate signal was required.
Further, !.C. § 49-808(2) is worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that
ordinary people~ and in this case Mr. Colv~ could understand that the appropriate sig11a.l
to signal an intention to move left from the right-hand southbound lane to the left-hand
southbound lane was a left signal- similar to (but opposite of) the signaling l\1-tY. Colvin
performed a few seconds prior when he activated his right signal to signal his intention to
move right from the left-hand southbound lane to the right-hand southbound lane.

After considering the relevant facts and applicable law, as set forfu hereins tbis
court does not find or conclude that I.C. §49-808 is constitutionally vague as applied in
this case. Idaho Code Section 49-808 gives adequate notice of conduct it proscribes and
establishes minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others ·who must enforce it.

Mr. Colvin did not directly assert or argue, but did. suggest or infer, that Officer
Talbott had an ulterior motive for following him and stopping him.

fio"\'v·ever, as

discussed in the concurring opinion in Dewbre. an officer.,s subjective intent is irrelevant
and a stop is not pretextual when there is objective reasonable and articulable s11.spicion
that a law violation, however minor, has occurred. See: Dewbre~ 133 Idaho at

.66.L..221

P.2d at,392; State v. Mevers. 118 Idaho 608. 798 P.2d 453 (Ct.App.1990); Stqte v. Law~
115 Idaho 769, 769 P.2d 1141 (Ct.App.l989); United States v. Michael R.._, 9.9 t.3d 340,_
347 (9th Cir.l996).
After considering this matter, as set forth herein, this court finds and concludes
Officer Talbott had reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Colvin's vehicle was ddven
contrary to a traffic law and his stop of Mr. Colvin was a lawful investigative ~etention.
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STATEMENTS MADE SUBSEQUENT TO ARREST
Mr. Colvin seeks the suppression of all statements he made subsequent to his

arrest bt~.t prior to being advised of his constitutional rights.

Miranda warnings must be given to a suspect who is subject to custod~al
interrogation. State v. Silva, 134 I~aho 848= 854, 11 P.3d 44. 50 (Ct.A,Q12:20Q_O_llii_tLug

Miranda v. Arizona, 384.U.S. 436, 86 S.C~ 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 {1966). The obligation
to give Miranda warnings arises only when there has been a restriction of a person's
freedom such that he is ~'in custody". State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 81 L 814,} 248 P.2d 166.
169 (Ct.A]2p.l997).

For the purpose of Miranda requirements, "custody'' is equivalent to faunal arrest

or restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. §jlva",
134 Idaho at 854 (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121. 1125, 1.03 S.Ct. 35J7~

3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275. 1279-80 (1983).

The standard for such deteniLination is an

objective test, being: would a reasonable person believe he or she \Vas in police custody

to a degree associated "With a formal arrest. The test is not whether a person vrouJd
believe he qr she was free to leave. Silva. 134 Idaho at 854~ (citing Berkemer v. 1\1c9aGY.::468 U.S. 420. 442. 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151-52. 82 L.Ed.2d 317. 336 (1984).
Stopping an automobile· and detaining· its occupants constitutes a seizuxe

\Vithin

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, however, a traffic stop is more an.c1logous to an
investigatory Te~ stop than an arrest, therefore it is not subject to the requ.irem.ents of
Miranda. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3149-50; State v. Beneflr;l, 131

Idaho 226. 953 P.2d 976 C1998).

2

.

Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
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Although a defendant may be subject to a seizure ·within the n1e.aning of 111c
Fourth Amendment during the adn1inistration of field sobriety evaluation-S conducted
pursuant to a traffic stop, such a seizure is an investigative detention and is not a seizure
equivalent to ''custody'' requiring the giving of Miranda waroings. See F'err.Ktr.f!.~JJ.'J
Idaho 474,480-81.988 P.2d 700,706-7 CCt.App.l999): State v. Pil,gk 1{9 I~lahQ.SO,__ZLL
P.2d 750 C~t.Ano.l996).
In the curren~ case Mr. Colvin has not identified any specific staternents be seeh-:s
suppression of, when such statements were made, or the circumstances pursuant to which
the statements were made. Further, there is insufficient evidence before 11"1.e court to
determine when Mr. Colvin was placed in "custody" for Miranda warnings purposes
and!or when Miranda rights were given, if at all. T11erefore, this court cannot detennine
whether any statements made by I\1r. Colvin were made in violation of his constitutional
rights.

This court can only make general determinations regardin.g unidentified and

unspecified statements:

• If 1v1r. Colvin· !nade any statements prior to being arrested and/or
restrained of his freedom of movement to the degree associated. \·vith a
formal arrest, such staten1ents would not have been in violation of his
Miranda rights.
• If Mr. Colvin made any statements in response to questioning by a la"iV
' enforcement officer after being arrested and/or resu;ained of.his freedorn
of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrests, but prior to
being advised of his Miranda rights and waiving such rights, such
statements would have been in violation of his Miranda rights <;~..nd would
be subject to suppression.
• If Mr. Colvin made any statements after being arrested and! or restrained
of his freedom of movement to the degree associated vvith a fotn1al
arrests, but the statements were not in response to questioning by a law
enforcement officer, or the statements were made after :M:r. Cohin -vvas
advised of his IVfuanda rights and waived such rights, such state1nents
would not have been in violation of his Miranda rights.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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INFORMATION AND/OR RESPONSES GIVEN TO LA.w· EN1~0E.C.K~_IJ;l{I
Mr. Colvin seeks ·to exclude any comment, reference, or questions rcgm·din.g

information and/or responses given to la\v enforcement agents.
Mr. Colvin does not identify any specific information and/or response that he
seeks to prevent the State from commenting on, making reference to, or asking qnc:sticm.J
regarding; when such info~tion and/or response was obtained at1d/or made; how· such
information and/or response was obtained or made; or, the cjrcmnstances pursuant to
which the information and/or response 'yas obtained and/or made. Therefore, ·t11is court
cannot determine whether any ·specific information and/or response was· obtained and/or
made in violation of Mr. Colvin's constitutional rights.·
4.

EVIDENCE OF "PRIOR BAD ACTS"

11r. Colvin seeks to exclude any evidence of i'prior bad acts", specif:ics.Uy
including any prior convictions.
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of other crimes, \vTongs or
acts is prohibited if offered to prove the character of a person, but may potentinJ.ly be
used for other purposes.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:

"Evidence of other crimes, 'Wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove t.he
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however~ be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution
in a criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial,
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause sho\vn~ of
the general nature of the evidence it intends to introduce at triaL~'

11r. Colvin does not identify any specific ''prior bad acts'~ or prior c.ritninal

convictions that he seeks to exclude&
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS ·oF LAW
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The State identifies a prior driving under the influence conviction a.s the on.lv
~

"prior bad act'' it intends to introduce, and then only for enhance1nent puxposes i~1 ·1lr.e
event the jury fmds :MI. Colvin guilty of driving under the influence.

Mr. Colvin is charged ·with driving under the influence, a second offense.
Therefore, in the event 1v1r. Colvin is convicted of driving under the hlfluence, the State
may thereafter offer evidence of a plior driving under the influence conviction for tl1o
purpose of proving l\1r. Colvin had a prior driving under the influence conviction.
However, ·the State may not offer evidence of a prior driving under the influence
conviction unless and until Mr. Colvin is convicted of the current charge. Further, the
State may not offer evidence of any other "prior bad ~ct'' unless and until it cornp1ics w.i.th

I.R.E. 404(b).
5.

FOUNDATION FOR OPINION AND/OR EXPERT TESTIMONy
Mr. Colvin seeks to require the State to establish, ou~side the presence of th~ jury,

adequate foundation for any opinion and/or expert evidence pursuant to LH.,E. 702 and
705, and prevent the State from mentioning ~y such opinions or expert evidence uDtil

the foundation requirements have been met.
Idaho·Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized lmowledge vd.ll assist the tTJer
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a \Vitness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.~,
Idaho Rule of Evidence 705 provides:

"The expert .may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give the
reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data,
provided that the court may require otherwise, and provided fTh.-ther that~ if
requested pursuant to the rules of discovery the underlyjng facts or data

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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were disclosed. The expert may in any event be require-d to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination."
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 requires that an expert be "qualified".

Th.::; JJ:vo

sources of expert qualification in the rule, being: knowledge, skill, experience, 1:tniuh.s;,;, .

and education, are disjunctive. State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 414, 3 J2.3d 5)2~~;i~.2J
CCt.App.2000). There n1ust be some den1onsttatiori that the Yvitn,ess has acquired G1c
necessary expertise and knowledge to render the proffered opinion~ through scnne type of
training, education or experience. Any one of the five souTces of qualification provided
for by the rule may be sufficient to qualify a 'Witness as an expert. Id
For opinion or other testimony of an expert to be admissible, two foundation
grounds must be established: 1) a reliable basis for the proffered testimony; aD.d, 2) the
proposed expert's qualification to provide that testimony. See Kum.ho Tire Co .. Lt~t. ~E.

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999): Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann 's, Inc ..:. 509 U.S. 593
(1993); Konechnv, 134 Idaho at 417, 3 P.3d at 542.
The current case is a driving under the influence case in which evidence regarding
various sobriety evaluations may be offered, inducting; 1) horizontal gaze uystagm.us; 2)
walk-and-tum; and, 3) one-leg stand.
In regard to the horizontal gaze nystagmus evaluation, the Idaho Suprerne Court
has held that the horizontal gaze nystagmus field sobriety evaluation is scientifica1ly
reliable and evidence of the results of such an evaluation are admissible with a foUJadation

that the witness is competent and reliable enough to introduce horizontal gaze nysta.gn111s
testimony and testify that nystagmus may be an indication of intoYication.

State v.

Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65. 844 P.2d 691, 694 C1992); State v, Garrett. 119 I®LliLl;LL~_t
811 P.2d 488 (1991).

However, horizontal gaze nystagmus evidence n1uy only be

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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admitted in conjuction with other field sobriety evaluation evidence and the \VitJ.;t:=:.:;s tnny
only testify that nystagmus may be an indicator of intoxication. CileasQtb_l23 Id0J.1o~gt
66. 844 P.2d at 695.

Horizontal gaze nystagmus evidence n1ay not be adcniUcd to

establish or infer any particular alcohol concentration level. Id
A police officer may qualify as an expert to testify about a. do.t1:.ndant' s
performance on a horizontal gaze nystagmus evaluation. State v. AJ1der.s:rzt£~-l~~Q_I~Lf!1H~~
765. 767. 947 P.2d 1013 .. 1015 (1997). The Idaho Supreme Court has recog:niz(;d tbat

H.

police officer may be qualified to t~stify regarding .horizontal gaze nystagu1us based on
his training by the Idaho State Police and.his attendance at field sobriety test sen.1irwxs.ld. ._

at 767. 947 P.3d 1015, citing Garrett. 119 Idaho at 882-83, 811 P.2d at 492-9~.·
As noted by in Anderson, citing Garrett:
"Qualifying police officers as experts on the administration of the I-IGl'J
test is a simple matter because ... ''[t]he observation of HGN in a person
and its interpretation as an effect of alcohol intoxication do not necessc.uiJy
require expertise in physiology, toxicology, or any other scientific field.
The nystagmus effect can be observed without n:~,echanic(lJ~ eleclTou1c or
chemical equipment of any kind. At least in the sin1ple form presented in
this case, it requires no more medical training th;m administration of o1l1er
field sobriety tests::o such as the one-legged balance."

Anderson. 130 Idaho at 767-68. 947 P.2d at 1015-16: Garrett, 119 Idaho ~ttJl83,7_ 8tl
P.2d 493.
In Garrett, the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished the horizontal gaze nys1.ag;.cnl.lS
evaluation from the -vvalk-and-turn evaluation and the one-leg stand evaluation in that the
walk-and-tum evaluation and the one-leg stand evaluation do not rely upon Sl~ience for
their legitimacy, but rather rely on facts within the realm of con1mon knowledge. ~..')ee

Garrett., 119 Idaho at 881, 811 P.2d at 491. Therefore, Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 does

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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not govern the admissibility of evidence as to the walk-and-tum evaluation and H1e one·~
leg stand evaluation.
The trial court has broad discretion regarding the adrnissio.n of c vidence,

Gleason, 123 Idaho at 65, 844 P.2d at 694.
After considering this matter, specifically including the relatively routine nature

of establishing a foundation for opinion and!or expert evidence at a driving under the
influence trial, this court does not find or conclude that it is necessary or appropriate to
require the State to establish the foundation for any such evidence outside tll,e presence of

the jury or prevent the State from referring to any opinions or expert evidence that .will
be admitted at trial until the foundation requirements have been1net
6.

EXCLUDING WITNESSES AT TRIAL

Mr. Colvin seeks to exclude witnesses from trial such that they c~mnot hear the
testimony of other witnesses.

Idaho Rule of Evidence 615(a) provides that the court·may order that ·witnesses be
excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. \Vhether to exclude

witnesses fron1 the courtroom is a discretionary determination for the court.
After considering this matter this court fmds and concludes that the interests of

justice ~ould be served by excluding all witnesses from the courtroom \Vh1.1e ot11cr
vvitnesses are testifying, except for Mr... Colvin who may remain in the cm.rrt.room and be
present during the testimony of other witnesses even though he may be a ·vvitness.
DATED this ~day of April, 2013.
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CLERK'S CERTIFCATE OF MAILING

I, the undersigned Dep'!lty Clerk of the .above-entitled Cou:ti do hereby certit)r that
a copy of the foregoing document was mailed or delivered by n1e on ..:Q!.J.J..___12___~-~-~-'
2013, to:
5

Scott. Chapman
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
P.O. Box446
Lewiston, ID 83501

E. Clayne Tyler
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box2627
Orofmo, ID 83544
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERC:E
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
Defendant

)
)·
)
)
)

Case No. CR 13-676

ORDER REGARDll\JG
PRETRIAL MOTIONS

)
.)
)

The defendant, Gaylord Jay Colvin, filed various pretrial nwtions.

On t11e

grounds and for the reasons set forth in this court's findings of fact ond conclusions of

la\V filed simultaneously herewith,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1) .Mr. Colvin's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop
of his vehicle and/or the seizure ofhis person is DENIED.

2) Mr. Colvin's motion to suppress all statements he n1ad.e subsequent to lJis
a.tTest and prior to being advised of his constitutional rights is GRANTED in
regard to any statements Mr. Colvin made in response to law enforcement

ORDER REGARDING
PRETRJAL MOTIONS
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questi.onmg subsequent to his arrest but prior to being a.d:viscd. of
constitutional rights.

However, the court is unable to detenniuc: vihut

statements, if any, would be suppressed because no such staten:J-ents have been
identified to the court. :Mr. Colvin's n1otion is DE1\fffiD in regard to any
statements Mr. Colvin made subsequent to his arrest but prior to being advised
of his constitutional rights that were not made in response to questioning by

law enforcement agents.
3) Mr: Colvin's motion to .exclude conunent, reference, or questions regarcti.ng
information and/or responses given to questioning by lavr enforcernent agents
is GRANTED in regard to any evidence or response suppressed or excluded

by the court. Mr. Colvin's motion is DENIED in regard to evidence aJJd
responses that are not suppressed or excluded by the coUJ.-t.
4) Mr. Colvin~s motion to exclude evidence of')>rior bad acts" is GI·lANTJ~D in
regard to evidence of ''prior bad acts~' and prior convictions, other tlum.
evidence of prior driving under the influence convictions used after a
conviction on the pending driving under the influence charge (in t..~e ev(~1Jt of a
conviction on the pending drivmg under the influence charge) to prove prio.r
driving under the influence convictions for enhancement purposes:

Tho

motion is DENIED in regard to evidence of prior driving under the influence
conviction as specifically excepted herein.
5) Mr. Colvin's motion to :require the State to establish> outside the presence of
the jury; adequate foundation for any .opinion audlor expert evidence) m1cl

prevent the State from mentioning any such opinions or evidence until the

ORDER REGARDING
PRETRIAL MOTIONS
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foundation requiren1ents have been met is DENIED.

6) Mr. Colvin's motion to exclude witnesses from trial such that they cannot hear
the testimony of other witnesses is GRANTED, except that Jvf...r. Col'vin :is not
excluded, even though be may be a witness.

DATED thls

t?m) day of April, 2013.
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CLERK'S CERTIFCATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk of the above-entitled Court.. do hereby C(\t1ify thu.l
a copy of the foregoing document was mailed or delivered by nie on Jj-f- (', f._d:.~-··~~:
2013, to:
Scott Chapman
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
P.O. Box446
Lewiston., ID 83501
E. Clayne Tyler
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney
P .0. Box 2627
Orofino, ID 83544
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Se"'': '-'1d Judicial District Court, State of ld~~o
An and For the County of Nez Perce
1230 Main St.
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Gaylord Jay Colvin,
Defendant.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Change of Plea & Sentencing
Judge:
Jeff P. Payne

Wednesday, June 05, 2013

09:00AM

at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday,
May 22, 2013.
Defendant:

Private Counsel:

Prosecutor:

NOTICE OF HEARING

Gaylord Jay Colvin
3131 4th St D
Lewiston, ID 8350100000
Mailed__

Hand Delivered_ _

Scott M Chapman
P.O. Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
Mailed__

Hand Delivered_x_

Mailed__

Hand Delivered_x_

E Clayne Tyler
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~:~}:~ond Judicial District Court, State ot~I~%~ho
In and For the County of Nez Perc\..
1230 Main St.
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

JL

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Gaylord Jay Colvin,
Defendant.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Change of Plea & Sentencing
Judge:
Jeff P. Payne

Thursday, July 11, 2013

08:30AM

at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday,
June 05, 2013.
Defendant:

Private Counsel:

Prosecutor:

NOTICE OF HEARING

Gaylord Jay Colvin
3131 4th St D
Lewiston, ID 8350100000
Mailed__

Hand Delivered _ _

Scott M Chapman
P.O. Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
Mailed__

Hand Delivered_x_

Mailed_x_

Hand Delivered _ _

E Clayne Tyler
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SCOTT CHAPMAN
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1106 Idaho Street
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, Idaho 83 501
(208) 743-1234
Idaho State Bar No. 3467

2.013 JUN 6" RPl 9 3~
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10
11

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZPERCE

12

STATE OF IDAHO,

13

Case No.:

Plaintiff,

CR13-676

14
15

vs.

16

GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,

17

RULE 11 AGREEJVffiNT

Defendant.

18

19

COME NOW, the State and the Defendant in the above-entitled matter,

20

and pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(1)(c) hereby agree to the following

21
22
23
24

disposition of the case:
PLEA:

The defendant agrees to conditionally plead guilty pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (9)(2) to a violation of Section 188004 of the Idaho Code (Non-enhanced).

25

26
27

Defendant reserves the right to appeal the court's Order
Regarding Pretrial Motions filed April 22, 2013, and if
successful may withdraw his plea.

28

RULE 11 AGREEMENT

1

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
· Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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TERMS:
1.

5

On the following understandings, terms, and conditions:

The defendant will receive:
(a)

A fine of$1000.00 with $250.00 suspended plus Court
costs.
(b) Any jail time imposed shall left to the discretion of the
court and defendant may request community service in
lieu of any actual imposed jail time.
(c) Probation may be ordered within the discretion of the
Court, under such terms and conditions as the Court
feels appropriate;
(d) Defendant shall comply with any recommendations
from alcohol evaluation;
(e) Driver's license suspension of 90 days retroactive to
date of ALS suspension;
(f)
Sentencing will be stayed pending outcome of appeal.
(g) That if after accepting this agreement the Court
concludes that any of its provisions regarding the sentence or the
term and condition of probation are inappropriate, it can reject the
plea, and give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

2.

If after accepting the plea the court concludes that any of the terms

19

and provisions of this agreement are unacceptable, both parties shall be given

20

the opportunity to withdraw from this agreement' or the court can reject the

21
22

agreement.

If the plea is rejected or withdrawn, the original charges are

23

automatically reinstated.

24

Defendant hereby gives up any and all motions, defenses, objections, appeals, or

Unless the plea is rejected or withdrawn, the

25
26
27
28

requests that defendant has made or raised or could have served hereafter to or
against any matters preceding the Court's entry of judgment and imposition of
sentence.

RULE 11 AGREEMENT
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Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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3.

The Defendant understands the following rights and understands

and gives up said rights by pleading guilty:

5

(a)

The right to a jury trial;

(b)

The right to confront the witnesses against defendant and
cross-examine them;

(c)

The right to present evidence and call witnesses in
defendant's defense knowing that the State will compel
witnesses to appear and testify;

(d)

The right to be represented by counsel (appointed free of
charge if defendant cannot afford to hire one) at the trial of
proceedings; and

(e)

The right to remain silent and refuse to be a witness against
defendant and to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.

6

7

8
9

10
11
12

13
14

15
16
17
18

4.

This plea agreement contains all the terms and conditions of the

plea agreement, and the Defendant understands that any promises made by

19

anyone, including defendant's lawyer, that are not contained within the written
20
21

22

plea agreement are without force and effect and are null and void.
5.

Any predication or promise as to what the possible sentence will be

23

is understood to be voided by this agreement.
24

25
26

6.

The Defendant is not under the influence of any drug, medication,

liquor, or other intoxicant, and defendant is at this time fully capable of

27

28

understanding the terms and conditions of this plea agreement.

RULE 11 AGREEMENT
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Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
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1

2
3
4
5
6
7

I HAVE READ AND u·NDERSTAND THE ABOVE.
I HAVE
DISCUSSED THE CASE AND MY CONSTITUTIONAL RlGHTS WITH MY
LAWYER. I UNDERSTAND THAT BY PLEADING· (GUILTY) I WILL BE
GIVING UP MY RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY. JURY, TO CONFR.ONT, CROSSEXAMINE, AND COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES, AND
MY. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIJ\1INATION. I AGREE TO ENTER
MY PLE.A AS INDICA TED ABOVE ON. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
SET FORTH HEREIN.

8

9

:DATED this

.t]

day of June, 2013.

10
11
12
13
14
15

I have discussed this case with my client in detail and advised n1y client of
the constitutional rights and all possible defenses. I believe that the plea and
disposition set forth herein are appropriate under the facts of this case. I concur
in the entry of the plea as indicated above and on the tenns and conditions set
forth herein.

16

17

DATED this ~ay of June, 2013.

18

CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC

19

20
21
22
23

24

I have reviewed this matter and concur that the plea and disposition set
forth are appropriate and are in the interests of justice.

25

26

DATED this

1?~·day of June, 2013.

27

28
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Post Office Box 446
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NOTIFICATION OF PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATION OF
DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if you plead guilty to or are found guilty of driving
under the influence in the future, the penalties will be as follows:
A SECOND DUI VIOLATION within ten (10) years, including withheld judgments, is a
MISDEMEANOR and you:
1. Shall be sentenced to jail for a mandatory minimum period of not less than ten (10) days,
the first forty-eight (48) hours of which must be consecutive, and five days of which must be
served in jail, and may be sentenced tO. not more than one (1) year; and
2. May be fined up to Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00); and
3. Shall surrender your driver's license to the court; and
4. Shall have your driving privileges suspended for a minimum one (1) year during which
absolutely no driving privileges of any kind may be granted; and
5. Shall drive only a motor vehicle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system,
following the (1) year license suspension period.

TWO DUI VIOLATIONS when both violations involve an alcohol concentration of 0.20 or
above, within five (5) years; A TIDRD DUI VIOLATION within ten (10) years; or a
SUBSEQUENT DUI VIOLATION with a previous felony DUI or aggravated DUI within
fifteen (15) years; including withheld judgments, is a FELONY and you:
1. (a): Shall be sentenced to the State Board of Corrections for not more than five (5) years
for TWO DUI VIOLATIONS involving an alcohol concentration of 0.20 or above. But

NOTIFICATION OF PENAL TIES FOR SUBSEQUENT VIOLATION OF
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE

1
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if the Court imposes a jail sentence instead of the state penitentiary, it shall be for a
minimum period of not less than thirty (30) days: or
(b): Shall be sentenced to the State Board of Corrections for not more than ten (10)
years for a TIDRD DUI VIOLATION within ten (10) years or a SUBSEQUENT DUI
VIOLATION with a previous felony DUI or aggravated DUI within fifteen (15) years.
But if the Court imposes a jail sentence instead of the state penitentiary, it shall be for a
minimum period of not less than thirty (30) days, the first forty-eight (48) hours of which
must be consecutive, and ten (10) days of which must be served in jail: and
2. May be fined up to Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00); and
3. Shall surrender your driver's license to the court; and
4. Shall have your driving privileges suspended for at least one (1) year and not more than
five (5) years following your release from imprisonment during which time you shall have
absolutely no driving privileges; and
5. Shall drive only a motor vehicle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system,
following the (1) year license suspension period.
Upon application to the Court by the defendant and proof of valid liability insurance or other
proof of financial responsibility (as provided in chapter 12, title 49 Idaho Code), the Court may
authorize a restricted driving permit. The acceptable terms for driving will be set by the court.
No driving outside the scope of the authorized stated use will be acceptable. In no event shall a
person who is disqualified or whose driving privileges are suspended, revoked or canceled
be granted restricted driving privileges to operate a commercial motor vehicle.
I HAVE READ THIS ENTIRE DOCUMENT; I HAVE HAD IT EXPLAINED TO ME;
AND I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY.
Dated: --~~~~----~~------------------

NOTIFICATION OF PENALTIES FOR SUBSEQUENT VIOLATION OF
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

CR-20 13-0000676
State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin
Hearing type: Change of Plea & Sentencing
Hearing date: 7111/2013
Time: 8:35am
Judge: JeffP. Payne
Courtroom: l{
Court reporter: none
Minutes Clerk: Brittany Davenport
Tape Number: crtrm4
Defense Attorney: Scott Chapman
Prosecutor: E Tyler - V\t;,_ ~ \~o(\..L

t

BE IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT:
083534

Defendant present for sentencing

IXl

with Counsel

0

Notification of Penalties reviewed and signed by Defendant

without Counsel

lXI

YES

0

NO

State moves to amend the charge to an Unenhanced DUI-18-8004 {M}-Court grants motion.

lXI

Judgment of Conviction entered

Court Orders: Fine: $ 1000.00

0

Withheld Judgment entered

Court Costs: $ 197.50
Total: $

P .D. Reimbursement: $

Suspended: $ 250.00
To Pay: within 60 days after appeal final-

can be revistied
License

Suspension~

Jail: 102

90 days
Suspended:

Commence on date:
105

to run concurrent with ALS once appeal is decided

Report Date: must serve with in 60 days of appeal being fmal-may

serve on weekends and/or 2 day increments- 5 days may be served through community service
Community Service imposed -

$

hours

Complete by date:

Community Service Fee imposed Due by date:

PROBATION ORDERED/CONDITIONS: Length 2 years-to begin upon appeal becoming final
Termination date 2 years later
( ~ ) 105 ~days D months of jail time is suspended and I or ( ~ ) $250.00 ofthe fine is suspended and
will not have to be served and I or paid if the defendant complies with the terms of probation.
• Meet with Probation Officer within 48 hours.
• Sign Probation Agreement and abide by all terms and conditions of probation.
• Notify the Court, in writing, of any change of address
( ~ ) Other Sentence is stayed pending appeal
( ~ ) Other Comply with recommendations of Alcohol Eval if they are reasonable-if don't appear appropriate, this
can be revisited
( ~ ) Other No misdemeanor or felony law violations while on probation
Court Minutes
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( !ZI
( !ZI
( !ZI
( !ZI

) Other
) Other
) Other
) Other

Ingest no alcohol and enter no establishment where the primary revenue source is alcohol
Submit to blood, breath or urine tests requested by Law enforcement for the presence of alcohol
Not to drive any vehicle with any amount of alcohol in system
Chapman will prepare order re: stay of sentence

Recess 090432

Court Minutes
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STf':::::~ OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF NEZ PERL~
JUDGMENT

FILE:C::::=:=:::c
AT
M
. CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
BY
, DEPUTY

V~~--'-"'·O;_:_(d~,~(J!..3f--=-=-~~----::-----CASE NO. aDI3- (JQ{)Ql93{o

STATE OF IDAHO
Address 3131 ··fhr

·

DEFENDANT:

pq· Is represented by counsel

( ) Waived right to counsel
(.>.::::)Waived right to jury trial
(>-) Understands nature of the charge, right of confrontation, and consequences of plea
(/)Waived right against incrimination
(><)Waived all defenses
P<)Acknowledged plea is voluntary
COURT ENTERS:

_(?<[Judgment after plea of guilty
( ) Judgment after trial- guilty
( ) Withheld judgment on conditions listed below
THE DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO PAY THE FOLLOWING:
(X) Fine $
lcw~
(X) Costs $_ __.__,q..::.._;·1._.__J2io<--"0"'---( ) Reimbursement for public defender services $_ _ _ _ __
per_ _ _ _ _ _to begin: _ _ _ _ __
(:x) To be paid by (oDduwp aft~.,. cu~;4ro/ f}v,..f Pay~
A
11 To: l7ra;-tcf (>.('·"1ol·w; t:/fl't"'r!J
1
( ) Restitution $
by
$ _ _ _ _ per month
BE INCARCERATED AS FOLLOWS:
(.><] Jail
I 10
I months
...
1
(><)Report to jail
o1" , 1-e -f v/fhrrr,

fdayJ

~

( ) Work Release _ __..,_.,"'-'-11""'!7"-----""=~"-----"'"-'-'--~=-'-~=-r---""-"'~-"'-"---"--::....::;__:_:.=t--'--i.£.!.,~:LS..:::..!"-'--'---'7----+--'-"--"--'j'-,~:.L.!...~~f--L.c.:L·r~S...::;.:·€1'-.!!,.&_;;,~"-<~tl-.!_
( ) In-home monitoring y
·th l/t:ii.t1h cJ,11/!rTI/,ru' fc_,z ?:Ervlo-r
( ) Complete
hours of community service by_ _ _ _, and pay workers compensa4ion insurance in 7the amount
of$
by_ _ _ _ _ _ __
(
days I months commencing COtt1C{!IYtr-~'.11 -} Wlt-b
Reinstatement of driving privileges must be accomplished before you can drive- apply to:
Driver's Services, Post Office Box 7129, Boise, ID 83707-1129.
( ) Temporary driving privileges granted upon application.

HAVE DRIVING PRIVILEGES (><} Suspended for

DCJ
~[ 1

/tl.5

&j·\~1 ~>fc'·'~'~ uf(~«:/ O.ec~~ifi11i')

/

Length
"J_ \ ,~.eur5
.
Termination date ']"'.pa.rs {qt<,r
0<) ~~months of jail time is suspended and /or
').ij[J;Y of the fine is suspended' and will not have
to be served and I or paid if the defendant complies with the terms of probation.
*Meet with Probation Officer within 48 hours.
* Sign Probation Agreement and abide by all terms and conditions of probation.
*Notify the Court, in writing, of any change of address
()Oilier ______________________________________________________
( )Oilier _____________________________________________________
()Oilier _________________________________________________________

PROBATION ORDERED/CONDITIONS:

C>0-$

MAKE PAYMENTS PAYABLE TO NEZ PERC~

DATE

7/t//){)
/3/
l
I
1

OUNTY CLERK AND INCLUDE CASE NUMBER
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JUDGE -----',;~/+-~---1--~--=--J~"-----------------~
1
U---J/1~

Ir~ THE DISTRICT CCL1RT OF THE ScCOr·JD IUDICI;.L Dl RICT CF Tnc
STATE OF IDAHO, Il'J A.ND FOR THE COL'NT'I OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO

ORDER OF BOND FORFEITURE

FI L_O~ ~LEASE

I

Plaintiff,

r')-

1

~O-()Lrsvrl '-) Co\ oU'l
.

•

LolG

. Defendant.

QLA \

OFFENSE

POSTEE:

fLbPt&--

- - - Defendant
BOND AMOUNT$

2Y\Dl
fLt.L ~

Cost

$_ _ _ _ __

Viet_ Fund

$_ _ _ __

C. J. Fund

$_ _ _ __

C. I_ Fund

$- - - - - -

__>c_...-_Surety

~\ OOJ _l0

ADDRESS-------------------

Dst. Crt. Fund

$- - - - - -

TOTAL REFUND

$_______

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the bond is forfeited to the Court· and Notice is
---hereby sent to the. following on the
day of
, 20_

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the bond be returned.
____IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Bond be applied to fines, costs, and to any
other funds as ordered by the Court, and any sums remaining be. disbursed to the
Poste.e.

DATED this ( /

i.}f'{ day af _____:7'-f-~-::::=:i=:=-r:=--~::::::_~~_:.k..==:::::::=-,~~z:

Check # _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Drown by ____________

Received by _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Mailed to

----------
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BY

(~Is

( ) Waived rig t to counsel

represented by counsel

'· __~ERK OF THE DISTRlCT COURT
,DEPUTY

(K..) Waived right to jury trial

(>9. Understands nature of the charge, right of confrontation, and consequences of plea
(j() Waived right against incrimination

( yj Waived all defenses

()') Ack.11owledged plea is voluntary

COURT ENTERS:
( ) Judgment after trial- guilty
W Judgment after plea of guilty
( ) Withheld judgment on conditions listed below

BE INCARCERATED AS FOLLOWS:
~) Jail / 1)o .,
(claY~; months
(>§Report to jail . e .
v-1 I '}
~J /;;;
.

>l ,

( ) Work Release
"lJ'¥-·'""""'·
~" ':?J:. . l.l"-"--'"'-'-'-~w..L.l:=..w:;~~-"""+""-'-~~=r-----'-'~............-"--"'-'-:'-'--7'--+~~::.-L--1-L-!~'----=--~:..::_.=:_-=.LL_
( ) In-home monitoring _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--!--!-1-~~l--J,~....!!"--!..L~'-4-:f:.__,..,~~~----( ) Complete_ _ _ _hours of community service by_ _ _ _,
of$
by_ _ _ _ _ _ __
-"=(J,f-1.·+->.

HAVE DRIVING PRIVILEGES ()C) Suspended for~ months commencing ((JnCiJlt/llnf 1A)Jfl!J ffL_5
, Reinstatement of driving privileges must be accomplished before you can drive- apply to:
Driver's Services, Post Office Box 7129, Boise, ID 83707-1129.
( ) Temporary driving privileges granted upon application.

J ~") . .

l

foAJl. /aJ;A

PROBATION ORpERED/CONDITIONS:
Length 1
Termination date
~)~~months of jail time is suspended and /or ~) $ J-r:;;t:J~ of the fine is suspended and will not have
to be served and I or paid if the defendant complies with the terms of probation.
*Meet with Probation Officer within 48 hours.
* Sign Probation Agreement and abide by all terms and conditions of probation.
* Notify the Court, in writing, of any change of address
()<.) Other ~,
I ' ,( )c:v ,o

~lAKE

DATE

PAYMENTS PAYABLE TO NEZ PERCE COUNTY CLERK

'7Tll:JD
-!L )-.· I·3·
I

,r~,

;n'1
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r /f

t
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No.: CR13-676

Plaintiff,

ORDER STAYING JUDGMENT

vs.
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
Defendant.

Based upon the Rule 11 Agreement of the parties and the Judgment
entered by the court on July 11, 2013,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the judgment entered on said date is stayed in
its entirety pending final determination of the appeal to be filed by the
defendant.
Dated this

fl+/1

day of July, 2013.

Judif

ORDER STAYING JUDGMENT

1

[I

I
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that
a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was on
this Jl!!]_ day of July, 2013,

_1
/

.-

-

Mailed
Hand Delivered
Faxed
Messenger

to the following:
Scott Chapman
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83 501

E. Clayne Tyler
Prosecuting Attorney
Clearwater County
Post Office Box 2627
Orofino, ID 83 544
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk

ORDER STAYING WDGMENT

2
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'

•,

;. . ;•I

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Fl LED
SCOTT CHAPMAN
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
11 06 Idaho Street
P.O. Box446
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1234
Idaho State Bar No. 3467

2m3 JUL 12 PP1

9
10

Attorneys for Defendant

11

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

12

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

13

CASE NO.: CR13-676

STATE OF IDAHO,

14

Plaintiff,

15
16
17
18

v.
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
Defendant.

19
20
21
22

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO:
AND TO:

STATE OF IDAHO, and its attorney;
Clerk of the above-entitled court.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

23
24
25

(1)

The above-named Defendant appeals against the above-named

respondent to Nez Perce County District Court from the Order Regarding Pre-

26
27

Trial Motions entered on April 22, 2013, by the Honorable Jeff P. Payne.

28

NOTICE OF APPEAL

1

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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1

2
3
4

(2)

Defendant has a right to appeal to the District Court, and the Order

described in paragraph (1) is an appealable order pursuant to Rule 54.1 of the

5
6

7
8

Idaho Criminal Rules. .
(3)

This appeal is taken to address both matters of law and matters of fact.

(4)

Issue to be presented on appeal:

9

(a)

10
11

Did the Magistrate Court err in denying Defendant's motion to

suppress all evidence?

12
13

(5)

14

A reporter's transcript is requested.
(a)

Appellant has requested the preparation of the transcript of the

15
16
17

18

Pre-Trial Motion hearing held on April18, 2013.
( 6)

Appellant requests all memoranda, affidavits,· and exhibits submitted

to the Court to be included in the Clerk's Record in addition to those automatically

19
20

21

included under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

(7)

I certify:

22

(a)

A copy of this Notice ofAppeal has been served on the reporter

23

24
25

26
27

with whom a transcript has been requested as set forth below:
Nancy Towler
Nez Perce County Court House
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, ID 83501

28

NOTICE OF APPEAL

2

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

155

1

2
3

4

(b)

The Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee

for the preparation of the Reporter's Transcript.

5
6

7

(c)

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20.

8
9

DATED this 12th day of July, 2013.

10

CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC

11

12
13

14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21
22
23
24

25
26
27

28

NOTICE OF APPEAL

3

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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-·

·---- ------

::;2

1
2

Certificate of Service

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

I declare that on the day indicated below a true and correct copy of this
Notice of Appeal was sent to the following parties via the method( s) indicated
below:
[v(Mailed
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Faxed
[ ] Messenger

E. Clayne Tyler
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 2627
Orofino, ID 83544

11
12

DATED this 12th day of July, 2013.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

NOTICE OF APPEAL

4

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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~:

I

Seco~~? Judicial District Court- Nez Perce Coun~y

"7115/2013

----

08:43AM

Receipt

NO. 0011252

:-:-·,

$ 150.00

.<eceived of: Chapman Law Offices

P 0 Box446
Lewiston, ID 83501
One Hundred Fifty and 00/100 Dollars
Case: CR-2013-0000676
150.00

Cash bond:

Check:2450
Payment Method:
Amount Tendered:

Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk Of The District Court

Check
150.00

By: -------------------------------------Deputy Clerk
Clerk: DEANNA
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FILED
0. WtEr(,'3

IN THE DISTRICT COU~~
filEtsE€0NfjJJUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
0

DEPUTY

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
v.
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 13-00676
CASE ON APPEAL

ORDER REGARDING DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE
[ X] The undersigned Judge voluntarily disqualifies himself/herself from presiding over this case.
[ ] Plaintiff [ ] Defendant has moved to disqualify the undersigned Judge under IRCP § 40.
The motion is [ ] with cause [ ] without cause.
The motion is [ ] granted
[ ] denied.
[ ] State

[ ] Defendant has moved to disqualify the undersigned Judge under ICR § 25.
The motion is [ ] with cause [ ] without cause.
The motion is [ ] granted
[ ] denied

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that true copies of the foregoing Order Regarding Disqualification of
Judge were delivered this
\\ day of ~
, 20~, to:
Scott Chapman
E Clayne Tyler

Order Regarding Disqualification

159

r-.

FILED
ZUI3 JUL 30 Art 8 02
PATTY 0. WEEKS

Of-T:HH··-E······O.'l·$-ffll.-C
fRT. '1j (}L
/l,) VLA.Jl;
,UvfLW
L

OEPUF(

........

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE SECOND1 J"UDICIA.L DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO-UNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.

GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,

Case No. ·CR-20 13-676
10RDEI~ J~SSIGNING

JUDGE

)
)

Defendant.

__________________________ )
It is ORDERED that Judge Carl B. KerJt·ick, whos1~ ehambers are located in 1\Tez
Perce~ Idaho~ is assigned to preside over all further proceedings in the above-entitled

matter.
DATED

&" {'~"' 91\..

A

this~ July 2013.
"--:.

(1
{

)\ ~ :-:~~-----

J
. St1~gner
A.dn1inistrative District Judge

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 1
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- _____ j

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a full~ true~ con1plete

and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
ASSIGNING JUDGE was delivered to:
E. Clayne Tyler
Special Prosecutor

V: o. Box ZG?.._I

() ro t;·· {\ o J t()

S2 3s,l-{ Lf

r- Scott Chapman
-p 0, 3ox Lf L{ ~
c;c;liJl~ Attorney for Defendant L-tWiShJv'~ t)
1 \

~Y\_( /

~l1/l-

on this ~)U -day of July 2013.

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE- 2
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY
Transcript Payment Voucher

REPORTER'S NAME: Nancy K.Towler
ADDRESS: 235 Larkspur Lane
Lewiston, Idaho 83 501

CASE NAME: State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin, Case No.
CR2013-676.

#of pages

Rate

Total

54

$3.25

$ 172.25

County of Nez Perce )
State of Idaho
)
The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes that the within is a fully itemized,
true and correct account against Nez Perce County, Idaho; that the same is justly due, and
that no part thereof has been paid.

SIGNED:

162

f\LED
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~t.~SvOf1R1~

JUDIC=Q11f~.·~·
~., ~ E
1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND
c. . ....
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT.,()!..~~~

·

.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
CASE NO. CV-13-0676

)

Plaintiff,

)
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENT

)

)

vs.
GAYLORD J.Al.Y COLVIN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

A transcript of the proceedings in the Magistrates' Division has now been lodged with

this Court.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1) Appellant shall file their brief on or before September 6, 2013;
2) The Respondent shall file their brief on or before October 4, 2013;
3) Appellant shall file a reply brief by October 25, 2013;
4) Oral argument shall take place before the above-entitled Court in the Courtroom
of the l~ez Perce County Courthouse on Tuesday, November 19,2013, commencing

at 11:00 a.m.
DATED this _ _ day of August, 2013.

CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENT

1

163

CERTIFICATE OF MAILll-JG
I hereby certify that a ttue copy of the foregoing ORDER SCHEDULING BRIE,--ES ~D
ARGUMENT \\ras mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this ~ay of
August, 2013, on:
E. Clayne Tyler
Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 2627
Orofino, ID 83544
Scott Chapman
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
P.O. Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENT

2
(
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1

2

FIL

3
4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF T~ SE<PfJ
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND R([)~ff'T.'. . .

5

::r-1.-v:--.L,...,.

6
7

STATE OF IDAHO,

8

Plaintiff,

9

10
11

v.

GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,

12
13

Defendant.

14
15

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

16
17
18

Appeal from Magistrate's Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Honorable Jeff P. Payne, Presiding

19
20

21
22
23

Scott Chapman
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box446
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Respondent!Appellant

24

25

26
27

28

E. Clayne Tyler
Special Prosecuting Attorney
P. 0. Box 2627
Orofino, ID 83544
Attorney for Petitioner/Respondent .

Chapman Law Offices, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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. . . .

1
2

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3
4

5
6

Gaylord Jay Colvin (Jay Colvin) was arrested for Driving Under While
Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI) in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. He
was stopped for failing to signal when two uphill lanes merged into one while he

7
8

continued to travel in the right lane, an alleged violation of Section 49-808 of the

9

Idaho Code.

10
11

12
13

The stop was based solely upon in alleged violation of Section 49-808 of the
Idaho Code, which statute is unconstitutionally void as applied because it failed to
provide fair notice that signaling is required when roadway design results in two

14
15

lanes down to one and that the same section is unconstitutionally void as applied

16

because it fails to establish minimum guidelines as to what is an "appropriate

17
18
19
20

21

signal" to govern enforcement of the statute.
Evidence at the suppression hearing adduced the following:
1) On January 28, 2013, at a little before 10:30 p.m. State Trooper Jeffory
Talbott stopped a vehicle operated by Jay Colvin;

22
23

24
25

26
27

2) The sole basis supplied by Talbott was: "As I was behind the pickup, it
appeared to be weaving in its lane and traveling 30 miles per hour (mph)
in the posted 35 MPH zone. The pickup then activated its right hand tum
signal and moved into the right hand lane as we passed a traffic sign
indicating the right hand lane was ending. The pickup continued south
and merged back to the left in front of me without signaling. I activated
my vehicle's overhead emergency equipment ... ";

28

1
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1
2

3) All of the foregoing appears on video from the "dash cam" video in
Talbot's patrol vehicle and fails to support any contention of weaving.
Further testimony was adduced that indicated the vehicle operated by Jay
Colvin was in an older model small pickup, which will not go up 5th
Street grade (location of the stop) any faster than 30 mph, which is why
plaintiff pulled over to the right (actually changed lanes with an
appropriate signal) to let the car behind him (Talbott) pass, and Talbott
chose not to pass.
·

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

4) There was evidence showing that no discernible leftward movement or
motion is required for a vehicle to continue straight forward movement
down 5th street. Further, that no "tum" is required.

10
11
12
13

II.
1.

14
15
16

Whether the Magistrate erred when it determined that there was legal cause
under Idaho Code §49-808 for a law enforcement officer to initiate a traffic
stop when defendant failed to use his tum signal when the lane he was
traveling in merged into another lane.
III.

17
18
19
20

ISSUE ON APPEAL

A.

ARGUMENT

THE MAGISTRATE ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS
LEGAL CAUSE TO STOP THE VEHICLE DRIVEN BY
DEFENDANT BECAUSE A TURNING SIGNAL WAS NOT
REQUIRED.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1.

SECTION 48-808(1) OF THE IDAHO CODE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VOID

State v. Morgan, 2013 SLIP opinion No. 14 at Page 3, states:
"Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment."
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007).
Limited investigatory detentions are permissible when justified
by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has
committed, or is about to commit, a crime. State v. Bishop, 146

2
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1

2

Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). "Reasonable
suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the
rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts." Id.
Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or
"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." !d. (quoting United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, (1989)). The test for reasonable
suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to
the officer at or before the time of the stop. I d.

3

4
5
6

7
8

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.

9

10

Constitution requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be "worded with

11

sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what

12
13
14

conduct is prohibited" and that it be "worded in a manner that does not allow
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711

15

16
17
18

(2003).
Therefore, a statute is void for vagueness if it "fail[ s] to provide fair notice
that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or fail[s] to provide sufficient

19
20

guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion" in enforcing the statute.

21

Id. at 712. The statute involved in this matter, I.C. § 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally

22

23
24

25

void for both of these reasons.
A statute is facially vague if it is "impermissibly vague in all of its
applications," i.e. invalid in toto. Id.

However, even if a statute is not facially

26
27

vague, it may still be vague "as applied" to a particular defendant's conduct. Id.

28

3
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1

2

Burton is not arguing that I.C. § 49-808(1) is facially void but, rather, that it is void

3

4
5
6

7
8

as applied to her conduct.
Section 49-808(1) of the Idaho Code states:
No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a
highway unless and until the movement can be made with
reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal.

9

10

The Idaho Court of Appeals in Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 748, 240 P.3d

11

933, 935 (Ct.App. 2008) in construing said statute under remarkably similar

12
13

circumstances states:

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23

24
25

26
27

28

Due process requires that all "be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not
be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law. Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605,
612 (1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246
(1998). Accordingly, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, premised
upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
requires that a statute defining criminal conduct or imposing civil
sanctions[fn1] be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and
the statute must be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-99, 102 S.Ct.
1186, 1192-94, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 370-72 (1982); State v. Korsen,
138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148
Idaho 31, 34, 218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.App. 2009). Thus, a statute may
be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of
ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it
fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or
others who must enforce the statute. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69
P.3d at 132; Martin, 148 Idaho at 35, 218 P.3d at 14.

4
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1
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3

4
5
6

7
8

9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19

The court continues and holds:
This vagueness in application occurs because the statute does not
specify how much or what type of movement to the left or right is
necessary to trigger the duty to signal. Admittedly, a very literal
interpretation of the statute might lead to a conclusion that a signal is
required when two lanes simply merge because a driver in either lane
must move the steering wheel at least slightly in order to steer into the
emerging lane. But the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly
literal application to every type of side-to-side movement, for a
vehicle literally moves to the left or the right when a driver weaves a
bit within his or her lane or simply negotiates a bend in the road, but
no one would contend that a signal is required in those instances. It is
simply not apparent from the language of Section 49-808(1) whether a
signal is required when two lanes blend into one. Persons of ordinary
intelligence can only guess at the statute's directive in this
circumstance. Therefore, the statute is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to Burton's conduct.
Because Section 49-808(1) could not be constitutionally applied to
her, Burton has shown that no legal cause existed to effectuate the
traffic stop that led to her breath tests.
Burton v. State, at 749-750, 936-937.

Obviously, the Burton holding overrules State v. Dewbre, in the instant case.

20

21

The Burton court stated:

22
23
24
25

26
27

28

This Court addressed a related but distinct issue in State v. Dewbre,
133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ct.App. 1999). The driver there
contended that the signal requirement defined in Section 49-808 did
not apply where a two-lane portion of a highway ended and two traffic
signs as well as painted arrows on the highway advised motorists that
the right lane was ending and traffic should merge left. The Dewbre
case generated a separate opinion from each of the three Court of
Appeals judges. The lead opinion stated that the signal requirement
applied in that circumstance. A second judge concurred in that result
but did not join in the lead opinion's reasoning, and the third judge

5
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1

2
3
4
5
6

7
8

dissented. The Dewbre op1n1on does not have precedential value
bearing upon the present case for several reasons. First, the Court in
Dewbre was not called upon to address the constitutional issue
presented here. Second, there was no opinion that commanded a
majority, and third, Dewbre is factually distinguishable because in
Dewbre, road signs and arrows on the roadway informed motorists
that the right-hand lane was ending and that traffic must merge into
the surviving, left-hand lane. In the present case, there is no evidence
of such signage or other indicator that one lane was ending and the
other surviving.

9

10
11

Burton v. State, at 749, 936.

The crucial element is the necessity of some distinct movement left or right

12
13
14
15

prior to the requirement of a signal. The position of Jay Colvin is no distinct
movement herein was required, and application of the Section 49-808(1) of the
Idaho Code is void for vagueness to the circumstances of the case.

16
17

Section 49-808 was last amended by the legislature in 2005. The Burton

18

decision came down in 2010. The legislature has been in session four times since

19
20

21
22

and has done nothing to clarify or remediate the statute's infirmity. One must
assume the legislature has placed its seal of approval on the Burton, interpretation
of its statute.

23
24
25

The Idaho Drivers manual does not at any place require a signal must be
used in the "Colvin" situation.

In fact the signage indicating a lane ends is

26
27
28

denominated as "advisory" ... not mandatory.

If a driver goes around a comer

faster than the "advised" speed on a yellow sign there is no law violation
limit\ OffiIces, PLLC
warranting a stop (absent exceeding the overall posted speerl
Cliapman Law
6
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1

2

Lastly and most importantly ... the evidence shows that no distinct right to

3

4
5
6

left movement was made by Jay Colvin on the night of the stop requiring a
signal. .. nor is such a movement ever required at that location making the statute
void for vagueness as applied herein.

7
8

While being required to signal if weaving within a lane or swerving to avoid

9

a deer, are situations that stretch the imagination, going around a bend in the road

10
11

12
13
14
15

16

is not. Proceeding forward on a road that makes anywhere from a 45°- 90° tum is
not. Proceeding through the roundabouts that seem to be more and more in vogue
In fact, signaling in these latter situations would actually constitute a

is not.
hazard.

Passing lanes often begin on inclines so slower traffic can stay right. The

17
18

19
20
21

22
23

passing lane then expires at the crest of a grade, where both lanes become one.
Thus, it is the lanes that merge and not the driver. It is preposterous to think that a
vehicle proceeding forward to the right of a passing lane, who remains in that lane
throughout (and may even be passed by other cars) needs to signal to lawfully
continue moving forward. In the present case, Jay Colvin was proceeding down a

24

25
26

three lane road, moved to the right-hand lane and continued in that lane, never
changing direction, exiting or merging.

27

28

Further, because the term "appropriate signal" is not defined in the Idaho
Code, a person of ordinary intelligence is left to wonder when a signal 1s

7
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1

2

appropriate and, therefore, required.

The vagueness doctrine does not require

3
4

5
6

every word in a criminal statute to be statutorily defined, State v. Casano, 140
Idaho 461, 464 (Ct. ·App. 2004). However, "a statute must be construed so that
effect is given to every word and clause of the statute" and "words and phrases are

7
8

construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language."

9

Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 656.

Therefore, effect must be given to the word

10
11

12
13

"appropriate" as it is used in this statute.
"Appropriate" is defined as "suitable or fitting for a particular purpose,
person, occasion" (http://www.dictionary.com, accessed Oct. 15, 2009) or

14
15

"suitable for the occasion or circumstances" (http://www.encarta.msn.com,

16

accessed Oct. 15, 2009). Therefore, inclusion of the word "appropriate" in the

17
18
19

20

statute implies that there are situations in which the use of a signal is not
appropriate.

However, because the statute provides no definition of the term

"appropriate signal," (e.g. when other traffic is present and your "movement"

21
22

could impede or interfere with their "movement"), people of ordinary intelligence

23

are left to wonder when a signal is appropriate. In fact, there are many situations,

24
25

26
27

including the one presently before the court, in which "the appropriate signal under
the circumstances was just as likely no signal at all."
Jay Colvin was traveling in the right-hand lane of a road that narrowed from

28

two lanes to one. Therefore, the design of the road forced Jay Colvin to continue

8
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·I.
1
2

forward in the same direction without turning as the two lanes became one. While

3
4
5
6

the lanes merged (in a manner of speaking), Jay Colvin no more merged or
changed lanes by remaining in the right-hand side than someone in the left-harid
lane in the same place may have merged or changed lanes. Thus, it becomes an

7
8

issue of who (in the two lanes) becomes the merger, changes direction or changes

9

lanes.

The result, according to the anticipated State's position would actually

10
11
12

13

require parties in both lanes to signal. Hence, one could envision a situation where
a driver in the left-hand lane, would signal a right-hand tum and a driver in the
left-hand lane would signal to tum left, even though both continued in the same

14
15

16

direction with neither turning.
There was no other traffic in the vicinity at the time whose travel was

17
18
19

20

potentially impeded or interfered with by Jay Colvin's action. Therefore, it is
likely that the "appropriate signal" in this situation was no signal at all. However,
because the statute fails to provide notice to people of ordinary intelligence

21
22

whether the terms "movement" and "appropriate signal" include such situations, it

23

is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this situation and, therefore, void.

24
25

26
27

2.

I.C. § 49-808(1) IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS
APPLIED TO THIS CASE BECAUSE IT FAILS TO PROVIDE
SUFFICIENT GUIDELINES . AS TO WHEN A SIGNAL IS
APPROPRIATE THEREBY GIVING POLICE UNBRIDLED
DISCRETION IN ENFORCING THE STATUTE.

28

9
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2

A law that does not provide minimal guidelines for enforcement

3

4
5
6

"impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 586 (1990).

7
8

This failure to provide minimal guidelines for enforcement is often "what tolls the

9

death knell" for a statute. Id. at n. 4. This is "perhaps the most meaningful aspect

10
11

12
13

of the vagueness doctrine." Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574
(1974)).
In Bitt, a city loitering and prowling ordinance was struck down as failing to

14
15

provide sufficient enforcement guidelines. 118 Idaho at 590. Under the ordinance,

16

a person could not be arrested or convicted unless he failed to identify himself and

17
18
19

20

offer an explanation for his presence and conduct. Id. However, the ordinance did
not provide any guidelines for what constituted credible and reliable identification
and, therefore, gave police officers complete discretion to make that determination.

21
22

Id. at 589-590.

23

reasoning is equally applicable in this "as applied" vagueness challenge.

Although that ordinance was found to be facially void, the

24

25
26

27

Similar to Bitt, I.C. § 49-808(1)'s use of the phrase "appropriate signal"
without providing further enforcement guidelines impermissibly gives officers
complete discretion to decide who is and who is not violating the statute.

28

Although a facial challenge of I. C. § 49-808(1) might not prevail because there are

10
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1

2

obvious situations in which a person of ordinary intelligence would understand a

3

4

signal to be appropriate, the statute is vague as applied to Jay Colvin's conduct.
As discussed above, there are many situations in which a signal is not

5

6

necessary. Not only does the statute's failure in defining the phrase "appropriate

7
8

signal" leave a person of ordinary intelligence wondering when a signal is

9

"appropriate," this failure to provide minimal guidelines provides police with

10
11

unbridled discretion in determining whether the statute has been violated.
Therefore, Section 49-808(1) of the Idaho Code is unconstitutionally vague

12
13

as applied to Jay Colvin because it fails to provide minimal guidelines as to when a

14
15

signal is appropriate thereby giving police officers unbridled discretion in

16

enforcing the statute.

17
18

B.

THIS REVIEWING COURT HAS ALREADY RULED ON THE
SAME FACTS AND LAW

19

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of the Memorandum Opinion

20
21

22

23
24

and Order on Petition for Judicial Review in Gaylord Jay Colvin v. State of
Idaho Department of Transportation, Nez Perce County Case No. 20130518,

25
26
27
28

11
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1
2

III.

CONCLUSION

3

4
5

6

For the reasons articulated above, Gaylord Jay Colvin respectfully asks this
Court to reverse the Magistrate's decision and order the suppression of any
evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful stop and/or seizure of Gaylord Jay

7

8
9

Colvin.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of September, 2013.

10

CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
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Certificate of Service

3
4

5
6

7
8

9

10

I declare that on the day indicated below a true and correct copy of
Appellant's Brief was sent to the following parties via the method(s) indicated
below:
[~
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Faxed- (208) 983-1401
[ ] Messenger

E. Clayne Tyler
Special Prosecuting Attorney
P. 0. Box 2627
Orofino, ID 83 544

DATED this 12th day of September, 2013.
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01: THE D\S1 ..

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
~TATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

GAYLORDJAYCOLVIN,

)
CASE NO.

)

Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER ON PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW

)

v.

CV 2013-0518

)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO
)
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,)
)

Respondent.

)

This matter came before the Court on the Petitioner's appeal from the Transportation
Department Hearing Officer's order sustaining the Petitioner's Administrative License
Suspension pursuant to I. C. § 18-8002A. The Petitioner was represented by Scott Chapman, of
Chapman Law Offices. The Idaho Transportation Department was represented by Edwin L.
Litteneker, Special Deputy Attorney General. The Court heard oral argument on this matter on
July 16, 2013. The Court, having heard the argument of counsel and being fully advised in the
matter, hereby renders its decision.
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FACTS

In the early morning hours of January 28,2013, Idaho State Police Trooper Jeffory
Talbott stopped a white 1992 Toyota SR5 for failing to signal on a roadway where two lanes
merged into a single lane. The vehicle was heading southbound on Fifth Street, near Stewart
Avenue, in Lewiston, Idaho. Administrative Record for Judicial Review1 at 5. Trooper Talbott
could smell the strong odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from the vehicle and the driver,
identif1ed as Mr. Colvin, appeared to have bloodshot eyes. !d. Colvin admitted to consuming
alcohol prior to driving. Trooper Talbott asked Colvin to perform standardized field sobriety
tests, and Colvin complied with the request. !d. Trooper Talbott determined Colvin failed the
field sobriety tests, and thus proceeded to obtain a breath test from Colvin.
Trooper Talbott played an audio of the ALS advisory and conducted a fifteen minute
observation period before obtaining breath samples from Colvin. The breath sample results were
.123 and .134. Colvin was placed under arrest and transported to the Nez Perce County Jail. !d.

Colvin made a timely request for an Administrative Hearing, which was conducted
telephonically before Hearing Officer Skip Carter on February 14, 2013. The Hearing Officer
sustained the suspension, issuing a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on March
14, 2013. R. at 28. Colvin filed a timely Petition for Judicial Review, and this Court stayed his

suspension pending consideration of that Petition.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the Hearing Officer erred when he determined the Trooper had legal cause to
stop the vehicle driven by the Petitioner.
2. Whether the Hearing Officer erred when he determined that the administration of the
breath alcohol testing complied with the ISP standard operating procedures based upon
the evidence presented in the record.
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.

i

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(8) states that a "party aggrieved by the decision of the hearing
officer may seek judicial review of the decision in the manner provided for judicial review of
final agency action provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code." Generally, judicial review of
"disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for judicial review." I. C. § 675277. The Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact. I. C. § 67-5279(1). Idaho Code§ 67-5279 further provides:
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other
provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless
the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions
are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
I.C. § 67-5279(3).

In an administrative hearing, the Petitioner bears the burden of proof. I. C. § 188002A(7). Further,
The hearing officer shall not vacate the suspension unless he finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that:
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the petson had been driving
or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of
drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 188004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the
testing equipment was not functioning properly when the test was
administered; or
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(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section.
!d.

ANALYSIS
1. Whether the Hearing Officer erred when he determined the Trooper had legal cause
to stop the vehicle driven by the Petitioner.

The hearing officer determined the Trooper had legal cause to stop the vehicle driven by
the Petitioner "for an improper lane movement (failure to signal) when he merged from the right
lane into the left lane on 5th Street near Stewart Avenue in the city of Lewiston, in violation of
Idaho Code, $49-808." R. at 34. The hearing officer also reviewed video and the officer's
sworn statement, and found "it is clear that the right lane was ending and the left lane continuing,
thus requiring the signal for motorists in the right lane to signal." !d. Based upon these facts, the
hearing officer determined there was legal cause to stop the vehicle.
The vehicle was stopped for violation ofl.C. § 49-808. This statute states in pertinent
part:
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon
a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the movement
can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal.
I. C. § 49-808(1 ). The· Petitioner has challenged whether the trooper had legal cause to stop his
vehicle, claiming that I. C. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally void for vagueness as it is applied to the
Petitioner's conduct. In this case, the Petitioner asserts that he did not move a vehicle right or
left upon a highway, but rather maintained a straight line of travel where two lanes merged into a
single lane.
The Petitioner relies on Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 240 PJd 933 (Ct. App. 2010) in
support of his argument. In similar circumstances, Burton was stopped by an officer when she
:MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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did not signal as she approached the end of a double lane expanse, where two lanes became a
single lane. 1 Id. at 747,240 P.3d at 934. Burton argued that I. C. § 49-808(1) was "vague as
applied to her because it does not provide fair notice that a signal is required before one drives
into a single lane that stems from the merger of two lanes. The statute does not give notice ...
that such a continued forward movement constitutes 'moving' a vehicle 'right or left upon a
highway."' Id. at 749, 240 P.3d at 936.
Due process requires that all "be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not be forced to guess at the
meaning of the criminal law. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574,94 S.Ct. 1242,
1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 612 (1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197,969 P.2d
244, 246 (1998). Accordingly, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, premised upon the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a statute defining
criminal conduct or imposing civil sanctions be worded with sufficient clarity and
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and
the statute must be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Village ofHoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,497-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192-94,71 L.Ed.2d 362,
370-72 (1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,711,69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003);
State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34,218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.App.2009). Thus, a statute
may be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary
intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it fails to establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute.
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132; Martin, 148 Idaho at 35, 218 P.3d at 14.

!d. at 74_8, 240 P .3d at 935. Ultimately, the Burton Court determined that I. C. § 49808(1) was void for vagueness as applied to Burton. The Court looked specifically to the

1

In Burton, the Court of Appeals found the officer's description of the events as "cryptic":
The officer's description of the event is cryptic. His affidavit states only that he stopped Burton's
vehicle after he observed it "fail to signal when it merged lanes." At the administrative hearing, Burton
testified that in the two-lane segment of the highway there was a passing lane on the left, but she was
traveling in the right lane, and when the two lanes became one, "the left lane disappeared." She said that
she passed a sign which said that the lanes were going to merge, but there was no evidence of signage
indicating that one lane was terminating and one continuing.
Burton, 149 Idaho at 749,240 P.3d at 936. The facts in the case at hand are similar. The trooper stopped Colvin for
an improper lane movement, failure to signal, when he merged from the right lane to the left lane. R. at 34. In this
case, the video indicates there is also a yellow sign which indicates the lanes were merging. Important to this case is
Colvin's testimony that he did not move his car to the left, but instead maintained a straight line of travel.
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fact that the statute does not specify how much or what type of movement is necessary to
trigger the duty to signal.
We are persuaded that there is merit in Burton's contention that Section 49808( 1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied in this circumstance, for the statute
does not clearly indicate that a signal is required when two lanes merge with
neither lane clearly ending and neither clearly continuing. This situation differs
significantly from that where one of two lanes ends and the other continues, as
occurred in Dewbre. In the Dewbre circumstance, the statute plainly requires a
signal because a driver in the terminating lane must change lanes in order to
continue travel on the highway, and changing lanes constitutes a move to the left
or right. But when there is no basis to discern that one lane is terminating and the
other surviving, but rather the two blend into a single lane, it is not clear that the
continued forward movement of a vehicle from either of the two lanes into the
emerging lane constitutes a "move ... right or left" that is subject to the Section
49-808(1) signal requirement.
This vagueness in application occurs because the statute does not specify how
much or what type of movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger the duty
to signal. Admittedly, a very literal interpretation of the statute might lead to a
conclusion that a signal is required when two lanes simply merge because a driver
in either lane must move the steering wheel at least slightly in order to steer into
the emerging lane. But the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly literal
application to every type of side-to-side movement, for a vehicle literally moves to
the left or the right when a driver weaves a bit within his or her lane or simply
negotiates a bend in the road, but no one would contend that a signal is required in
those instances.
It is simply not apparent from the language of Section 49-808(1) whether a
signal is required when two lanes blend into one. Persons of ordinary intelligence
can only guess at the statute's directive in this circumstance. Therefore, the statute
is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton's conduct.
Because Section 49-808(1) could not be constitutionally applied to her, Burton
has shown that no legal cause existed to effectuate the traffic stop that led to her
breath tests. We therefore reverse the district court's decision affirming the
administrative suspension of Burton's driver's license. Costs on appeal to
appellant.

!d. at 749-750,240 P.3d at 936-937.

The Department contends that the case before this Court is similar to State v. Dewbre,
133 Idaho 663,991 P.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999). The hearing officer relied on Dewbre in
determining that it was "clear that the right lane was ending and the left lane continuing, thus
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___ I

requiring the signal for motorists in the right lane to signal." R. at 34. The hearing officer failed
to address the issue of whether Colvin's vehicle moved to the left or right, triggering the
requirement to signal as required by I. C. §49-808(1). Further, the Burton Court distinguished the
situation in Dewbre from the constitutional challenge before that Court.
This Court addressed a related but distinct issue in State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho
663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ct.App.l999). The driver there contended that the signal
requirement defined in Section 49-808 did not apply where a two-lane portion of
a highway ended and two traffic signs as well as painted arrows on the highway
advised motorists that the right lane wa.S ending and traffic should merge left. The
Dewbre case generated a separate opinion from each of the three Court of Appeals
judges. The lead opinion stated that the signal requirement applied in that
circumstance. A second judge concurred in that result but did not join in the lead
opinion's reasoning, and the third judge dissented. The Dewbre opinion does not
have precedential value bearing upon the present case for several reasons. First,
the Court in Dewbre was not called upon to address the constitutional issue
presented here. Second, there was no opinion that commanded a majority, and
third, Dewbre is factually distinguishable because in Dewbre, road signs and
arrows on the roadway informed motorists that the right-hand lane was ending and
that traffic must merge into the surviving, left-hand lane. In the present case, there
is no evidence of such signage or other indicator that one lane was ending and the
other surviving.

Burton, 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P.3d at 936.
The hearing officer determined that the Petitioner's reliance on Burton was misplaced and
that State v. Dewbre was applicable to the case at hand. R. at 34. The hearing officer erred in
this determination because the Petitioner in the case at hand brings forth a constitutional
challenge to the statute, which did not happen in Dewbre. The hearing officer specifically found
that the right lane was ending and the left lane continuing; however, the hearing officer neglected
to make a finding regarding whether the Petitioner was required to move his vehicle to the right
or left, which would trigger the requirement to signal as set forth in I. C .. § 49-808(1). Based on
the similarities of the case at hand to Burton, and no evidence in the record which established the
Petitioner moved his vehicle to the left, triggering the signal requirement, the Petitioner's
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argument that I.C. §49-808(1) is void for vagueness as applied to him is well taken. Therefore,
the hearing officer's decision is in violation of constitutional and statutory provisions. LC. § 675279(3)(a). As a result, the hearing officer's determination is reversed?

CONCLUSION
Colvin's license suspension was sustained by order of the Hearing Officer.
Colvin challenges the hearing officer's determination arguing that I. C.§ 49-808(1) is void
for vagueness as it applies to him. Based upon the Court of Appeals determination in
Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746,240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010), and the unique

circumstances of this case where there is no evidence that Colvin moved his vehicle to
the left, the Petitioner's argument that the statute is void for vagueness as applied to him
is well taken. Therefore, the hearing officer's determination is set aside, and remanded
for further proceedings reversing the Notice of Suspension, consistent with this opinion.

2

Because the bearing officer's determination is set aside regarding the question of whether the stop was legal, it is
not necessary for this Court to determine whether the test for alcohol concentration was conducted in accordance
with I.C. § 18-8004.
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ORDER
The Hearing Officer's Order of March 4, 2013, sustaining the suspension of Colvin's
·driver's license set out in the Notice of Suspension dated January 28, 2013, is hereby SET
ASIDE and REMANDED for further proceedings reversing theNotice of Suspension, consistent
with this analysis.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this J...?flay of August 2013.

CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge
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ST.ATEMENT OF Tl:lE CASE:

The defendl::lnl was charged ·with

<:1

.second

olfen~~e

(enhanced) .Drivi.n.r-r,

Li1Fk1· thi.'

Inilu.encc of Alcohol {DUI) on January 28. 2013. The Defendant sought to supprcs:;
evidence resulting in the ~vlagistratc Court issuing Findings

or Fact and C.cmclu~>iu.rt~.;

'.!I·

Law RegardingPretrial1\1otions on the 22nd day of April~ 2013.
Follo·wing a hearing on .the .n1otion to SlJppress

e-.;,r.iclence~ the

l\1agisLnllC Court.

found that 'rrooper Ta1l1ott, who made the traffic. stop, noted ·Mr. Col v1n's vch1ck
\Veaving -ii1 its lane at tiJnes. The Troopet .al~o noterlthar the J_).eJe.n.dant \vas consisLC!l Uy

traveling ynder tl!e.

sp~ed

lin;11t;includihg traveling ·on 5th Street at approxi.rnately 3 U u 1i 1c~::

per hour when the spce,d lhn1t :vvas 35 tniles per hour. The Magistrate fcrund ·that as
Trooper Talbott an.d the

D~fen9,a:nt

were trc;~.veling op_ ·~th Street, in the

l.~·ft-hund

southbound lane that the Defendant activated his..right turn signal and moved i!1Lo tile

right hand southhound
lane .

Thereafter~

lane~

while Troop.er Talbott re1na.incd in the ]eft hand southtlound

the .Defendant·passed a yellovv dic.nnond shaped traffic sign contcdrJing a

black sy1nbol vvhich is depicted and defined as follows:

Tlhereafler the Defendant continued .south in the righl
- hand h1n.e und the 1yvo (2.')
,,
,,
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'.···,.

use any signals while he traveled in the right-hand southbound lane through the nre:u
·where the two (2) southbound lanes converged. After passing th1·ough the m:cn, 0 fli ccr
Talbott conducted a traffic stop. 1

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW:
I.C.R. 54.17 provides:
All appeals from a magistrate shall be heard by the district cou.rl as n.n oppcH:,Jc
proceeding unless the district court oi"ders a trial de novo as pro'\lidcd in thc:-;c
ru]es."'Tlie s6ope
appellate review~ 011 appeal to the district COUlt shaiJlJC as foJJuYV~!:

of

(~~) "Qpph ~h,appe~l ~l~oni.:a,Inagistratc to the district court, not involving~~ tri;d dr:
novo, the district court shall revie'v the case on the recoi'd and determine the
appeal as an appellate court in the same 1nanncr and upon the .sante standards or
revie\V as an appeal from the district court to the Suprc1nc Court under the lchdH>
appellate rules.

(b) ...
In State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 P .3d 702, 704 (200 I), the Idaho
Supreme Court succinctly clarified T.C.R. 54.17 in the context of a claim that n statute j~;
unconstitutional as follow~ [internal citations omitted]:
.

I

.

~

I

.

.

When this Courl considers a claim that a statute is unconstitutionaL we re-v ic1-v t1 Jl:'
tri~i"couli's.n{Hng de novo since it involves purely a question of lm~r. ''" /\pr)cll:1ic:
~r~:obUgat~d tq seek an in~cq.,retation of a statute that upholds it::_;
constit{ttionality. :.. The pi:uty L:hallenging a slatule on constiLuUonul gnJlutds
the burden of establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and '\uust uvcrcoJnc ;\
strong presumption of validity.~' Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idnho 706, 70<.1.,
791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990).

.· •. cout!:s

Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLavfRegarding PretriaJ Jvfotions, pages)·-,:!.
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The proper consideration on appeal fr01n an order of the district cuw:L i (.~.vi~~\\'iiJg :~
detern1inationmade by a magistrate: "Whether 1n a civil or criminnl C(1~;c, i.s for (hi::
Court to exa1niue the record of the trial court jndepenclcntly of, but \Vi [lJ <.ht(_' rq;:,<lrd
for, the district court's intermediate appellate decision ....
Vagueness m·ay invalidate a criminal law either because the statute fails to provide
the kind of notice that will enable ordinmy people to understand ·vvlwt conduct it
prohibits or because it may authorize and even encourage arbjt.rary and
discriminatory enforcetnent. The test for vagueness to be applied in Idnho~ if the
lmv does not regulate constitutionally protected conduct or a significant amount o !'
that conduct, is to ask whether the statute gives notice to those \Vho arc subject tu it
and whether the statute provides sufficient guidelines for the exercise of discrcLirm
by those who must enforce the ordinance. It has long been held that?\ ;,tc1iuk
should nol be held void for uncertainty if any practical intcrprctntior1 can be
the statute.

While specifically considering the statute at issue in this case., LC. § 49 . ·KO?<.(l)., the
Idaho ~0\,.I~t:q.f APP~als in Stat~v. De·wbre, 1.33 Idaho 663, 665, 991 P.2d 38~\ 3:)() (Ct.

App. 1999).sta,ted. a~{plluws: ..
. , i.

·.~·-

...

.. i

·~

On revie·w of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capadty, we
examine the record of the trial court independently ot~ but with due regard for, the
district court's intennediate appellate dec.~ision. State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 5R4 5g5 n.
l, 798 P.2d 43, 44 n. 1 (1990); State v. Bm.vman, 124 Tdaho 936, 939, 86(} J).2.c1
193, I 96 (Ct.App.1993). 'l11e standard of review of a supprcssionutolJon is
bifurcated. When a decision on a tnotion to suppress is c.haltenged, \VC acCCJll the
trial court's findings of fact vvhich Y\rere supported by substantial cvjucnc.~\ bu I \-Vt..~.
tl'eely review the application of constitutional principles to lbc DKI.s a.•; fow1d. /)'tor-e~
v. A£kinson 128ldaho 559, 561, 916 P.2cl128L~, 1286 (CL~pp. '1996).
1

III.

ISSUE ON APPEAL:

. i
1 1

Tl).~: ~?le
J

'

~

1

• '

i?spe r;?Lised on appeal is ·whether or not the Nlagistru tc (:.rrcd
•

,- -

'

det.ennin~q..
tha~.tht1.r~
..
: .. . . ·. ; - ' .
.
~

.

·'

•

it

'

;was.,
sulTident
legal cause for a traffic stop to
. ·;
.

~-

\Vh c.n

.

·..

~

'

be conrlnci r:.d \Vhcn
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traveling

jD

ended,

cnu:.~ing hin1

to merge with the through Jane. The Defendant argues that l.C.§ 49-sog, whid1

id~~tifies:"whep.'a t~~n signal is required, is unconstitutionally vague ns npplkd jn thb

. -~ . ·..·:·.·:: :·~.,_ :·: .. ~~~ ~·.:. . ~-r. . ~.·:...,' ...

case; The Pef~n~antdo.es ngt ftrgue the statute 1s tl.nconst1tutionally vague in u 11 c.(l~~cs .
.

·~·;~~·J·~.~:·,·

. ·!

.·.~.~~

·,,.

.

In the event the traffi·~ stop was inappropriate., all evidence that f1mvcd from said

stop ·would be subject to suppression. Altetnatively, if the stop \vns appropriate, cll.l.
evidence which t1oyved from said stop is not subje-ct to suppression.

IV.

ARG-UMENT:

l.C. § 49-808 provides as follo. ws:

(l) No person shall tutn a vehicle onto a highway or n1ove a vehicle right or len
upon a high,vay or merge onto or exit fron1 a hjghvvay unless and unLi l lhc
;ufo~etl1:~nt Call be mc;t.de with reasonable safety nor 'vithout giv jug f.lll npprupri<.J\.c ;,j L'·! 1·! l .

.(2):A ~-~g~a)o(fri:rerition' to turn or tnove right or )ell when required Kh:dl

be; givt:n
continuously.:to'>\vaql'othei· traffic. On controlled~access high·way~ and lJcforc
turning fl·om a parked position, the signal shall be given continuousl~y fur nol .lc.s.':l
than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last ouc
hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.

(3) No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle \:YilhouL Lir:::L
giving an appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle immediately to Lhc rear
vvhen there is opportunity to give such a signal.
(4) The signals required on vehicles by section 49-809, Idaho Code, sh:t!J nut he
flashed on one (1) side only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a comtcsy or ~\lo
pass" signal to operators of other vehicles approaching frmn the rear, nor be
flashed on on~ (1) side only of a parked vehicle except as n1ay be necessary for
con}plia,~lce ·with this section.

'S{op :and investig"atory.detentions are recognized exceplions Lo t.hc. wnrr:ml.
'

requirement.·

.

.

Tei·fy~: .. Ohio::~9;(lJ.S.

1,

88 S. Ct.

1868 (1968). An offlc.cr Jnny

~src,p

:md
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detain an individual if, based on the totality of the circumstances, the nfJ!c.cr·lw:·:

;1

reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that t.he suspcc.L h:1~' l::r:c.n, i:;,
or is about to engage in criminal activity, or that the vehicle is being driven in vio1:Ji i'.)11

:1

f

trat1ic la}VS.: State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 829 P.2c1 520 (1992) .

. .A ~top is an_ int~nnediate response that allo-ws an officer to nutintain {he slnl.tL~:; qn:.l,
•

1

-

..

'

;

'

~

;

;

: -

~.

identify the s~spect an~l il)v.estigqte possible crin1inal activity, even though the ofl)ccr
.'

'.

,,

·1

..... ,

.,

••

'.

'

docs not have sufficient-'infonnation to establish probable cause to n1akc an arrc:1t. Sec

Terry (supra). Therefore any assertion that the officer tnust have probable caw:;e Lo
conduct an investigatory stop is a misstatement of the hrw. State v. ](night~ 128 J:~hho
862, 920 P.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1996).

To determine ·whether a stop is lawful, the reviewing Court rnust evaluate the Cnc.ts
!mown to the officer at the time of the stop based on the totality of the circumsta11ces or lhe

whole picture. State v. GalleF;os, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2cl 949 (1991). In addition, <Jn o[J.lccr is
permitted to draw rational inferences from the facts in light of his/her experience nnd trnin1n.g.

See· Terry, :Gallegos (supra) ...
Thc:Mag{sh·atc>Comi documented the evidence presented at the supprcssiontnotiotL :1nd
' -

-l •

l :~-

i

•

held ,that ·,~Ofli~vr. Tal99i~ hac,t ,fe~sonable articulable suspicion that Jv[r. Colvin's vchj clc w:·l:j
•

...'

driven cont~ary to

~

•

•

•

• • •

:.,

--;:

j..

.:

•

;' -.

•

• ' .. ·,

'

~.

a trafficJ~w'and his stop of Mr. Colvin was a lawful inve~tig(.!livc cklc.u1iou.

As heavily discussed by the Magistrate and by the Defendant in hdefing, there: ;uc l\vu ())
opinions issued by the 1daho Court of Appeals which review the const.Hntionnllty ns npplicd <Jf
I. C. § 49-808 in the specific context of merging, san1e directional traffic lanes.

The first case being State v. DerFbre, 13 3 Idaho 663 ~ 991 P .2c1 38 8 (Ct. App.

199~J)

and

the second case, Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 922 (Ct. App. 2008). In th.c Cir:3t e:r3c,

the Idaho Com1 of Appeals found the statute constitutional as applied. In the

second~

the ldnl10

Court of Appeals found the statute unconstitutional as applied.
The Defendant argues that Burton, the second case, overrules Dewbre, the first

'

~

• -

;

'

crLse:, at H.!

I
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provides the controlling law. This argument ignores the specific holding iu Burton tllnt it dm:;:

not overrule De1vbre.
Whether or not a statute is lmconstitutlonal as applied to a specific ca~;c or set. u [ f:lct~;

depends heavily on those facts. The argument that Burton overrules Dewbn.: ignurc~:; the
difference in the facts of those cases.
To explain:

Dewbre involved·a motorist traveling on State Highway 57,
r

'f, ; ) .•

~ ~

1:1

divided two (2) lnnc

,

highway, who encountered a portion of the highway where the traffic lane he wns in :;plit inlo
two (2) lanes, a right and left hand lane. The signage indicated he was to stay righlunJcss kr

pass. He moved into the right hand lane without signaling. Traffic signs and arnnvs painicd in
the lane advised that the lane was ending, and he was to 1nerge left. Afler passing the cad nf iJ 1c
dashed line separating the two lanes, he moved into the left hand lane, again without sign(' line,
Because Dewbre failed to signal while making these maneuvers, the officer stopped Dewbre Cor

violating I.C. § 49-808.

Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 664, 991 P.2d at 389.

Dewbre contended that the officer lacked the requisite suspicion i.o ~top his vehicle
because LC~ § 49-808 does'

not require the use of signals when entering or exiling

(I

pn:~Sltl(!,

The rd~~aiTt poitio'n oftC. § 49-808 provides that no person "shall turn a vcldclu or

d.

IllfJ\'f:.!

or left updn'·a;hlgh~ay!ml~ss:.an~ 11_ntil the n1overnent can be n1ndc with reasonable ~;~1 fdy
without ·giving

111C<1.

JHJr

lli{ap~roprlt1te·slgiial>' Dewbre contends that I. C. § 49-808 requires the usc or

turn signals only when a vehicle turns or tnakes a lane change. Devvbrc contends Lhal be rJid

1J<1(

turn or change lanes, that he continued in the same lane while entering uncl exiting the pn:;sing
area, and that he, therefore, was not required to usc his signal. Dewbre also argues that T.t.~- ~~
49-808 requires the use of signals only when appropriate and that no turn signal b the
"appropriate signal" when the vehicle rnovemcnt can he n1ade with reasonably safety_ .!d. I J 3

Idaho at 663, 991 P.2d at 390.
The Court held specifically as follows:
The language ofl.C. § 49-808 is plain and unambiguous and must be given effect. 'IIv~
follo-vvmg holding .from the district court's order affirn1ing the magistrate's dl'ni::ll of
.,De\.~br:e1s :supp~e.ssion motion correctly analyzes the siatute1s application:
,,

•

\"

t.
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When Dewbre approached the portion of the high\vay containing a passing Lmc, !he nitll
required hlm to '~keep right accept to pass." As such, Dewbre moved hi.s n:hic!c fo fl1e
right to comply with this requirement. \'\'hen De\vbre reached tbc end or Ll1{~ porli\ n 1()r
the highway that contained a passing lane, the record clearly eslahlis_hcs that lhcrli -..,v,_\:~ n
sign requiring Dewbre to merge back into the left lane. This required (1 turning l!ZO\'I"lllC!1(
to the left_ lt is undisputed the [sic] Dewbre .made these movcincnts, and it is nlso
undisputed that he did not signal when he made either turn. By failiug to signal when lw.
made these turns; De·wbre violated I. C. § 49-808.

It is tn1e that at
;1oir:t De'l.ivhre made these tw11ing ma11euvcrs, the clashed Jiuc did nut
separate the 1ef.t lar-i'd:ri'ght i11drthbotidd lanes. However, the s1atule Jocs nui sLric! i y Ii u J i i j L';
application to the lane changes. Instead, the stalute requires a signa 1 whcnlwcr ~m
individual makes a "move right or left upon a higlnvay.'' Had the legislature intcudcd
to regulate tmns and lane changes, it could have stated so spccificaHy. By moving f:it·:i
right, and then left, Dewbre came within the ambit of the statute, and \Vas required tu
make to [sic] signal. (Emphasis added.).
I am constrained to agree. Upon entering the passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle tu
the right in order to comply with the highway signage. Upon exiting the~ passing :::trca:
Dewbre moved his vehicle to thelefi, complying once again \vith the highway ~3.ignagc.
There are no exceptions in I. C. § 49-808 to the signal requirement. S'tate v. Pressley, 1:; t
Idaho 277~ 279, 954 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ct_App.1998). Whenevel' a movement i.·~ mnde ln
the left or rtght on a highway, regardless ofwhethcr the moven1ont is made ncccs~:nry fu
corhJHY -vvith.highway signage, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to LC. ~;. ,! S)--::Wt;_
, j

j \ i : • • ,

1 db

1

~

: ·:

1

\

: • '

l

: :

I

:

~.

·~

'

f

tldt~att~riip~:by hJ_s;holding to define the boundaries of·vvhat consli.lutcs a c;nwvcrnco!

~o ~ly_ rigfl;t

qr l,ef,t UJ~on. a P,igh\vay.:~ I .condude only that De\vbre's movements placed l1i1 11

~itli:ii-1 ti16~ ~i~b'~(:~~ltJ1e ;:h~itM·e. UnGL't'tniher clarification is provided by the ldahu
legisiaiiu·e~ (afilc6Ii~ti~i1I~-c!'to ho]dthat whenever a vehicle J:noves to the righl or to the

left because one lane splits into two lanes, or two lanes merge into une lane, em
appropriate signal is required pursuant to I.C. § 49-808. Therefore, I.C. § 4:J- i\08
required Devvbre to use an appropriate signal when he moved to the right \vhilc ct\lcrinJr,
the passing area and then to the left while exiting the passing area. State v_ De1vl;re, 1. n
Idaho 663, 666, 991 P.2d 388 1 391 (Ct. App. 1999)

Dewbre argued for the first time on appeal that the statule was unconslilutionally
as applied, and the

Court recognizing the issue was raised for lhe first time on appeal

vnguc

dcclilJcd to

consider it.
'•
;,'11

,J, ,'

l-i<f:iY'l~-,i~)De:l·Ff:n;tf.:P-~n~,istent_with lhe case at hand? First, the Defe..ndant .moved to the
t

'

r

• .'

I

,

;

.'

~

'

:

'I

'

'

J ' •
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right, after signaling his intent to do so. Dewbre did not signal the right hand movcmcnl.
Regardless, both movements were clearly identified as con~lituling both a lane change

:JiHJ

a 1 it•,hi

hand movement upon the highway requiring a signal.
Second, signage on the high\vay indicated that the right hand lane was abont to end, ;u1ci

\:

',\
~·~'

on the highway, and as a lane change: The sign specifically

meallR 'T~anc I~l!_~,~l.!~_l~.:rJ:S

Left. Two (2) lanes of traffic will soon become one (1) lane {)f traffic.

l{iJi;ltLhln~Jr.;~tJts~

must yield when merging.»

In Dewbre, highway signage (not spec.ifically identified in the decision) and

arrow~;

un

l h~-~

roadway informed Dewbre that his lane was ending, and he was to merge left.

Neither driver signaled their intent, which \:vas the basis for the traffic stop.
The. Burton Cou11
considered
simllar facts specifically 1vith the consthut.ional.i Ly.
.
.

signage.

DS

j~e ~0~f6nll;;i4~~~~j;\JVerrul~ Dewbre, but instead distinguished it on thcfnctc.

holding:
The Dewbre opinion does not have precedentiai value bearing upon the present c:1sr fur
several reasons. First) the Court in De~rbre was not called upon to nddress Lhe.
constitutional issue presented here. Second, there vvas 110 opinion that comiun.ndc cl n
1najority, and third, Dewbre is factually distinguishable bccansc in Dc\Ybrc, road ~ii ~~,n:1
and arrows on the roadway infonned tnotorists that the right-hand.lanc W8S ending <"Uld
that traffic n1ust 1nerge into the surviving, left-hand lane. In the present case, there 1s no
evidenec of such s1 gnagc or other indicator that one lane was end ill g and the other
surviving.
We are persuaded lhat_there is merit in Burton's contention thal Section 49-80/~i( J) !~;
uncon.stitutionally vague as applied in this circumstance, for the statute does not. c.icarly
'...

'•'.

202
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indicate that a signal is required when tvw lanes rnerge 1rithJ1cither l~UJ}.~ dendy_gn~l~IH~
and neither dearly continuing. Tltis situation differs sh~Mifi.cantly frou~ tllaL\\'_hs.n.~
one of two lanes ends and the other continues, as occurrc.d in. I~_f.Jl.p_f;r_g_. 1n the. Ilc.~.v1·.n:
circumstance, the statute plainly requires a signal because a c.h'ivcr in the krminating l<ln•,)
must change lanes in order to continue travel on the high1vay, and changing lanes
constitutes a 1nove to the left or right. But when there is no basis to discern that one lcmc
is terminating and the other surviving~ but rather the two blend into a single Jane~ iL is nol
dear that the continued forward movement of a vehicle ±l'om either of the two lanes into
the en1erging lane constitutes a "move ... right or left" that is subject to the Scclion
49-808(1) sign~1.l requirement.
.·r. (} / -·. ···~

Burton v. Stat.~,__L!:'f!.lL::~{l..l:.{:J:~nsp .. 149 Idaho 74~ 749_, 240 P.3d933, 936 (Ct. ,{np. 20/0).
(Emphasis add~cl/ -

It is clear frotn both cases that when a traffic lane ends, requiring the driver to merge i u!n
an adjacent tlu·ough traftlc lane, it is considered a right or left hand

movement on the higi·!\'v'H}'.

\1.

is also a merge onto a highway. Both circumstances are clearly defined by LC. § 49~BOB a:_;
requiring a signal.
The Magistrate found that indeed the Defendant in this case 1nade a nwvcmcnt

t.lJH.>ll

the

high\vay 1 _This. is afactual deter!n~nationnot reviewable on appeal. Specifically the f.vJngi:::frt1\c
:;·i'.'

,. ·;_ '.: ·. . .

found:

'

3., i_} /

f;

J.: .: ~· .

+h~/~b~-~e~i~ikidi1~ed·':s;tJ:,;~~osted' albrlg the right-hand shoulder of the rlght-l.mnd

southbound lane ~f 51b Street, was a wmning sign Lhal called attention t.u <-1 :s.iluu1.il.ln that.
tnight not have been readily apparent- the right-hand southbound lane of 5th Street -vvuuid
be ending and a 1notorist in the right-hand lane \V011ld have to move kfl and merge wil11
the left-hand southbound lane to continue. [footnote 1: \Vhen ti\'U parallel hue:; c.unvcT!~C.,
one or the other with have to Hmove~' toward the other; otherwise the l-rvo parallel !:mi.;~;
will ren1ain parallel and never converge. Jn this case the \varning .sign ndvi;;cd. t h:li.! hr:.
right-hand southbound lane was ending and n1otorist in such lane had to mcrvc left Lo
continue.].

Tbis is the exact finding in Dewbre (supra), in which the Court spcciJ)c::llly Jcnmd l'llnl.
"whenever a ·vehicle moves tq the.right or to the left because one lane splits i.ntu two lm1e:3, or
:

~

•

' .

.

'

\ I

'

! ; .-

'

'

! .::·.

I.,T.:.'-SPOND'_;~-E':·Ni'.·r'' ;S·.· BR·,~yi_;~·~x-''.
·-8~11' /.,i
:\..Ci

•

·.'

.-' • , '

.

•

·

~.

,'' i. • I

.·;·:··
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two lanes 111erge into one lane, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to LC. § 119--80({.

Dewbre, supra.
Because I. C. § 49-808 required a signal, both because of the movc1ncnt upon lhe
high\vay and the lane change, the next question is '\Vould the Defendant have been given

rea;onab~c:n:otiee· bf the, r~q~irements of the statute.
l': •.-

. ·,_ . · Agairi:;. thhsigh~~e-'-along the road answers the question.

Dewbre·and.··B~;~ii:iz"tf'f::i{~e~{"fb}~He analysis~

Signage, as pointed out in

In this case, the Magistrate took grcHt care ·rn

outline the Idaho Departn1ent of Transportation rules, the l\.1anual for ·uniform Traffic Co1Jl rot
Devices for Streets and Highways, and the IDAPA rules which apply to the analysis.
That analysis is not re-stated here.
The Magistrate correctly concluded that the unifonn signage usctl by the Idaho
Department of Transportation and authorized by IDAP A and the MUTCD,

is to _promote

highway safety and efficiency, and to notify road users of regulations and to provide -warning aud

guidance.1reeded for the 'uniform and e±licient operation of a11 clcn1ents or lho lraiTic stream.
j

•

•

•

Wan1ing'sigii~;:·s~cl~:~i~\iie on~ at issue here, arc to call attention to unexpected condition~{ on
•',.

._

""-~

<- 1 [

,?·,··: ...

to a highway to situ~tions ~hich 1night nol be readily apparent to road users.
'.' , '

adjacent

'!·'

I •

:-..

•

:;

This Defendant, Mr. Colvin was advised of three things by the vvarnjng sign at is~n.~c~ hc.rv:
The lane he was traveling in was not the through lane~ and he \Vas to yield tu

1.

. traffic in the adjacent lane;
2.

The lane he was traveling in was about to end;

3.

I-Ie was required to n1ergc into the through lane (1ncrge ldt) to c.ont.im1c traveling

fo_incllings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Pre-Trial IV1otions~ p. 7 .

'
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on the highway.

In other words, (a) he needed to change lanes, (b) by m.oving to the lel't. Both

cin.:un1::t:mcc.'; :.1n;

clearly contemplated by the statute as requiling a turn signal.

I.C. § 49-808, as applied to this situation, was clear, U11atnbiguous} and wa~; violated by
the Defendant. ln other words, it is "worded with suffic]ent clarity and deflnitenes5 tlwt urdin:.Hy

people, ~~'·in thi$ CC;I~~ !Yf~·.>~Colvin, could understand that witl1 his trafGc lane (the 1 ighL--h:ltJd
~

., ;_.: :~·~·! : -~

~~

·

\

\1 :.,

l;.) :,:;· ·-· .: • J

-~r:,

..-.·

southbo1.mdlane of 5 1 h'st;·e3~:~
"·~ -.. -

..

el~.cting and his having to m.etgc left into another 1ri.lfFiL: lru tc (tlK
.
'

..

left-hand southbound lane of 5th Street) to continue on, an appropriaLc signal was req11ircd~). '1
The Defendant goes on to argue that the ten11 "appropriate signal" is nol defined in T.C.
49~808 therefore the statute contains a second ambiguity which should c.ause

it to CDil. Thb

1~;

raised for the first time on appeal. Regardless, it is clear that the Defendant failed to sign:1l :1L :-.dl.
so the length or appropriateness of his signal is inelevant. The. Defendant also :1rgues thnl th<";
Magistrate's decision would give unbridled discretion to law enforceniCnt without guidcl.i..11cs
1

which woul.4'lcadJo ,arbitrary and discrin1inatmy application. The 11agistrute ~ ruliug 'Nmdd
. '.

',

' ' .. · . . ' :'. ;. ~ ' ._ .: . ~;!~. (.,_.. 1•: ( : } ~; . ..

•'

'.

provide ab.s~iutely 9l:e~t:tdtrid ui18inbiguous guidelines to law enforcement as to ~vvhcn a driver
,-.

. ..... ,···-.-·i' :\ ._:

.. ·._:·:.~·-,··:

'·:~:---~~--~~.'i.{ ~~:~·: . 1:~'-·.l~?<..j.:·:~i;·;·.~
1TIUSt

signal

l .. ·,!;r(:

•.

~.

· ..

:

aIan~ cliatig~.·OJ,:;:JJ.~~q~;i(;~' and wheri a driver is not obligated to signal.

Finally, the Defendant points out that this Court has already reviev·.,red on appeal tile

~;;mJC

issue arising from the same trai11c stop in the context of an ad1ni11istrativc license suspension
proceeding, and found the referenced statute unconstitutiona1 as applied.. The St.nl.c n-:::;pt.~c.l fully
submits that the record in this instance, as documented in the Tvfagistrate~s op1nion, djl.J\::.L~->
signi±icantly from the record referenced by the Cmnt. in the A.L.S. suspension, 1..uost spcc1 fll.;l\ly

. Finding;s o~PacL_ and Conclusions of Law Regarding Pre-TrlallVIotions, p. I 0- .t

J
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with. rc.spcct to the Magis.tratc.'s findings and analysis regarding: n1oving- ]cJ'l o1· dglli ('ll 5' 11 :~-;(J ·:·,,-;.

Given:the record in the ALS hearing was

d~void

of those t1nd.ing~:; and that a.na1ysi;.>, the

~3!<~\r:

argues this appeal is substantially different.

V.

CONCLUSION:
.

'

.

.

. ·Accordingly/1~i:i~·:1:e{.1lles:ted that the Dishict Court ·uphold the.l\11agistraie's d12.r.:i::;iun ill
i

re.tl.1sing tq. ~:~lpp~·es's~';tf~~·~~\i::i·(}~;:ic~:i'~iferenced Hy the Defencltmt. ln light of tbe

lVh\gi~:;{Jn(c

Judge' s· ±1ndh1gs. of fact, .exhaustive anaJ.y.l)i·s of the law, and in Ugb.t of the pn~o:dei1rinl \';due.
found in Dewbre and B1-Jrton, and in light of the deference to be paid to

tlH~. JVfagisln1\c~s l\;:··r.:i:'~i~

:11,

lhis Com·( should a11inn.
.rt:'.'~'::.;J""'

•.• ~· .~ ..

• .:-''

·¥······~ .:~.•~;-~c;-~:1~~~-;._.. .... :~::~::~
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The undersigned hereby certH1e$ that a true and correct copy of I he 1·-rwcgn'tnc. .,,..:.,~:

deH·,te1'ed to the followi11g on the //.ri~P\ciay of October, 2013:

Scott Chap1nan

\j

CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
PO Bo:x446
Lew'lston,·ID 8.3$01
Fax: 208-743-1266
!·

•j
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2013-0000676
State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin
Hearing type: Oral Argument
Hearing date: 11/19/2013
Time: 11:01 am
Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
Courtroom: #1
Court reporter: Linda Carlton
Minutes Clerk: JENNY
Tape Number: CTRM #1
Defense Attorney: Scott Chapman
Prosecutor: E Clayne Tyler

110103 Mr. Tyler and Mr. Chapman present and ready to proceed.
110135 Mr. Chapman presents argument.
110430 Mr. Tyler presents argument.
110940 Mr. Chapman presents rebuttal argument.
111025 Court takes matter under advisement and will issue a written decision.
111057 Recess

Court Minutes
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.
GAYLORD J. COLVIN,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2013-0676
APPELLATE OPINION
AND ORDER

This matter came before the Court on appeal of the magistrate's denial of the Appellant's
motion to suppress. The Court heard oral argument on this matter on November 19, 2013. The
Appellant was represented by Scott Chapman, of Chapman Law Offices. The State of Idaho was
represented by Clayne Tyler, Clearwater County Special Prosecuting Attorney. The Court,
having heard the argument of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its
decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL ffiSTORY
On January 28,2013, Idaho State Police Trooper Talbott stopped a vehicle being driven
by the defendant, which ultimately resulted in the defendant being charged with driving under the

APPELLATE OPINION AND ORDER

1

209

in:fluence. 1 The Trooper first noticed the v~hicle as it turned from 8th Avenue onto 21st Street, in
Lewiston, Idaho. The Trooper followed the vehicle for three or four miles until he effectuated
the traffic stop on 5th Street. The Trooper testified that he observed the vehicle weaving within
its lane of travel, that the vehicle consistently traveled under the speed limit-including driving
30 mph on 5th Street where the posted speed was 35 mph-and that the vehicle appropriately
signaled and made three turns and one lane change.
Trooper Talbott was following the Defendant's vehicle traveling south on 5th Street. 5th
Street initially consisted of three lanes of travel-a single northbound lane and two southbound
lanes. The two southbound lanes were parallel lanes, separated by a dashed white line. Both
vehicles were initially in the left-hand southbound lane as the Trooper followed the Defendant.
The Defendant then activated his right tum signal and moved from the left-hand lane to the righthand lane as he continued south. The Trooper remained in the left-hand lane behind the
Defendant.
The Defendant continued in the right hand lane when he pa~sed a yellow, diamond
shaped traffic sign which contained a symbol indicating the right lane would be ending. 2 The
sign was located along the right-hand shoulder of the roadway. The Defendant continued his
travel in the right-hand lane, and shortly after passing the sign he passed through an area where
the two southbound lanes converged to become a single southbound lane. The Defendant did not
use any signals while he traveled in the right-hand southbound lane as he approached and
traveled through the area where the two lanes converged into a single lane. After the Defendant

1

The facts of this case are set forth in detail within the Finding ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw Regarding Pretrial
Motions, filed by the magistrate court on April22, 2013.
2
A picture of the sign is included in the magistrate's Findings ofFact at page 3.
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passed through this area, the Trooper activated his lights and stopped the Defendant for failing to
signal, in violation ofl.C. § 49-808.

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether the Magistrate erred when he determined that there was legal cause under I. C.§ 49-808
for a law enforcement officer to initiate a traffic stop when defendant failed to use his turn signal
when the lane he was traveling in merged into another lane.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, a bifurcated standard is used. State v.
Decker~

152 Idaho 142, 145, 267 P.3d 729, 732 (Ct App. 2011). A reviewing court must defer

to the lower court's findings of fact when supported by substantial evidence. State v. Emory, 119
Idaho 661, 662, 809 P.2d 522, 523 (Ct. App. 1991). However, the court may exercise free
review over a lower court's determination of whether constitutional requirements were satisfied
in light of the facts found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App.
1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual
conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. Decker, 152
Idaho at 145, 267 P.3d at 732. See also State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d
993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

ANALYSIS
When an officer activates his lights and stops a vehicle, this action constitutes a "seizure"
3

of the occupants, which implicates the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure. State v. Kimball, 141 Idaho 489, 491, 111 P.3d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2005);

3

"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Its purpose is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental
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Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). "[I]n order for a stop to
be la.vvful, it 1nust be based upon an officer's reasonable suspicion that the verJcle is being driven
contrary to traffic laws or that other criminal activity is afoot." Id.; United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981); In re Driver's License

Suspension ofDeen, 131 Idaho 435,436,958 P.2d 592,593 (1998).
The reasonable suspicion standard is lower than that of probable cause, but nevertheless,
a stop must be based upon more than the officer's speculation or a hunch.
Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause but more than speculation
or instinct on the part of the officer. The reasonableness of the suspicion must be
evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances-the information known to the
officer at the time of the stop must yield a particularized and objective basis for
the officer's suspicion.

Kimball, 141 Idaho at 491, 111 P.3d at 627 (internal citations omitted). "When a defendant
challenges the validity of a vehicle stop or other seizure, the burden is on the state to prove that
that stop was justified." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963, 88 P.3d 780, 782 (Ct. App.
2004).
Trooper Talbott stopped the Defendant's vehicle on the basis that the driver failed to
signal a lane change when he passed through a portion of the roadway where the right-hand lane
and left-hand lane converged to create a single lane of travel. The magistrate made a factual
finding that the Defendant passed a yellow, diamond shaped traffic sign which indicated the right
lane of travel would end. The magistrate did not make any factual fmdings regarding whether the
Defendant moved the vehicle to the left when he traveled through the area where the lanes
converged into one lane.

agents to safeguard an individual's privacy and security against arbitrary invasions." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho
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I. C. § 49-808 sets forth the requirements for signaling when moving a vehicle right .or left
upon a highway, or merging or exiting a highway. This statute states in pertinent part:
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon
a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the movement
can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal.

I. C. § 49-808(1 ).
The Defendant asserts the statute is void for vagueness as it is applied to the facts of this
case. He relies on Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010) in support of
his argument. In similar circumstances, Burton was stopped by an officer when she did not
signal as she approached the end of a double lane expanse, where two lanes became a single
lane. 4 Id. at 747, 240 P.3d at 934. Burton argued that I.C. § 49-808(1) was "vague as applied to
her because it does not provide fair notice that a signal is required before one drives into a single
lane that stems from the merger of two lanes. The statute does not give notice ... that such a
continued forward movement constitutes 'moving' a vehicle 'right or left upon a highway."' Id.
at 749, 240 P.3d at 936.
Due process requires that all "be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not be forced to guess at the
meaning ofthe criminal law. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242,
1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 612 (1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d
244, 246 (1998). Accordingly, the ~aid-for-vagueness doctrine, premised upon the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a statute defining
criminal conduct or imposing civil sanctions be worded with sufficient clarity and
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and
the statute must be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and
961, 963, 88 P.3d 780, 782 (Ct. App. 2004).
In Burton, the Court of Appeals found the officer's description of the events as "cryptic":
The officer's description of the event is cryptic. His affidavit states only that he stopped Burton's
vehicle after he observed it "fail to signal when it merged lanes." At the administrative hearing, Burton
testified that in the two-lane segment of the highway there was a passing lane on the left, but she was
traveling in the right lane, and when the two lanes became one, ''the left lane disappeared." She said that
she passed a sign which said that the lanes were going to merge, but there was no evidence of signage
indicating that one lane was terminating and one continuing.
Burton, 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P.3d at 936.

4
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discriminatory enforcement. Village ofHoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estares, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192-94, 71 L.Ed.2d 362,
370-72 (1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,711,69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003);
State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34,218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.App.2009). Thus, a statute
may be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary
intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it fails to establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute.
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132; Martin, 148 Idaho at 35, 218 P.3d at 14.

!d. at 748, 240 P.3d at 935. Ultimately, the Burton Court determined that I.C. § 49808(1) was void for vagueness as applied to Burton. The Court looked specifically to the
fact that the statute does not specify how much or what type of movement is necessary to
trigger the duty to signal.
We are persuaded that there is merit in Burton's contention that Section 49808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied in this circumstance, for the statute
does not clearly indicate that a signal is required when two lanes merge with
neither lane clearly endL."'lg and neither clearly continuing. Tris situation differs
significantly from that where one of two lanes ends and the other continues, as
occurred in Dewbre. In the Dewbre circumstance, the statute plainly requires a
signal because a driver in the terminating lane must change lanes in order to
continue travel on the highway, and changing lanes constitutes a move to the left
or right. But when there is no basis to discern that one lane is terminating and the
other surviving, but rather the two blend into a single lane, it is not clear that the
continued forward movement of a vehicle from either of the two lanes into the
emerging lane constitutes a "move ... right or left" that is subject to the Section
49-808(1) signal requirement.
This vagueness in application occurs because the statute does not specify how
much or what type of movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger the duty
to signal. Admittedly, a very literal interpretation of the statute might lead to a
conclusion that a signal is required when two lanes. simply merge because a driver
in either lane must move the steering wheel at least slightly in order to steer into
the emerging lane. But the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly literal
application to every type of side-to-side movement, for a vehicle literally moves to
the left or the right when a driver weaves a bit within his or her lane or simply
negotiates a bend in the road, but no one would contend that a signal is required in
those instances.
It is simply not apparent from the language of Section 49-808(1) whether a
signal is required when two lanes blend into one. Persons of ordinary intelligence
can only guess at the statute's directive in this circumstance. Therefore, the statute
is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton's conduct.
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Id. at 749-750, 240 P.3d at 936-937.
The magistrate court relied on State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ct. App.
1999). Dewbre also addresses a similar situation wherein the defendant was stopped by law
enforcement for failing to signal when a passing lane ended. In this case, there was significant
signage which indicated that the passing lane was ending. On appeal, the defendant argued the
statute did not require the use of signals when entering or exiting a passing area. 5 The magistrate
court found the defendant moved his vehicle to the right in order to comply with a sign that
stated "Keep right except to pass." Then the defendant moved his vehicle to the left at the end of
the passing portion of the highway. The appellate court focused on this factual determination
that the defendant's vehicle moved to the right and to the left, thus an appropriate signal was
required pursuant to I. C. §49-808. 6

5

The argument was set forth as follows:
In the instant case, Dewbre contends that the officer lacked the requisite suspicion to stop his
vehicle because I. C. § 49-808 does not require the use of signals when entering or exiting a
passing area. The relevant portion ofl.C. § 49-808 provides that no person "shall turn a vehicle or
move right or left upon a highway unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable
safety nor without giving an appropriate signal." Dewbre contends that i.e. § 49-808 requires the
use of turn signals only when a vehicle turns or makes a lane change. Dewbre contends that he did
not turn or change lanes, that he continued in the same lane while entering and exiting the passing
area, and that he, therefore, was not required to use his signal. Dewbre also argues that I. C. § 49808 requires the use of signals only when appropriate and that no turn signal is the "appropriate
signal" when the vehicle movement can be made with reasonably safety.
Id. at 665, 991 P.2d at 390.
6
Justice Perry relied on the magistrate's finding of_fact as follows:
The language ofl.C. § 49-808 is plain and unambiguous and must be given effect. The following
holding from the district court's order affirming the magistrate's denial of Dewbre's suppression
motion correctly analyzes the statute's application:
When Dewbre approached the portion of the highway containing a passing lane, the sign
required him to "keep right except to pass." As such, Dewbre moved his vehicle to the right
to comply with this requirement. When Dewbre reached the end of the portion of the
highway that contained a passing lane, the record clearly establishes that there was a sign
requiring Dewbre to merge back into the left lane. This required a turning movement to the
left. It is undisputed the [sic] Dewbre made these movements, and it is also undisputed that
he did not signal when he made either turn. By failing to signal when he made these turns,
Dewbre violated I.C. § 49-808.
It is true that at the point Dewbre made these turning maneuvers, the dashed line did not
separate the left and right northbound lanes. However, the statute does not strictly limit its
application to the lane changes. Instead, the statute requires a signal whenever an individual
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I am constrained to agree. Upon entering the passing area, Dewbre moved his
vehicle to the right in order to comply with the highway signage. Upon exiting the
passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle to the left, complying once again with the
highway signage. There are no exceptions in I. C. § 49-808 to the signal
requirement. State v. Pressley, 131 Idaho 277, 279, 954 P.2d 1073, 1075
(Ct.App.1998). Whenever a movement is made to the left or right on a highway,
regardless of whether the movement is made necessary to comply with highway
signage, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to I. C. § 49-808.
I do not attempt by this holding to defme the boundaries of what constitutes a
"movement to the right or left upon a highway." I conclude only that Dewbre's
movements placed him within the ambit of the statute. Until further clarification is
provided by the Idaho legislature, I am constrained to hold that whenever a
vehicle moves to the right or to the left because one lane splits into two lanes, or
two lanes merge into one lane, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to I. C. §
49-808. Therefore, I. C.§ 49-808 required Dewbre to use ati appropriate signal
·when he n1oved to the right while entering the passing area and then to the left
while exiting the passing area.

Id. at 666, 991 P.2d at 392.
The case at hand is factually more similar to Burton than Dewbre. In Burton, the
defendant testified that there was a sign which said the lanes were going to merge, but nothing
indicated that one lane was terminating and one continuing. Burton, 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P.3d
at 936. In Dewbre, there was significantly more signage which stated the addition of the passing
lane, the requirement to keep right, and the indication that the right lane would be ending.
Consistent with this signage and the roadway itself, Dewbre's vehicle first moved to the right,
and then to the left.
1.~ the

case at h:m.d, the magistrate succinctly described the roadway in question as

initially consisting of two southbound lanes that converged to become a single southbound lane.

makes a "move right or left upon a highway." Had the legislature intended only to regulate
turns and lane changes, it could have stated so specifically. By moving first right, and then
left, Dewbre came within the ambit of the statute, and was required to make to [ sic ] signal.
(Emphasis added.).
Id at 666, 991 P.2d at 390.
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However, the magistrate did not make a factual finding regarding whether Colvin's vehicle
moved to the left as a result of the narrowing of the roadway into one lane. 7 According to the
magistrate's conclusions of law, the Defendant had to merge left into another traffic lane, and
thus, should have signaled:
Idaho Code Section [49]-808(1) is worded with sufficient clarity and
definiteness that ordinary people, in this case Mr. Colvin, could understand that
with this traffic lane (the right-hand southbound lane of 5th Street) ending and his
having to merge left into another traffic lane (the left-hand southbound lane of 5th
Street) to continue on, an appropriate signal was required.
Further, I. C. § 49-808(2) is worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness
that ordinary people, and in this case Mr. Colvin, could understand that the
appropriate signal to signal an intention to move left from the right-hand
southbound land to the left-hand southbound lane was a left signal- similar to
(but opposite of) the signaling Mr. Colvin performed a few seconds prior when he
activated his right signal to signal his intention to move right from the left-hand
southbound lane to the right-hand southbound lap.e.

Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw, at 10-11.
However, this conclusion of law is not consistent with the Findings of Fact. The
magistrate found that the Defendant completed a signaled, lane change to the right hand lane, but
then traveled through the area where the lanes converged into a single lane.
Officer Talbott and Mr. Colvin were both initially in the left-hand southbound
lane with Mr. Colvin's vehicle directly in front of Officer Talbott's vehicle. As
Mr. Colvin traveled south in the left-hand southbound lane he activated his right
turn signal and moved from the left-hand southbound land into the right-hand
southbound lane and continued south. Officer Talbott remained in the left-hand
southbound lane. Thereafter, while· traveling in the right-hand southbound lane,
Mr. Colvin passed a yellow, diamond shaped traffic sign that contained a black
symbol. The sign was located along the right-hand shoulder of 5th Street and
appeared as follows:
[a picture of the sign is inserted in the opinion here]

7

In a footnote within the conclusions of law, the magistrate judge addressed this issue as follows: "When two
parallel lanes converge, one or the other will have to "move" towards the other; otherwise the two parallel lanes will
remain parallel and never converge. In this case the warning sign advised that the right-hand sopthbound lane was
ending as motorists in such lane had to move left to continue." Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw, at 9.
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After passing by the above-referenced sign Mr. Colvin continued south in
the right-handed southbound lane and the two southbound lanes converged to
become a single southbound lane. Mr. Colvin passed through the area where the
two southbound lanes converged and continued south in the single remaining
southbound lane. Mr~ Colvin did not use any signals while he traveled in the
right-hand southbound lane as he approached and traveled through the area where
the two southbound lanes converged into a single remaining southbound lane.
After Mr. Colvin passed through the area where the two southbound lanes
converged Officer Talbott activated his overhead lights and stopped Mr. Colvin
for failing to signal, in violation ofl.C. § 49-808.

Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw, at 3-4. The magistrate found that the Defendant
traveled through the area where the two southbound lanes converged into a single lane. The
magistrate did not find that the vehicle moved to the left in a manner which triggered the
requirement to signal.
The statute is void for vagueness as applied to the situation at hand. The requirement to
signal is triggered by the movement of the vehicle, thus, a reasonable person in the same situation
may not know whether a signal is required or not based upon the gradual convergence of the two
lanes. In Dewbre, the magistrate made specific factual fmdings that the vehicle moved right, and
then left, each movement triggering the requirement to signal. In Burton, a sign indicated a lane
was ending, but the statute was found void for vagueness as applied because it was "simply not
apparent from the language of Section 49-808(1) whether a signal is required when two lanes
blend into one. Persons of ordinary intelligence ca.n only guess at the statute's directive in this
circumstance." 149 Idaho at 750, 240 P.3d at 937.
In the case at hand, there is not a factual fmding regarding whether Colvin's vehicle made
a leftward movement in order to trigger the requirement to signal. Although the magistrate found
there was a sign which indicated to the driver that the lane was ending, this is not dispositive of
the issue of whether the vehicle in fact moved to the left in a manner triggering the need to
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signal. As the Burton Court explained, the statute does not specify how much or what type of
movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger the duty to signal.
This vagueness in application occurs because the statute does not specify how
much or what type of movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger the duty
to signal. Admittedly, a very literal interpretation of the statute might lead to a
conclusion that a signal is required when two lanes simply merge because a driver
in either lane must move the steering wheel at least slightly in order to steer into
the emerging lane. But the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly literal
application to every type of side-to-side movement, for a vehicle literally moves to
the left or the right when a driver weaves a bit within his or her lane or simply
negotiates a bend in the road, but no one would contend that a signal is required in
those instances.

Id. at 750, 240 P.2d at 937. 8
Based upon the foregoing analysis, I. C. § 49-808(1) is void for vagueness as it is applied
in this situation. In this case the driver activated his signal when he executed a lane change from
the left-hand southbound lane into the right-hand southbound lane, because his vehicle made a
distinct movement to the right. However, such a movement is not evident when the lanes
converged together, thus a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would not know whether
the statute required a signal or not in this situation. Therefore, the magistrate's ruling denying to

8

Further, the Burton Court distinguished the situation in Dewbre from the constitutional challenge before the Burton
Court. The case at hand is similarly distinguishable from Dewbre.
This Court addressed a related but distinct issue in State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d
388 (Ct.App.1999). The driver there contended that the signal requirement defined in Section 49808 did not apply where a two-lane portion of a highway ended and two traffic signs as well as
painted arrows on the highway advised motorists that the right lane was ending and traffic should
merge left. The Dewbre case generated a separate opinion from each of the three Court of Appeals
judges. The lead opinion stated that the signal requirement applied in that circumstance. A second
judge concurred in that result but did not join in the lead opinion's reasoning, and the third judge
dissented. The Dewbre opinion does not have precedential value bearing upon the present case for
· several reasons. First, the Court in Dewbre was not called upon to address the constitutional issue
presented here. Second, there was no opinion that commanded a majority, and third, Dewbre is
f~ctually distinguishable because in Dewbre, road signs and a_lTows on the roadway informed
motorists that the right-hand lane was ending and that traffic must inerge into the surviving, lefthand lane. In the present case, there is no evidence of such signage or other indicator that one lane
was ending and the other surviving.
Burton, 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P.3d at 936.
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the motion to suppress is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this analysis.

CONCLUSION
This Court considered whether the Magistrate erred when he determined that there was
legal cause under I. C.§ 49-808 for a law enforcement officer to initiate a traffic stop when
defendant failed to use his turn signal when the lane he was traveling in merged into another
lane. I. C. § 49-808(1) is void for vagueness as applied to the case at hand because the statute
does not specify how much or what type of movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger
the duty to signal where two lanes converge into a single lane. Based upon the foregoing analysis,
the determination of the magistrate court i~ reversed.
ORDER
The magistrate's determination in the foregoing matter is hereby REVERSED. The
matter is REMANDED to the magistrate court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this

It:

.

jJ_ day of December 2013.

C!Y:JL

\

CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge
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)
)
)
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)
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GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
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___________________________ ))
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83501 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
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1.

The above-named appellant, State of Idaho) appeals against the
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December, 2013, the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick presiding.
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2.

NO. 872

P. 3

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court

and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable
orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(1 0), I.A.R.
3.

Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district

court erred by reversing the magistrate and suppressing evidence based on a
perceived violation of due process.
4.

7

To undersigned S knowledge, no part of the record has been

sealed.

5.

Apperlant requests the preparation of the following portions of the

reporter's transcript Appellant requests that the transcript prepared for the
appeal to the district court be included in the record.

The Appellant does not

request the preparation of any additional transcript.
6.

AppeUant requests the normal clerkrs record pursuant to Rule 28,

7.

I certify:

I.A.R.

(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each

reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the
address set out below:
LINDA CARLTON
Court Reporter
PO Box 896
Lewiston, ID 83501
(b)

That arrangements have been made with the Nez Perce

County Prosecuting Attorney who wilf be responsible for paying for the reporter's

transcript;
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(c)

NO. 872

P. 4

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee

for the preparation of the record because the State of Idaho is the appellant

(Idaho Code§ 31-321·2);
(d)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in

a criminal case (I.A.R. 23(a)(8));
(e)

That service is being m·ade upon all parties required to be

served pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this

7th

day of January, 2014.

KENNETH K. J
Deputy Attorney G eral
Attorney for the ppellant
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true and correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
THE HONORABLE CARL B. KERRICK
Nez Perce County Courthouse
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
THE HONORABLE JEFF P. PAYNE (Magistrate Judge)
Nez Perce County Courthouse
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston Idaho 83501
7

DAN SPICKLER
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

E. CLAYNE TYLER
Clearwater County Prosecutor's Office
PO Box 2627
Orofino, Idaho 83544
SCOTT CHAPMAN
Chapman Law Offices
PO Box446
Lewiston, Id 83501
LINDA CARLTON
Court Reporter
Nez Perce Courthouse

P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
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MR. STEPHEN W. KENYON
CLERK OF THE COURTS
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 41762
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for Nez Perce
County, do hereby certify that the following list is a list of
the exhibits offered or admitted and which have been lodged with
the Supreme Court or retained as indicated.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
seal of the Court this

day of March 2014.
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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Date: 3/17/2014

Second Judicial District Court- Nez Perce County

Time: 01:45PM

Exhibit Summary

Page 1 of 1

User:
BDAVENPORT

Case: CR-2013-0000676
State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin
Sorted by Exhibit Number
Storage Location

Number

1

2

3

Description

Result

Property Item Number

Defendant's Exhibit A, CD with
footage of traffic stop, admitted
4/18/13

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Chapman, Scott M

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Chapman, Scott M

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Chapman, Scott M

Defendant's Exhibit 8, Probable
Cause Affidavit, admitted 4/18/13
Defendant's Exhibit C, CD with
footage taken by Colvin, admitted
4/18/13

Destroy
Notification
Date

Destroy or
Return Date
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 41762
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's Record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound by me and
contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and
papers designated to be included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate
Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-Appeal, and
additional documents that were requested.
I further certify:
1.

That all documents, x-rays, charts, and pictures offered

or admitted as exhibits in the above-entitled cause, if any,
will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
Additionally, a CD with photographs of exhibits and
recordings has been submitted in lieu of original
Defendant's Exhibits A, Band C.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said court this

day of March 2014.
PATTY 0. WEEKS

1

Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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